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To share information effectively with state legislative policymakers, administrators of nonprofit 
organizations need policy practice knowledge and skills. This study presents a theory of tailored 
information sharing to help social workers and others who administer nonprofit organizations 
enhance their policy practice knowledge, and identify ways to build legislative policy advocacy 
skills. Policymaking in state legislatures is increasingly important to nonprofit human service 
(HSNP) organizations. Legislative decisions can sigificantly impact their ability to provide 
client services. At the same time, HSNPs have information about clients, services, and emergent 
social problems they need to share so legislators can make better policy decisions. HSNP 
administrators who lack policy practice knowledge and skills for communicating this 
information effectively, may be able to learn from lobbyists who routinely share information to 
influence state legislator decisions. This study investigates expert lobbyist decisions to build a 
theory of lobbyist information sharing. Based on in-depth semi-structured interviews with 18 
expert lobbyists from a single Midwestern state, this qualitative study elucidates how lobbyists 
influence state legislators through tailored communications. Specifically, expert lobbyists use 
what they know about a legislative bill, an individual legislator, and legislative district politics to 
select or tailor information most important to the legislator. In this way, lobbyist information 
assists legislators in making policy decisions. Study findings include generation of the Tailored 
Information Sharing Decision Model, reflecting real-world expert decision making. This decision 
model can be used in instructional design of policy advocacy training for social work students, 
nonprofit organization personnel, and others. This study helps address a critical social work 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
How should social workers, and especially nonprofit administrators, share information 
with state legislators? Current literature offers very few clear ideas on how this should be done. 
And yet, it is vital social workers and nonprofit administrators develop this kind of policy 
practice knowledge. This qualitative study investigates how expert state lobbyists share 
information with state legislators. It focuses on the details of lobbyist decision making. It 
identifies the steps they take, and the knowledge they use, to figure out what they are going to 
provide a legislator for greatest impact. As such, this study builds a macro practice theory about 
legislative information sharing which helps address a critical social work policy practice research 
need (Byers, 2014; Weiss-Gal, 2016). 
States have had to assume increasing responsibility for making public welfare policy 
decisions for decades. This pattern of policy devoluti n (Breslow, 1996; Hoefer, 2000, 2005; 
Reisch, 2002, 2016; Sherraden, Slosar, & Sherraden, 2002) has placed additional decision 
making burdens upon state legislative bodies. Devolution is also an opportunity for social 
workers to become more involved in policy practice (D Rigne, 2011; Sherraden, Slosar, & 
Sherraden, 2002). Specifically, social workers can use devolution as an opportunity to share 
information with state policymakers (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005). Such information about local 
client problems and service needs can " keep policies and plans fluid and responsive to real 
needs" (Rothman, 2007, p. 35). 
Scholars have long argued that business interests and the wealthy dominate the policy 
process. Well-heeled interests are able to press thir policymaking advantage especially at the 
agenda-setting stage of the policy process (Kimball et al., 2012). Professional associations, like 
NASW, also share information with state policymakers (Hartnett, Harding, & Scanlon, 2005; 
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Scanlon, Hartnett, & Harding, 2006). At the same time, policymakers sometimes see such 
information as biased (K. Oliver, Innvar, Lorenc, Woodman, & Thomas, 2014).  
The expert knowledge of human service nonprofit (HSNP) organization personnel could 
help state policymakers make better policy decisions (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; Balassiano & 
Chandler, 2009; Breunig & Koski, 2006; de Montigny, 2011; DiNitto, 2009; M. N. I. Oliver, 
2002). HSNPs typically address the needs of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in society. 
HSNP administrators possess current, detailed, local- evel information and expertise concerning 
poverty, aging, health disparities, substance abuse, mental illness, child and family welfare, 
domestic violence, and other social problems. Moreover, nonprofits have a responsibility to 
"foster, formulate, perform, and evaluate society's policies that are in the furtherance of the 
public good" (Bryce, 2012, p. 9).  
Nonprofits have played a very limited role in state policymaking, despite having valuable 
information (Bass, Arons, Guinane, Carter, & Rees, 2007; Fyall & McGuire, 2014; Sandfort, 
2010). Nonprofit personnel advocate mostly for organiz tional benefits, such as continued 
funding. They advocate less for expanding social benefits for the most vulnerable clients 
(Mosley, 2012; Strolovitch, 2006). Some scholars argue that policy advocacy should be part of 
human service organizations’ everyday practice (e.g., Bass et al., 2007; Bryce, 2012; Mosley, 
2013).  
HSNPs can increase their policy influence through en anced professionalism. Enhanced 
professionalization already builds nonprofit expertis  in various domains (Hwang & Powell, 
2009). Managers adopt effective business tactics as part of professionalism (Alexander, 2000). 
Nonprofit professionalization also includes having more paid staff and more credentials (Hwang 
& Powell, 2009). Nonprofits should expand professional domains to include policy practice. 
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Such policy practice professionalization requires skills and knowledge that nonprofit 
leaders often lack (Bass et al., 2007; Berry, 2007; Kimberlin, 2010; Maton, 2017; Mellinger, 
2014; Minkoff, 1994; Pardasani & Goldkind, 2012; Pick, 2008; Schmid & Almog-Bar, 2014). As 
part of information sharing, needed skills include communication and relationship building 
(Maton, 2017; Thomlinson, 2016). Information sharing s especially effective when it is tailored 
to policymakers’ needs and priorities (Bogenschneider, Olson, Linney, & Mills, 2000; McBride 
et al., 2008).  
Academic programs, like public affairs, sometimes hlp students learn policy practice 
communication skills (Griffin & Thurber, 2015). Unfortunately, both formal education 
(Pardasani & Goldkind, 2012) and training opportunities do not emphasize policy practice skill 
and knowledge development for nonprofits (Bass et al., 2007; Mosley, 2008). As a result, HSNP 
administrators’ abilities to influence state policy through information can lack sophistication 
(Pardasani & Goldkind, 2012).  
Social work students can get guidance on how to share information from policy practice 
texts and other resources (e.g., Homan, 2016; Jansson, 2014; Watson & Hoefer, 2013). In those 
texts, however, information sharing is often placed within a larger context of legislative 
advocacy. Such texts cover various topics, including argument construction associated with 
persuasion strategies (Goffman, 1974; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). Guidance in those resources is 
limited, however, on how information should be shared to influence policymakers’ decisions. 
Literature is needed that sheds light on the “nuts and bolts” details of how information is 
actually shared. Various scholars have investigated legislators’ perspectives on information 
sharing (e.g., Brownson, Royer, Ewing, & McBride, 2006; Dodson, Geary, & Brownson, 2015; 
Levine, 2009), but legislators might be reluctant to admit the limited role information might play 
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in their decisions. One might also look to the policy analysis literature, but scholars in this field 
continue to wrestle with how and whether policymakers actually use policy analysis to make 
policy decisions (Mead, 2013; Tarschys, 1983; Weiss, 1988, 1989, 1991; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 
1980). Research on knowledge transfer, or communicati g research to non-research audiences, 
helps academic researchers understand the importance of factors like timing and relationships to 
sharing research findings (Lavis et al., 2003; Scheufel , 2013). However, knowledge transfer 
findings might not be applicable for nonprofits seeking to share non-research information with 
policymakers.  
Alternately, one could examine the perspectives of th se whose livelihood depends on 
communicating information successfully to legislators, namely, lobbyists. Lobbying offers an 
important source of policy practice knowledge for nnprofits. Information sharing is a key policy 
advocacy strategy of lobbying (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009; G. M. 
Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Powell, 2012). Lobbying is also one of a number of social work 
macro practice skills (Reisch, 2016). It is a social work learning outcome for students engaged in 
state-level advocacy campaigns (Sherraden, Slosar, & Sherraden, 2002). As such, nonprofits 
could benefit by learning about lobbyists’ information sharing practices. 
Lobbying literature describes the particular kinds of information lobbyists share with 
legislators. The lobbying literature also features relatively well developed theories about the 
relationship of information and policymaker decisions (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; B. L. Leech & 
Baumgartner, 1998). This scholarship also examines lobbyist flexibility in their use of different 
information sharing strategies (Leech & Baumgartner, 1998).  
Still, the lobbying literature in political science has significant gaps, limiting its use for 
direct policy practice application. Most of these limits are related to missing details. For instance, 
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information on how a lobbyist decides to use a persuasion strategy to influence a policymaker 
rather than another strategy is vague. Nor is it understood how lobbyists might share different 
information with different policymakers, and why. Details of how lobbyists present the 
information they share, the timing of their communicat ons, and the ways they might alter what 
they share is not clear in the lobbying literature. 
Nonprofit administrators and macro social work students need clear, empirically-based 
knowledge addressing such policy practice questions. Such detailed knowledge can be generated 
by investigating expert state lobbyists as policy practitioners. Systematic qualitative exploration 
of how lobbyists decide what information to share with particular legislators can help fill current 
gaps in social work policy practice knowledge. Also, investigating decisions which lobbyists 
make as part of their information sharing strategies builds and extends theoretical understanding 
of informational lobbying.  
This exploratory study addresses these various gaps in policy practice knowledge. The 
study generates knowledge about expert state lobbyists’ decision making and information 
sharing practices. Based on in-depth interviews with 18 expert state lobbyists, a decision model 
was generated. The Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model is a systematic analysis of 
how expert lobbyists make decisions to share information with state legislators. In the decision 
model, key steps are identified. Requisite knowledge and choice options associated with different 
steps are identified as well. Data analysis clarifies how expert lobbyists choose between 
persuasion, subsidization, and other strategies to influence a particular state legislator. The 
decision model also describes how expert lobbyists select or tailor information to move a 
particular state legislator in a desired legislative direction. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 critically examines the literature on 
information sharing and policymaking. First, the review focuses on theory and empirical 
literature related to lobbying and information. Informational lobbying literature is examined, 
focusing especially on persuasion and subsidy strategies lobbyists use. Public health literature 
also offers important insights about tailoring research findings for state policymakers. This 
literature is also critically reviewed. Knowledge from lobbying and public health tailoring 
literatures are then compared. This comparison highlights the absence of knowledge about 
lobbyist tailoring, and the need to empirically investigate such.   
Study methods are presented in Chapter 3. The chapter presents a justification for using 
qualitative methods, including Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (Militello & Hutton,1998), to 
explore state lobbyist information sharing. Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) methods 
were used to collect and analyze data reflecting expert decision making in real-world contexts.  
ACTA studies are especially useful for generating kowledge to support training and 
instructional design. Applying ACTA to expert lobbyist information sharing decisions is an 
innovative application of this method. The chapter also describes sampling, data collection and 
analysis procedures, as well as the study sample.  
Chapters 4 and 5 present study results. In short, lobbyists share information with 
legislators as part of a larger legislative strategy. They also use particular kinds of knowledge in 
various points during the legislative strategy. Chapter 4 reviews results concerning lobbyist 
knowledge needs and legislative strategy. Included is how lobbyists work with legislative and 
committee staff as part of their communications strategy. The chapter also reviews findings 
concerning how lobbyists generate the knowledge they ne d for informational lobbying.  
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Chapter 5 continues to explore study results, deepening understanding of lobbyist 
information sharing. Specifically, this chapter describes how lobbyists tailor what they share 
with particular legislators. The 5-step Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model, is 
presented.  The decision model helps explain how lobbyists make their information selection 
decisions, resulting in tailored information sharing.  
Chapter 6 discusses study findings. It begins by presenting study limitations, and then 
reviews and discusses key study results. Discussion includes exploring how the Tailored 
Information Sharing Decision Model builds macro policy practice knowledge. The decision 
model can be beneficial for various professionals, including social workers, public health 
advocates, nonprofit administrators, and others. Study findings are also synthesized to reflect an 
integrated middle-range theory of legislative information sharing. The decision model, the theory 
of legislative information sharing, and other study findings have various implications. In 
particular, they serve to extend informational lobbying theory. Findings can also be used as a 
centerpiece for social work macro education and nonprofit policy advocacy training design. 
These and other implications are then discussed, followed by a brief conclusion. Nonprofit 
personnel must master professional policy practices if they are to be competitive in state capitals. 
Expert lobbyists in the study are professionals, and study findings reflect real-world, professional 
policy advocacy practices. Study findings illustrating how experts share information to influence 
policymaker decisions make substantial contributions to both social work policy practice 
curricula and nonprofit policy advocacy training design. Such a contribution can help move 
nonprofits, social work professionals, and others in the direction of greater policy practice 
competence.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter examines the literature for clues about information sharing related to 
legislative policy decision making. This requires looking at theory and empirical studies from 
various topics. These topics include lobbying, informational lobbying theory, and, to a limited 
extent, public health literature. The chapter briefly reviews policymaker information needs and 
sources. The review then explores the lobbying literature. This section includes looking at 
theories and nascent empirical investigations about lobbying as persuasion, and lobbying as 
legislative subsidy. The literature review thus serves to create a foundation for understanding 
information sharing and policy change.  
Information Needs and Sources 
The relationship between policymaking and information is complex. Legislators must 
make decisions across a wide range of policy domains. However, they cannot be expert across all 
those domains. Empirical studies clearly illustrate policymaker information needs (e.g., Kerwin, 
2003; McBride et al., 2008). Obtaining technical and political information to make policy 
decisions can be costly (Hall, 1987; Hall & Evans, 1990). Policymakers utilize both formal and 
informal sources of information, and use information differently at different points in the policy 
cycle (Tarschys, 1983). Information can be used to reduce decision maker uncertainty (Wright, 
2003). Moreover, better decisions are made when multiple experts provide differently biased (but 
not extremist) information (Krishna & Morgan, 2001), though having more information does not 
always produce better decisions (e.g., Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2014; Schnakenberg, 
2015).  
State legislators’ information needs can be even grate  than Congress members’ 
(Newmark & Nownes, 2016). States differ in terms of taff support and time to legislate policy 
(Squire, 2007). So, states with less staff and shorter legislative calendars likely have greater 
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information needs. Legislators in part-time legislatures can find themselves unable to develop 
expertise in many areas. Consequently, they often depend on others, including colleagues, for 
guidance (Jewell & Bero, 2008).  
Legislator information sources. Legislators need credible information (Dodson et al., 
2015; Jackson-Elmoore, 2005) and advice from others to support decision making (Levine, 2009; 
Mintrom, 2000). They rely on various sources for such. Legislators access government agency 
websites, web-based resources, and nonprofit health agencies for information (Dodson et al., 
2015). Liberal state legislators preferred information from ethnic organizations, while legislators 
representing wealthier districts and conservatives pr fer state-wide trade and business association 
information (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005). Though policymakers see some information sources as 
more credible than others, they can value expertise even when it comes from an opposing 
political perspective (Bertrand et al., 2014).  
Lobbying and Information Sharing 
Professional lobbyists make their living sharing information, and lobbying theory and 
empirical literature shed light on the relationship between information sharing and policy 
outputs. Information sharing and developing relationships both play key roles in lobbying 
(Bertrand et al., 2014). This section begins with a description of lobbying and lobbyist types. It 
then reviews the role of information in lobbying and looks at the extent to which lobbying theory 
and empirical literature about lobbyist information aligns. Gaps between the two are also 
identified. The review then examines additional empirical literature outside of lobbying. In 
particular, public health literature offers important, though preliminary, insights into information 
sharing with state legislators. 
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Lobbyists influence policymaker decisions by sharing information (Baumgartner, Berry, 
et al., 2009; de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014; G. M. Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Krishna & 
Morgan, 2001; Potters & Van Winden, 1992; Powell, 201 ). Lobbyists and the media were the 
two most highly rated information sources cited by legislators from 12 states—regardless of 
legislator race, gender, class, or racial characteristics of their legislative districts (Jackson-
Elmoore, 2005). Other studies also confirm that state legislators value lobbyist information (e.g., 
Dodson et al., 2015). According to Kersh (2007), lobbyist “ideas, arguments, and factual details 
turn up in policymakers' speeches, legislation, and administrative rules" (p. 408).  
Various scholars have reviewed theoretical and empirical developments concerning 
lobbying (e.g., Contandriopoulos, Lemire, Denis, & Tremblay, 2010; Hojnacki, Kimball, 
Baumgartner, Berry, & Leech, 2012). Baumgartner and Leech (1996, p. 535)  describes 
lobbying: 
Lobbying is a social activity where groups pay careful attention to the behaviors of other 
groups (both rival and allied), where they have long-standing relations with their targets, 
where both indirect and direct strategies of influence are coordinated, and where the 
strategies chosen in one particular case may or may not be similar to those that will be 
chosen in the next. 
According to Thomas, Hrebenar, and Nownes (2008, p. 326), there are five categories of 
lobbyists: contract (hired); in-house; citizen, cause, or volunteer; private, individual; and also a 
group of lobbyist known as government legislative liaisons. Interest groups and coalitions may 
hire contract lobbyists to achieve strategic objectiv s. In-house lobbyists has been further 
differentiated as in-house organization, and in-house corporate lobbyist (Thomlinson, 2016). In-
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house organization lobbyists work for nonprofits, while in-house corporate lobbyists are 
employed by for-profit companies (Thomlinson, 2016). 
Lobbyists and interest groups help move legislation through the policy process (M. 
Grossman & Pyle, 2013). Alternately, they also work t  defeat legislative initiatives 
(Baumgartner, Berry, et al., 2009; Grossmann, 2012; Wright, 2003). Policymakers often see 
lobbyists as “necessary partners” in the policy process (M. Grossman & Pyle, 2013, p. 9). 
Lobbyists increase access through sharing their expertise, whether politically ideological or 
neutral (Esterling, 2004), and they prefer face-to-face communication, seeing it as most effective 
(Milbrath, 1960; Terry, 2001).  
Lobbyist information.  Generally, lobbyists offer political information ad topical 
expertise during the policymaking process (Thomas et al., 2008). Expertise can influence a 
decision maker on whether or not to support a proposed policy (Schnakenberg, 2015). Non-
routine information can be particularly influential when it is related to a legislator’s electoral 
aspirations (Burstein & Linton, 2002). 
Baumgartner, Berry, et al. (2009) conducted a large study of federal lobbyist influence. 
They found lobbyists most frequently shared information concerning bill implementation and 
feasibility. This was followed by costs to non-governmental actors. How bills affect a shared 
goal or value was also frequently communicated. Lobbyists also emphasized their expertise. 
Alternately, lobbyists seldom prognosticated about dire consequences. They also focused on 
their own arguments, and shared opposition arguments l ss (Baumgartner, Berry, et al., 2009).  
Federal lobbyists shared different information when d fending the policy status quo, 
compared to changing it (Baumgartner, Berry, et al., 2009). Lobbyists emphasized cost savings 
when seeking change. When the change was small, lobbyists emphasized the prudence and 
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incremental nature of the proposed change. Information used to oppose bills was somewhat 
different. Status quo defenders were more likely to distribute research, testify during hearings, 
submit written comments, and use advertisements. 
Nownes and Newmark (2016) likewise found similar information shared by state 
lobbyists. There were no differences between contract and in-house lobbyists in information 
types shared. Arguments focusing on partisan or political party concerns were rarely used, and 
mostly when opposition came from other interest groups. Constituency opinion and secondary 
impact information was greater in response to executive agency opposition (Nownes and 
Newmark, 2016). Ideological information was seldom used, and was communicated when 
opposition was higher, if used at all. Variation in when and why lobbyists emphasized certain 
information types was unclear. Nownes and Newmark (2016) speculated this variation might 
have been due to "policy proposal-specific factors such as salience, costs to government...and 
impact on established programs" (p. 73).  
Studies describing lobbyist information begin to clarify what is shared from what is not. 
Descriptive studies like those just discussed also begin to link the kinds of information shared to 
different conditions. Those conditions include the lobbyist goal, which could be to either 
maintain the policy status quo, or change it. Though associational, linkages suggest how certain 
conditions might also predict certain types of information shared over others.  
The studies reviewed thus far were not designed to develop or test theoretical 
propositions concerning lobbyist information sharing, per se. Nonetheless, certain theories have 
been developed, to varying degrees, linking conditions, information types, and lobbyist 
information sharing. These are examined next, along with related empirical investigations. 
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Lobbying theories and information sharing. Theories have been developed to describe 
and explain the role of information in lobbying. In fact, most treatments of lobbying and 
information sharing are theoretical, including game-th oretical treatments (e.g., Austen-Smith, 
1993; V. P. Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Felgenhauer, 2013; G. M. Grossman & Helpman, 2001; 
Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Potters & Van Winden, 1992; Schnakenberg, 2015). In those, scholars 
present formal models of decision making, taking into consideration various dimensions, 
including information asymmetry, information costs (Potters & Van Winden, 1992), payoffs to 
players, and penalties for misinforming policymakers (Austin-Smith, 1993; Potters & Van 
Winden, 1992).Such treatments also theorize how lobbyist information sharing decisions might 
change where information sharing occurs repeatedly, rather than only on a single “play” of the 
game. 
There are also three non-game theoretical lobbying theories (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; 
Nownes & Newmark, 2016; Schnakenberg, 2017). The first is exchange theory, which focuses 
on campaign contributions. The other two are persuasion and legislative subsidy, which focus  on 
information. Persuasion and subsidy theories are sometimes represented as  informational 
lobbying theories (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2006).  
Exchange theory.  The exchange theory of lobbying plays down the rolof information. 
Instead, it focuses on the role of campaign contribu ions. It is mostly associated with the idea of 
“pay-to-play.” The exchange theory is a poor predictor of lobbyist support, however, with 
lobbying expenditures often far exceeding campaign contributions (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). 
According to Snyder (1992), campaign contributions are not a short-term quid pro quo. Rather, 
they represent a long term investment in a legislator. Contributions do not buy votes, but 
facilitate lobbyist access to the legislator. The value of gaining access should not be minimized. 
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It is a critical first step to lobbyist influence (Wright, 1996); however, exchange theory does not 
directly address the role played by information sharing.  
Lobbying as persuasion. There are multiple views of how information is used by 
lobbyists to persuade policymakers. To begin, some contend that lobbying is “persuasive 
communication” (McGrath, 2007, p. 269). In persuasion, words are carefully chosen (Luntz, 
2007) because its is to present a “vision about the particular public policy-related social reality 
[the lobbyist wants] to convey” (Terry, 2001, p. 268).   
Persuasion strategies are used mostly with legislator  who are undecided about a bill to 
influence their behavior (Victor, 2007). Persuasion involves using information to alter the 
legislator’s beliefs and actions in the direction of the lobbyist’s legislative goal (Hall & 
Deardorff, 2006; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). Information is provided “strategically” to affect 
“legislator’s beliefs about legislative outcomes,” including the effects of policies (Wright, 1996, 
p. 75). Persuasion can stem from communicating alterna  interpretations of potential 
consequences (Smith, 1984). These consequences include “who is affected, in what ways, and to 
what extent” (R. A. Smith, 1984, p. 46).  Such information supports or alters the legislator’s 
belief about whether the policy will work, or “wheth r their constituents support or oppose” the 
legislation (Wright, 1996, p. 81).  
State legislator voting behaviors are affected when t y learn about constituent opinions 
(Butler & Nickerson, 2011). This knowledge about constituent views and likely policy outcomes 
is a lobbyist’s greatest asset (Wright, 1996). Such information is used to make legislators aware 
of how their vote will affect their reelection (Nownes & Newmark, 2016).  
Lobbyists use persuasion strategies with supportive legislators as well (Wright, 1996). In 
that instance, information about policy outcomes and constituent views is shared to support and 
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reinforce the legislator’s beliefs. In other cases, the lobbyist may seek to persuade a supportive 
legislator to alter the content of legislation under consideration (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). 
Persuasion at times involves using argumentation to alter a legislator’s problem 
definition. That is, different issue dimensions areemphasized in an argument (McGrath, 2007; 
McKissick, 1997). Altering the way legislators define the problem influences their beliefs on 
how the problem should be addressed. This suggests that persuasion might employ information 
to focus legislator attention.  
Case study evidence illustrates the use of persuasion to influence legislators. Wright 
(1996) examined blocking Robert Bork’s nomination t the U.S. Supreme Court. Terry (2001) 
used case studies to understand lobbyists’ use of prsuasion to promote a common vision of 
managed care issues among Texas legislators. Smith (1984) illustrated how a bill was defeated in 
the U.S. Senate by arguing it violated the law.  
Lobbying as persuasion highlights how sharing different types of information can be used 
to affect a legislator’s beliefs and legislative decisions. Persuasion can be used with both 
supportive and undecided legislators. It involves sharing particular kinds of information 
including constituent views, possible consequences, and policy outcomes. Figure 2.1 presents a 




Figure 2.1 Theory of Lobbying as Persuasion. Lobbyist use information to change a legislator’s 
beliefs and, hence, actions concerning a bill or issue. Persuasion may be employed with 
undecided legislators to urge them to support or oppose a bill. Information can also be provided 
to persuade a supportive legislator to initiate desired bill changes. Based on Hojnacki and 
Kimball (1998) and Wright (1996). 
Some of the assertions made by persuasion theorists feel overly general. Smith (1984) 
and Wright (1996) both argue that no new information is communicated during persuasion. 
Instead, attention is being drawn to particular consequences of a bill, or to constituent views 
about the bill. From this perspective, persuasion is more a matter of attention, and less a matter 
of providing information for understanding. Certainly, a legislator might already have known, 
but forgotten about a particular bill consequence. An argument might then remind the legislator 
about that consequence. Conceivably, a bill consequence could be old news for one legislator, 
and completely new for another. For the former, the information is a reminder. For the latter 
legislator, the ‘new” information increases understanding. Concerning constituent views, 
legislators certainly know they have constituents ad that their constituents might have particular 
views on an issue. It makes more sense that persuasion draws the legislator’s attention to the 
connection between a bill and the legislator’s constituents’ interests.  It might even be the case 
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that lobbyist information about constituent views con erning a piece of legislation is, in fact, 
something the legislator did not know before.  
According to Schnakenberg (2015), lobbyists share exp rt information as part of 
manipulative persuasion. This suggests lobbyists choose what information they share. It is 
unclear if lobbyists use the same argument for every undecided legislator, or offer different 
arguments, and different information. This level of specificity is critically important to the 
persuasion process, but appears unexamined in current literature.  
Both how and when information is shared in persuasion is unclear. One must assume 
lobbyists seek to persuade when legislators are voting. This can be at the committee stage, or 
afterwards, related to the floor vote. To that end, it should be particularly evident in relation to 
committee members. Once a bill passes out of committee, persuasion should be seen in relation 
to consideration by the full chamber. It appears diectly linked to an overall lobbyist goal of 
either passing or killing a bill.  
Lobbying as legislative subsidy. Significant effort was needed to explicate a coherent 
theory of lobbying as persuasion. In contrast, Hall and Deardorff (2006) readily articulate their 
theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy. Figure 2.2 reflects key concepts of that theory. 
 
Figure 2.2 Theory of Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy. In this theory, the lobbyist works with a 
legislator who shares the same legislative goal. The lobbyist subsidizes or offsets the legislator’s 
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(Figure 2.2, continued) work by providing resources to advance the legislator’s interests on the 
mutually beneficial piece of legislation. These resources include costly policy information, labor, 
and political intelligence (Hall & Deardorff, 2006).  
In the theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy, lobbyist information is shared to allow an 
allied legislator to work on other legislative priorities. Allied legislators referenced in the theory 
likely are the “champion” legislators described by DeGregorio (1997). Mahoney and 
Baumgartner (2015) examined the factors which influenced legislators to champion a particular 
bill. This includes that legislators want to be part of successful legislative efforts. According to 
Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015), championing can be driv n by legislator perceptions of 
aggregate-level issue factors including issue salience, the groups involved in the debate, and 
lobbyist characteristics (e.g. resources).  
In this theory, sharing information goes beyond “info drops” (Hall & Deardorff, 2006, p. 
75). Nor is the goal to persuade. The lobbyist communicates information with a legislator who 
shares the same legislative goal (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). The theory predicts that lobbyists will 
share information with allied legislators, and not with those who are undecided or opposed to the 
lobbyist’s position on a bill. To that end, the lobbyist offers three general resources to allied 
legislators: costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; 
Nownes & Newmark, 2016).   
Costly information consists of policy analytic information (Nownes & Newmark, 2016). 
This includes constituent perspectives on the bill, feasibility, costs to government and non-
government entities (Baumgartner, Berry, et al., 2009), bill consequences (Austen-Smith, 1993; 
Nownes & Newmark, 2016), technical information, and i - epth analysis (Hall & Wayman, 
1990).  
Analytic information is presented in a “politically user-friendly form” (Hall & Deardorff, 
2006, p. 74). Hanushek (1990) offers prescriptions  formatting policy analysis information for 
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policymakers. Information must be timely; it must “relate directly to parameters of immediate 
choice;” decision makers also want findings to be understandable and “rhetorically useful;” and 
information should reflect a single answer as well (Hanushek, 1990, p. 148). Brevity of 
information is also imperative, given policymaker time constraints (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005; 
Thomlinson, 2016). 
The political intelligence lobbyists provide can include strategic and procedural advice, 
such as anticipating reactions of other policy players (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). It also includes 
tracking the progress of bills and generating head counts (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Nownes & 
Newmark, 2016). The third resource, “labor,” includes drafting legislation, speech writing, and 
generating talking points that legislators can use to address a particular piece of legislation (Hall 
& Deardorff, 2006).  
Empirical investigation of legislative subsidy theory is limited (Hojnacki et al., 2012). 
What exists, however, provides evidence to support pr positions about the types of information 
lobbyists share during subsidization (e.g., Nownes and Newmark, 2016).  
Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) theory does not specify e ther how or when information is 
shared with an allied legislator. It is reasonable to assume, however, that lobbyists subsidize a 
bill champion with information early in the bill’s life. Political intelligence, such as head counts, 
could be provided at any time during the bill’s life. It is most likely provided as the bill is 
examined in committee, discussed on the floor, or both. This suggests that information sharing as 
subsidy likely changes over the legislative life of a bill, but the theory does not expressly address 
this.  
Overall, there appear to be two key differences betwe n persuasion and legislative 
subsidy. First, lobbyists employ one or the other strategy based on legislator issue or bill 
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position. In persuasion, the legislator may be either undecided or in support. In contrast, subsidy 
is used only with allied legislators. It is assumed these allied legislators are primarily bill 
champions, but this might not be entirely accurate. Second, each strategy suggests sharing 
different kinds of information. For undecided legislators, persuasion involves sharing 
information about bill consequences. This might or might not be new information to the 
legislator. In subsidy, a range of information is shared with the allied legislator, including policy 
analytic and political intelligence. Third, both strategies can involve sharing similar types of 
information, such as constituent views. 
Both theories make clearer the linkages between conditi s and information shared. 
Decisions about what information to share in subsidy is conditional on legislator issue position. 
It is also conditioned on the proximate political objective, according to Hall & Deardorff (2006).  
This appears to be applicable to persuasion as well. The connection between legislator issue 
position, lobbyist objective (to persuade or subsidize), and the types of information thus shared 
suggests something else about information sharing. That is, lobbyists are likely being selective 
about the types of information they share, and withhich legislators. 
There is evidence that lobbyists are selective in other ways. Specifically, lobbyists appear 
to choose the legislators whom they will approach on legislative issues. Such decisions appear to 
be based mainly on the legislator’s issue position (Gullberg, 2008; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; 
Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999; Rosenthal, 2001). Evidenc suggests that federal-level lobbyists 
primarily contact legislators in committee who support the lobbyist’s issue position (Hojnacki & 
Kimball, 1998; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999). At the same time, undecided legislators in 
committee can be directly contacted to increase support (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999). 
DeGregorio (1997) analyzed the characteristics of federal policy leaders across several issue 
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areas. She found substantive as well as political expertise (i.e., political know-how) were 
essential leadership qualities. Thus, those characteristics would be key criteria to lobbyists in 
deciding whom to approach when seeking a bill champion.  
Unfortunately, neither theoretical nor empirical literature offers much more direct support 
for how lobbyists might be selective about the information they share. There is ample evidence 
they are selective in other ways, including whom to lobby (M. Grossman & Pyle, 2013; Hojnacki 
& Kimball, 1999), but the trail runs cold here. Thus, we leave the lobbying literature, and briefly 
explore that of public health, to better understand selective information sharing.  
Selective Information Sharing: Targeting and Tailoring Information 
There is more direct empirical support for sharing information selectively when looking 
outside the lobbying literature. For instance, information needs to be seen as relevant if a 
decision maker is to use it, including business and market data (Skorka, 2017). The same is true 
for policy research and analysis (Hanushek, 1990).  Being selective about what information 
should be shared reflects the process of tailoring.  
Message targeting and tailoring are two approaches to making messages more relevant to 
recipients (Kreuter & Wray, 2003). Targeting involves communicating information focused on a 
particular group’s needs (Halder et al., 2006). Tailoring involves assessing what is particularly 
important to a specific person. Highly selective, specialized information, based on the 
assessment, is then communicated (Halder et al., 2006). Certainly, information may be 
communicated in a way that blends both approaches. 
Tailoring is important when communicating with policymakers. It has been used to 
promote health policies among state lawmakers (e.g., Brownson et al., 2011; Brownson et al., 
2006; Stamatakis, McBride, & Brownson, 2010; Tabak, Eyler, Dodson, & Brownson, 2015).  
22 
 
Colby, Quinn, Williams, Bilheimer, and Goodell (2008) found that it is important for 
health researchers to differentiate the information needs of different policy actors, such as 
committee staff compared to agency analysts. Dodson et al. (2015) found that sharing data helps 
state health committee chairs and bill sponsors understand a health issue, while providing stories 
can help sponsors persuade others. Some legislators place more value on state- versus local-level 
data concerning health problem costs (Brownson et al., 2006; Dodson et al., 2015). Constituent 
information is also more valuable when it is selected for specific state legislators (Jackson-
Elmoore, 2005). 
Some policymakers find stories presented from the point of view of a person affected by 
a problem to be useful (Brownson et al., 2011; K. Oliver et al., 2014; Sharf, 2001). Brownson et 
al. (2011) found that legislators who preferred stories rather an data also preferred local- rather 
than state-level data. Those researchers also found that Democratic legislators who preferred data 
over stories were more likely to rate the information as more useful than Republican legislators. 
Tailoring can also be used with legislators to communicate the impact of legislation on families 
(Bogenschneider et al., 2000).  
These public health tailoring findings are very important. They suggest that information 
needs are different for state legislative staff, committee members, bill sponsors, and others. 
Tailoring is used, then, to select and share information most responsive to those different 
policymaker needs. The content of information (e.g., stories versus state-level data) is then 
matched to the particular policy actor.  
These studies are focused on public health issues, thu  their generalizability may be 
limited. One cannot say how readily findings can be applied to other policy areas. Further, they 
focus on communicating research findings. As such, insights might not be applicable to sending 
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other types of information. Furthermore, the literau e does not indicate that tailoring is being 
used to promote legislative decisions. Rather, it appe rs most of the literature investigates 
tailoring more abstractly, unrelated to actual bills being considered by state policymakers. 
Integrating Informational Lobbying and Public Healt h Tailoring Literatures 
In the informational lobbying literature reviewed, there is some degree of consensus 
concerning the types of information shared with federal and state policymakers. Lobbyists also 
share different information depending on a legislator’s issue position. It appears constituent 
information is shared with all legislators, regardless of issue position and whether the objective is 
to persuade or subsidize. Still, different information is shared when the aim is to subsidize a bill 
champion versus to persuade an undecided legislator. This literature is also focused on 
information sharing in service of passing or preventing legislative change. The role of tailoring 
in lobbyist information sharing, however, is unclear.  
Important insights are provided by public health tailoring research, but that literature 
lacks theoretical coherence. Public health tailoring esearch is also unconnected to how 
information might actually be applied to alter the fate of a piece of legislation. Lobbying 
literature offers a degree of theoretical coherence about information sharing directly linked to 
legislator decisions on legislation. That lobbying literature, however, lacks explicit attention to 
the role of tailoring by lobbyists.  
Lobbyist information sharing knowledge could be advnced by investigating how 
lobbyists select or tailor the information shared with state legislators. Such an inquiry could 
extend informational lobbying theory. Findings from such an inquiry might have implications for 
public health tailoring knowledge as well. 
Researching Lobbyist Information Sharing  
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To address key limitations in the informational lobbying literature, inquiry into lobbyist 
decision making is necessary. Specifically, expert lobbyists have real-world experience deciding 
whom to persuade, and what information will be most effective. They are also in a position to 
offer details clarifying (or confirming) how information differs when the goal is to subsidize 
rather than persuade, and based on legislator issue position. Such details can also elucidate how 
information is used to support an already supportive legislator.  
Moreover, the tailoring literature suggests that various factors (in addition to legislator 
issue position, and choice of persuasion or subsidy strategy) might affect lobbyist information 
sharing decisions. These factors include legislator role (committee chair, bill sponsor, committee 
member, or at-large legislator). Further, other unide tified factors could also be guiding lobbyist 
decisions about the information they select. 
Professional lobbyists are in the best position to answer questions concerning how and 
when they communicate their information in tailored ways. In particular, lobbyists can report 
how factors like committee role, or other legislator needs and characteristics, affect the 
information they decide to share. Expert lobbyists can report how the information they share 
might change over the policy cycle as well.  
A qualitative approach is well-suited to guide inquiry into professional lobbyist decision 
making. The following chapter specifies the qualitative methods used to explore professional 
lobbyist information sharing with state policymakers.   
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Lobbyist information sharing with state legislators is a social process. Qualitative 
methods are especially effective for generating data reflecting “naturally occurring information” 
of social processes taking place within a particular context (N. L. Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007, 
p. 560).  
The objectives of this qualitative study were to explore and describe lobbyist information 
sharing decisions. The purpose was to generate a practical decision model of expert state lobbyist 
information sharing. Semi-structured interviews were used to generate data. By using data from 
actual experiences of lobbyists, a descriptive rather an prescriptive decision model was sought 
(Lipshitz, 1993). Focusing on the recent actual behaviors of lobbyists during specific instances of 
sharing information increased the validity of study findings (Beckmann & Hall, 2013). 
Moreover, analytical generalizability was enhanced by comparing experiences across cases or 
instances of information sharing (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). The case study research design 
thus appeared most appropriate. Method choices were driv n by the research question, study 
purpose, and availability of data. 
Decision Model Selection 
From the study onset, certain initial assumptions about decision making were made. As a 
study of expert decision making, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) theory (Klein, 2008) was 
chosen to guide the study’s research design. NDM differs substantively from more classical 
decision theories. Classical decision making theories propose that decisions are made 
analytically. Such a conceptualization includes using structured processes, where the decision 
maker ideally identifies and accesses all available options, analyzes the utility of each option, 
and then chooses the one which maximizes utility (McLennan & Omodei, 1996; Schraagen, 
Klein, & Hoffman, 2008). Classical decision making models have been losing ground among 
26 
 
decision researchers and theorists (e.g., Beach & Lipshitz, 1993; Lipshitz, 1993). This is due in 
part because those models are poor reflections of expert practices.  
Naturalistic Decision Making, on the other hand,  focuses on real-world contexts, 
including the use of heuristics which facilitate rapid decision making (G. Klein, 2008). NDM 
also allows for the possibility that decision making s not necessarily orderly, but can at times be 
very messy (Schraagen et al., 2008). This messiness can occur for various reasons, including 
“limited time,” the presence of other actors, incomplete information, and “unstable conditions” 
(Klein, 2008, p. 456). The goal of empirical investiga ions in real-world contexts, then, is to use 
data from experts to identify the strategies they use to make decisions (Klein, 2008). Analysis of 
study data is used to develop descriptive models reflecting decision processes responding to both 
typical and atypical experiences (Naikar, 2010). Such modeling can include identifying the types 
of heuristics or short-cuts that experts use (G. A. Klein, 1993; Lintern, 2010).  
Decision theorists have also generated diverse decision models, reflecting that decisions 
can be made in a variety of ways (G. A. Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). For 
example, some emphasize mental images or schema decision makers use, while others draw 
attention to decision makers’ values and principles (Lipshitz, 1993).  
The Rasmussen model of cognitive control (Lipshitz, 1993) was selected for this study. 
This decision model has been represented by a decision ladder (Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & 
Goodstein, 1994). The choice of the Rasmussen decision model was based on a number of 
factors. The informational lobbying literature makes clear that lobbyists choose from various 
options (e.g., information types) when deciding on a particular strategy (e.g., persuasion versus 
legislative subsidy). Consequently, the referent decision model must accommodate options or 
choice sets available during decision making. The model also needed to be capable of reflecting 
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the reiterative, dynamic nature of decisions, including the role of heuristics experts use. Lastly, 
the decision model needed to be adaptable to the cont xt of state legislative lobbying, which has 
no apparent precedent in the empirical literature on lobbying or decision making.  
Rasmussen Decision Ladder. The Rasmussen decision ladder is one visual 
representation of cognitive decision making. It features pairs of information processing steps and 
states of knowledge. These pairs are then linked to each other, reflecting a sequence of decisions 
and choices that ultimately result in the execution of a complex cognitive task. According to 
Rasmussen et al. (1994) and others (e.g., Jenkins, Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & Rafferty, 2010), 
decision making begins with “attention,” representing monitoring and information gathering, 
analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. These are conducted in relation to a decision maker’s 
goals. The decision ladder also identifies desired “target states,” choices of actions to be taken, 
planning, and ending with execution. The Rasmussen representation also acknowledges the role 
that short cuts play in expert decision making. These can be represented visually by arrows 
leading from earlier steps to later ones, bypassing ome or most intervening steps.  
Though arrows in the decision ladder might imply decisions are step-wise, this was not 
Rasmussen’s intention. Rather, he envisioned decision makers sometimes moving iteratively 
between steps, or moving through steps in sequence (Naikar, 2010). A key strength of the 
decision ladder is that it is able to model choices and options available at different steps, as well 
as describe a particular decision (Jenkins et al., 2010). Rasmussen’s decision ladder also draws 
attention to three dimensions of decision making: skills, information or knowledge, and rules 
informing behaviors (Klein, 2008).  
Qualitative Methods Selection 
Generally, qualitative methods are especially useful for generating richly detailed data 
about experiences. Semi-structured interviews were used with expert state lobbyists to hear their 
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“war stories” of times when they shared information with a state legislator. Probe questions were 
used to generate additional details. These probes were especially important for elucidating expert 
tacit knowledge, i.e., knowledge operating without conscious awareness during lobbyist decision 
making. The detailed stories served as cases for analysis. 
Methods requiring experts to recollect events can present challenges to data reliability. At 
the same time, a high percentage of experts accurately recall the gist of critical incidents in 
retesting (Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998). Studies using retrospective reports can enhance 
their reliability and validity in several ways. These include: asking about facts and events rather 
than opinions; asking about recent events (i.e., within the last two years); giving assurances 
about confidentiality; and the duration of data collection is kept to a minimum (D. L. Miller, 
2003). Also, the measure used to make the reports of incidents should be valid (C. C. Miller, 
Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). Data validity was also increased by focusing on actual behaviors and 
decisions made in specific incidents of information sharing (Beckmann & Hall, 2013). To 
address these concerns, this study focused on actual recent events, and participants were given 
assurances that confidentiality would be maintained. Interviews were designed to be completed 
in approximately 60 minutes. The interview protocol was pre-tested prior to using it in the field. 
Methods were selected, in part, to generate findings that could also be applied to policy 
practice instructional design. Therefore, two specific qualitative methods, Applied Cognitive 
Task Analysis (ACTA) and the Critical Decision Method (CDM), were selected to guide data 
collection and analysis. Both ACTA and CDM are highly effective methods for eliciting expert 
knowledge about decision making in real-world contexts, based on Naturalistic Decision Making 
assumptions (Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006 ). These methods were chosen because of their 
extensive use by the Department of Defense and other instructional design researchers. The 
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ACTA method is especially useful because it offers a coding framework to facilitate analysis of 
expert cognitive decision making.  
ACTA is used to analyze decisions made by experts performing typical tasks. ACTA 
methods generate data about decision steps, knowledge needs, decisions which are particularly 
mentally challenging, and strategies experts use to g nerate needed knowledge. As typical or 
routine, these decisions are likely to be rule based, and are usually automatic in the minds of 
experts (Van Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2013). ACTA was not developed for cognitive 
psychologists, but for those investigating how experts make decisions (Militello & Hutton, 
1998).  
To increase variability across cases, atypical experiences of sharing information were 
also solicited. The CDM is based on the critical incident method (Flanagan, 1954), and uses 
storytelling to generate data about decisions experts have made to handle situations which were 
challenging, difficult, or presented new problems (Hoffman & Lintern, 2006 ). In contrast to 
ACTA, CDM is useful in generating data about atypical ases (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 
2006). It is also highly compatible with the decision ladder model (Rasmussen et al., 1994) for 
gathering data (Naikar, 2010). Data embedded within those stories reflect knowledge used by 
experts “to determine the bases for situation assessm nt and decision making during critical 
(non-routine) incidents” (Clark et al., 2008, p. 582). Experts are also asked what they speculate 
someone with less experience might have done, under similar circumstances. Such questions are 
used to differentiate novice from expert decision processes. The CDM also accommodates the 
use of “What-if” questions, as a way of exploring how experts might alter decisions under 
varying conditions. Taken together, then, Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) and Critical 
Decision Method (CDM), are well suited for gathering and analyzing self-report data to describe 
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expert decision making in various field settings (Hoffman & Militello, 2009; G. Klein & 
Militello, 2001; Militello, Hutton, Pliske, Knight, & Klein, 1997; Schraagen et al., 2008). 
To explore the role of informal rules and norms, the institutional grammar of Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2000, 2005, 2011) was adapted for data 
collection and analysis in this study. The framework was developed as a way to study how rules, 
norms, and strategies affect collective decision making (S. E. S. Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; 
Ostrom, 2005). Examining the types of rules and norms lobbyists informally follow allows for 
specification of rule-based knowledge associated with Rasmussen’s decision model (Lipshitz, 
1993; Rasmussen et al., 1994).  
Instrumentation: Interview Protocol  
Guided primarily by ACTA and CDM methods, the intervi w protocol was constructed 
in order to generate particular types of data. Question  needed to generate data to help identify 
lobbyist decision steps, options, knowledge needs an  strategies, and cognitively demanding 
aspects of typical information sharing decisions. The semi-structured interview protocol also 
employed probes to generate relevant details.  
Questions were included in the protocol to investigate requisite lobbyist skills. “What-if” 
questions were also asked to generate data identifying differences between novices and experts. 
To generate insights into atypical incidents, lobbyists were asked to share stories when “things 
did not go according to plan, and [they] had to change [their] approach.” To develop a more 
complete understanding of rule-based lobbyist decision making, questions were included to 
identify data about informal rules and norms guiding decisions. These included asking about 
informal (“unwritten”) rules participants follow when working with legislators or other lobbyists. 
The interview protocol is included in the Appendix. 
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A total of 18 open-ended questions and 41 optional sub-questions or probes were 
developed for the interview protocol. Six open-ended background questions were used. Four 
open-ended questions were used to generate typical incident data; eight sub-questions were 
included as needed. One open-ended question and two sub-questions were used to generate 
knowledge data. Three questions were used to generat  a second (atypical) incident, with 20 sub-
questions. Four open-ended questions (and eleven sub-questions) were used to generate data 
about rules and norms. The interview protocol was divided into the following four domains:  
• First incident of information sharing 
• Breadth of knowledge & information sharing experienc s 
• Second incident of information sharing 
• Role of rules and norms in information sharing 
The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Instituonal Review Board approved the 
interview protocol. Following IRB approval, two pilot interviews were conducted to insure 
questions would be perceived as relevant and understandable to study participants. Participants 
found the protocol thorough and logical. No changes w re made, and the protocol was used 
throughout the remainder of the study.  
Following the pilot interviews, the interview protocol was memorized, and a prompt-
based version was generated for reference and to maintain consistency of questions across the 
rest of the interviews. The prompt-based interview protocol was necessary as a means of 
accommodating the researcher’s sensory disability (visual impairment; legal blindness). More 




Beginning with the first interview, participants invariably began describing their first case 
or war story with attention to the specific situation at one point in time. For all war story 
recollections, probes were used to clarify temporal sequences of events, the kinds of information 
and knowledge needed, decision points and corresponding options, and aspects which were most 
mentally challenging or demanding to the lobbyist. The lobbyist was also asked what less 
experienced lobbyists might have overlooked or gotten wrong during that specific case. During 
initial interviews, lobbyists referenced using specific materials, including “fact sheets,” as part of 
information sharing decisions. Subsequent interviews included probing further for details 
describing those materials, including their origins, genesis, and characteristics.   
Questions were also used to verify that the step sequences generated on the spot by the 
interviewer were accurate reflections of the event. This followed the pattern of “So, first you did 
X, then Y, then Z. Is that right?” This would be followed by questions of the form, “So, at Y, 
what specifically did you say?” and “What were your ther options at that point?” These latter 
questions generated additional data, such as verbal scripts the lobbyist used and options. 
Concerning rules and norms, questions were used to identify informal rules and norms 
participants thought affected their interactions with legislators and fellow lobbyists. Follow-up 
questions were used to probe for details of those. In particular, additional data were generated to 
identify both penalties for violating rules, and payoffs for compliance.  
Expert Lobbyist Sampling 
Pairwise sampling design was used to find consistency across information sharing 
experiences (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Pairwise sampling designs involves selecting cases 
and treating them as a “set,” with each case then analytically compared to all other cases in that 
set (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 243). Within the design, criterion and snowball sampling 
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techniques guided state lobbyist selection (Onwuegbzie & Collins, 2007). These purposive, 
non-probability sampling techniques are congruent with pursuing analytic generalizability 
(Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). Purposive sampling was chosen also because it can generate a 
“loosely representative” sample of the population of interest (Lynch, 2013, p. 41), that of expert 
state lobbyists. 
Sample size was determined by a number of considerat ons. Individuals who are expert in 
the same domain are more likely to generate similar responses to the same interview questions 
(Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). As few as four highly competent, informed experts are 
necessary to generate such  consistency during structured interviews (Romney, Weller, & 
Batchelder, 1986). To study decision making during a single cognitive task, three to five subject 
matter experts are typically required in ACTA (Militello & Hutton, 1998). In qualitative studies 
using in-depth interviews, overarching (versus fine-grained) themes or “metathemes” often begin 
to emerge after six interviews, while data saturation appears to be achieved after twelve (Guest, 
Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). A sufficient number of cases had to be selected to enable cross-case 
comparisons (Guest et al., 2006). At the same time, the number of interviews needed to be 
limited to make data analysis manageable. At the beginning of data collection, the goal was to 
interview 15 expert state lobbyists. 
For this study, an “expert” was defined as a lobbyist who shares information with 
policymakers “rapidly and successfully" (Clark, Feldon, Van Merriënboer, Yates, & Early, 2008, 
p. 578). To be included in the study, lobbyists hadat least five years of experience as a contract 
and/or in-house lobbyist.  
Recruitment. A single Midwestern state from which to sample expert state lobbyists was 
chosen for convenience. Convenience sampling was used to identify two lobbyists to participate 
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in pilot interviews. Referrals were also requested from state legislators and/or legislative staffers 
from legislative bodies and committees in that state. This strategy has been used in prior studies 
to locate experts for qualitative interviews (Haynes et al., 2011). Legislative offices were 
contacted by phone, and the legislator or a staff person was asked to “identify two to three 
lobbyists who are particularly effective in sharing formation with legislators.” Lobbyists who 
were subsequently interviewed were also asked to recommend other lobbyists whom they 
perceived to be effective in sharing information, or “a good fit for the study.” Recruitment 
beginning with purposive sampling and continuing with snowball sampling is recommended for 
interviewing political elites, because it increases the chances of identifying participants who 
might be lesser known, but still expert in their field (Beckmann & Hall, 2013). 
Once a referral was made, a state-run database of registered state lobbyists was used to 
assess lobbyist eligibility for study inclusion. That database included information about each 
year since 2000 the person was a registered lobbyist with the state, client names, and other 
identifying and contact information. Each referred lobbyist who met inclusion criteria was sent 
an introductory letter inviting them to participate in the study. Twenty-four invitation letters were 
mailed to lobbyists referred into the study. Follow-up calls were made to respond to questions 
and schedule an interview. Fifteen lobbyists who responded to the letter or follow-up phone calls 
agreed to participate; two refused. Eight lobbyists who were sent invitations neither responded 
nor could be reached. One lobbyist agreed to participa e, scheduled and changed interview times 
twice, then declined to reschedule, citing workload burdens as the reason. One participant 
initiated contact with the researcher, having been r ferred by another participant. Both pilot 




Two pilot interviews provided feedback on the clarity and effectiveness of the interview 
questions, including wording and question order (Lynch, 2013). Neither participant suggested 
changes to the interview protocol. Data collection began on February 28, 2017 and ended on July 
27, 2017 following the eighteenth interview. Intervi ws were conducted in person (n=3), by 
phone (n=14), and one by video (Skype). The interviews lasted between 54 minutes and 2 hours 
and 17 minutes. The average interview length was 1 hour and 19 minutes. One participant 
requested a follow-up interview, which lasted for 10 minutes.  
All participants agreed to allow digital audio recording of the interview. Transcription by 
the researcher began immediately following the first interview. Sixteen of eighteen transcriptions 
were completed by 31 August 2017. The final two interviews were transcribed and analyzed 
later, and used to check the validity of key study findings.  
At the beginning of each interview, participants were first told about the study’s purpose, 
informed of their rights as study participants, and then asked permission to digitally audio record 
the interview. Each interview began with a set of background questions to generate descriptive 
information about the participant’s education, political experience, and lobbying history. 
Background questions were followed by asking the participant to recall a typical situation or 
“war story” describing a recent time when they shared information with a legislator. Probes were 
used to gather additional information about the incident. Only one lobbyist was unable to recall 
such an event—having recently shifted to solely lobbying state agencies. Participants were then 
asked about one other incident, which could exemplify a time when they had to change their 




The ACTA in situ analytic method of developing a task diagram for each incident in real 
time during the interview proved to be unwieldy. Consequently, a visual representation of the 
task diagram was abandoned. Specifically, there was unexpected extreme variability between 
incidents, and how subjects shared their information. Efforts to develop the task diagram 
distracted the researcher from listening to interview question responses.  
To compensate for the loss of the task diagram, follow-up probes during the interview 
served to verbally clarify steps and their sequences, and for subjects to verbally verify or correct 
mistakes in those. Switching from a visual to an auditory task diagramming process also allowed 
for subsequent interviews to be conducted by phone, facilitating data collection for the 
researcher. This departure from ACTA methods is addressed later as a study limitation.  
Participant demographics. Of the 18 participatns, four were women and 14 were men; 
17 were white, one was African-American; and 17 were r gistered state lobbyists. More than a 
third of the participants were trained as attorneys, and several were social workers or had 
backgrounds in health care or related professions. All but one participant held undergraduate 
degrees, in fields such as communications or politica  science.  One participant, though not a 
registered lobbyist, nonetheless had extensive experience in informing state legislators, and 
hence was included in the study. Of the 17 registered lobbyists, 13 were contract lobbyists, and 
four were in-house organization lobbyists. Though unsolicited, five lobbyists self-identified as 
Republican, and several as Democrat, suggesting the sample was representative of both major 
political parties. The remaining lobbyists neither mentioned nor otherwise identified their 
political party affiliation.  
Most contract lobbyists were employed by for-profit lobbying firms. Those firms 
represented both large and small corporate clients. A few contract lobbyists presided over their 
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own small or large lobbying firms, working with similar types of clients. In-house lobbyists 
worked as members of nonprofit issue advocacy organizations. 
The study sample represents an extremely high levelof expertise. Years as a registered 
lobbyist ranged from 0 (as indicated above) to more than 50. The sample possessed 362 total 
years of registered lobbying experience. Average experience was 20.1 years, with a standard 
deviation of 14.9 years (n=18).  Removing the two outliers at either end of the experience range , 
the average and standard deviation were 19 and 11.3 years of experience (n=16), respectively. 
None of the participants indicated lobbying outside of their state. Some indicated lobbying 
occasionally in Washington, DC, but none indicated b ing a registered lobbyist there. 
Many study participants also indicated having signif cant political experience of other 
types before becoming lobbyists. Political experience includes: legislative intern, legislative 
analyst, community organizer, nonprofit advocacy, legislative staff member, legislator or other 
elected official. Years of political experience ranged from 0 to more than 35, averaging 7.5 
(n=18). Removing outliers (those with either 0 or more than 35 years of political experience), the 
average for those remaining (n=10) was approximately 9.4 years. Figure 3.1 offers a graphical 
representation of study participants’ experience in both lobbying and in related political areas.  
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Figure 3.1 Lobbyist Expertise, measured in Years of Experience. Lobbyists participating in the 
study possessed substantial experience, measured in y ars. The sample average was 20.1 years. 
Such experience included not only years as professional lobbyists, but also included years of 
political experience (illustrated as line segments de cending below the “0” horizontal line). 
Political experience included serving as an elected official, professional legislative staff, etc. 
Issue and bill types. Some lobbyists discussed incidents of information sharing related to 
the same piece of legislation during the interview. Others discussed distinctly different types of 
bills. The types of bills or legislative issues participants discussed varied widely. These included: 
health and health care, transportation, environment, tax policy, organized labor, human rights, 
animal welfare, mental health, disability, wage policy, regulation of professional services, 
education, and others. Bills concerning health and health care were most frequently the topic of 
exploration followed by bills addressing employment a d wages.  
Lobbyist goals concerning the bills were also part of the interview. The majority of 
incidents had to do with passing legislation. Lobbyists also discussed incidents reflecting efforts 
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to thwart passage of bills they opposed. Occasionally, lobbyist incidents reflected efforts to 
initiate or subsidize legislation.  
Data analysis 
Data analysis occurred in two phases. The first focused on the primary purpose of the 
research, which was generation of a descriptive decision model. The second phase focused on 
analysis of rules and norms related to information sharing decisions. Analysis of institutions 
began as specification of the information sharing decision model was being finalized. This was 
supplemented by analysis of interview data concerning lobbyist legislative strategy. 
Analyses of qualitative data were primarily deductive. For exploring and describing 
information sharing decisions, a deductive approach of constant comparison was used (N. L. 
Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). In that context, incidents of information sharing (cases) were the 
unit of analysis. In analyzing data concerning rules and norms affecting information sharing 
decisions, narrative thematic analysis of interview data was employed to generate institutional 
statements. Those statements were then analyzed deductiv ly, using a grammatical syntax 
(Siddiki, Weible, Basurto, & Calanni, 2011). Relevant rules and norms were then integrated with 
the information sharing decision model. Narrative th matic analysis was used inductively to 
analyze unexpected findings concerning lobbyist strategy. 
Analyzing information sharing decisions. Data analysis involved identifying what 
lobbyists had in common concerning information sharing incidents (Guest et al., 2006). This 
served to generate a more truthful or valid representation of information sharing decisions from 
the data.  This constant comparison approach to analysis (Fram, 2013) is highly compatible with 
pairwise sampling (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Where the lobbyist shared multiple cases, 
within informant comparisons were made (Romney et al., 1986). Each lobbyist’s cases were also 
compared with cases shared by the other lobbyists.  
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Pre-determined analytic categories (e.g. steps, knowledge needs, etc.) were utilized as a 
foundation for data analysis.  As such, this aspect of analysis reflects a deductive approach (N. L. 
Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). Patterns across cases were identified based on ACTA. These 
included: decision steps, options available during different steps, information or knowledge 
needed in order to complete different steps, and short-cuts experts used.  
Data analysis concerning information sharing decision  began immediately after 
completing the first (pilot) interview. Memos were g nerated following each interview to capture 
interviewer insights, and note any insights affecting data collection and the interview protocol. 
All transcriptions were generated by the interviewer to insure confidentiality. Interview 
transcription began shortly after completing the pilot interviews. Data analysis occurred during 
and after transcription, with memos generated for each subject.  
No qualitative data analysis software was used for this study. Inaccessibility of data 
analysis software for blind users is not uncommon (NFB 2017 conference, panel presentation).  
Qualitative data analysis software programs (e.g. NVIVO) were deemed incompatible with the 
researcher’s text-to-speech software. As a result, coding of MS Word-based transcripts was 
conducted through a cut-and-paste method. Headers and ub-heads, reflecting themes and related 
codes, were created in a word document. Excerpts were th n taken from each interview 
transcription, matched to the relevant theme or code, and then pasted. This word document then 
served as the primary document for additional coding a d analysis. Each subsequent interview 
transcription was analyzed in terms of current themes and codes. As additional codes emerged 
within themes, prior interview transcripts and corresponding memos were re-analyzed for 
relevant data. Those data were then copied into the relevant themes and codes.  
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Generating the information sharing decision model. Generating the decision model 
involved an iterative process of both deductive andinductive analysis over the entire study. It 
began with the start of data collection. Both textual and graphical methods were used to develop 
the model, including concept mapping (Novak & Cañas, 2006, 2008). Iterations of these artifacts 
were also used in ongoing analysis. The following traces the course of the decision model’s 
development. This includes key turning points.  
Following the fourth interview of this study, a simple linear decision model began to 
emerge from analysis, reflecting multiple parent themes or metathemes (Guest et al., 2006). 
Initial data analysis of the first five interviews generated a six-step model, represented 
graphically. This is consistent with ACTA literature where three to five experts are usually 
needed to accomplish a single task analysis. Data from the first seven interviews were then 
analyzed reiteratively to generate a prototype decision model capturing emergent steps, decision 
points and choices, and knowledge needs across incidents.  
Once specified, the prototype model was presented as a concept map to a group of social 
work macro-practice educators during a national social work policy conference (Influencing 
Social Policy, Policy Conference 2.0, St. Louis, Missouri: 1-3 June 2017). The public 
presentation served to informally assess the plausibility of the prototype model (Hammersley, 
1997) and obtain critical review and feedback. In particular, the researcher sought audience 
reactions to the model’s potential utility for social work policy practice students. Feedback was 
used as preliminary informal validation of the model’s usefulness in social work policy practice 
student learning. Feedback was also used to generat clarifying narrative explanations of the 
decision model, to increase audience understanding.  
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The prototype continued to serve as a reference point throughout the remaining 
interviews, and during interview transcription and analysis. Few substantive changes were made 
following interviews of participants 7 through 18. The penultimate decision model was presented 
at a national conference of social work educators (CSWE APM, Dallas, Texas: 19-22 October 
2017). As before, the aim was to receive critical feedback from social work policy practice 
educators on the model’s plausibility. Participant reactions and feedback were also used 
informally to assess the model’s potential usefulness for social work policy practice curricula.  
Several other methods were employed to increase transparency and validity of analytic 
findings. An audit trail was designed to allow for evaluation of data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation (Schwandt & Halpern, 1988). Memos were generated following each interview, as 
well as during interview transcription, in order to record analytic and personal insights. Regular 
peer debriefing sessions with a dissertation committee member and others were used to prompt 
interrogation of emergent findings from data analysis. Any modifications to the use of the 
interview protocol were recorded, including identifying reasons for such. 
Throughout analysis, the researcher sought to challenge his own loyalty to the emergent 
decision model. First, the researcher sought to alter or discredit the accuracy of the model by 
finding ways that any lobbyist incident might contradict or perturb the model (negative cases). 
Over time, the researcher also critically examined the logic of step sequences. This resulted in 
making one important, substantive change in step order. While a six-step decision model was 
generated, the researcher sought to eliminate stepsto simplify the model. This took the form of 
dropping individual steps from the model, and asking hypothetically whether someone following 
the remaining steps would be able to generate the same type of information sharing decisions 
they might have when following all six steps.  
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By the time the sixteenth interview was conducted, he decision model had reached its 
penultimate form. Transcripts from the first seven interviews were reanalyzed, according to the 
penultimate decision model steps, knowledge needs an  strategies, and step options or choices. 
Reanalyzing interview transcripts, beginning with the first several, allowed for assessing the 
accuracy of step sequences. Step definitions were also elaborated upon. For instance, additional 
items were added to Step 1, Proximate Political Objectives. Steps were also renamed to make 
their meaning clearer to a broad range of audiences. The last change resulted in removing 
“Tailored Bill Analysis” as its own step and subsuming it, as a knowledge need, within the step 
concerning obtaining and selecting information. This resulted in a 5-Step model, with 
clarification of knowledge needs and choices specified.  
Analyzing knowledge needs. Data were also analyzed to identify knowledge needs 
associated with information sharing. These needs were id ntified inductively, based on interview 
data. Strategies for developing these knowledge typs were developed inductively as well. 
Knowledge need and knowledge strategy analyses take the place of knowledge audit tables, 
specified by the ACTA method (Militello & Hutton, 1998, p. 1621).  
Analyzing rules and norms. The expanded grammatical syntax of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed by Siddiki et al. (2011) and Siddiki, 
Basurto, and Weible (2012) was used to analyze formal and informal rules and norms. In 
particular, these were analyzed in relation to lobbyist information sharing decisions, from the 
lobbyist perspective. The analysis was primarily deductive (N. L. Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). 
Table 3.1 presents the five primary components (ADICO) of institutional statements (S. E. S. 




Table 3.1 Syntax of IAD framework Institutional Grammar. The table features the components 
found within institutional statements. Rules contai ll six components, including indications of 
penalties for violating them, and pay-offs for compliance. Norms include all components, except 
“or else.” The table is based on Ostrom (2005), Siddik  et al., (2011), and Siddiki, Basurto, and 
Weible (2012).  
Throughout interview transcription and data analysis, question responses which generally 
appeared to represent either informal rules or norms were identified and aggregated. Next, those 
responses were analyzed first by creating institutional statements. These were the primary unit of 
analysis. Using the modified ABDICO institutional grammar of the IAD framework, following 
identification, data were first coded as direct lobbying informal rules (ABDICO) or norms 
(ABDIC) related to sharing information with policymakers or lobbyists.  
Rules and norms were analyzed to the extent they applied to the decision model. Data 
were analyzed to align payoffs and penalties with corresponding informal rules. Analytic 
findings concerning the effects of institutions on information sharing decisions was integrated 
into study results concerning the decision model.  
Analyzing lobbying strategy. Study subjects frequently offered highly detailed 
background information describing various conditions a d the larger strategic lobbying context 
within which information sharing took place. An inductive approach was used to analyze those 
data related to lobbying strategy. Narrative thematic analysis was used to generate themes and 
codes explicating key dimensions and patterns of lobbying strategy. Those dimensions most 
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closely related to information sharing were analyzed most thoroughly. The findings of that 
analysis are examined in the following chapter.  
Writing conventions. In the sections that follow, results of qualitative data analysis will 
be presented. This will include “thick descriptions” or excerpts from interview transcriptions. It 
is important to be explicit about certain decisions made concerning how data and analyses are 
being represented herein.  
There is always a concern for maintaining the confidentiality of participants, especially in 
qualitative studies. To protect study participants’ identities, neither names nor racial identities are 
included. Rather, each participant has been given a code name, such as “Sub1,” “Sub13,” and so 
forth. Additionally, third person pronouns (e.g., “they,” “them,” “their,” “theirs”) are used 
throughout, to obscure participants’ gender identities. In addition, all identifying information 
concerning lobbyists’ clients, legislation, names of proponents or opponents of bills, and 
legislators’ names have been removed from all textual descriptions. Even the type of bill is made 
generic. So, for example, if a lobbyist was talking about an issue or bill concerning reducing 
penalties for marijuana possession, that issue or bill would be referred to generically as “issue X” 
or “bill X.”  These were purged to reduce the risk of deductive disclosure of participant 
identities.  
Thick description involves including large portions of data, and encouraging the reader to 
assess the extent to which analytic claims about those data are warranted. At the same time, a 
balance must be struck in the spirit of clarity and parsimony.  To preserve clarity, strive for 
parsimony, and protect participant confidentiality, portions of text considered extraneous, or 
which contain identifying information are not reported. Where that has occurred, ellipses (“…”) 
are used to indicate such deletions. Modifications t  interview extracts were generally made to 
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preserve the continuity of meaning following certain deletions.  In those cases, any text added to 
an excerpt is set off and highlighted using brackets “[ ]”.  
Finally, a claim can appear more warranted where more data are used as evidence for that 
claim (Wentzel, 2018). At the same time, this study is qualitative, and is limited to a relatively 
small sample of participants and information sharing incidents. To communicate a sense of 
frequency about the occurrence of claims, terms indicating quality of such frequencies are used 
instead of counts. In study results, various terms (and their general quantitative meanings) were 
employed. “All” is used to indicate every participant or case of information sharing offered the 
same or highly similar idea or response; “almost all” indicates 12-15 or more offered such; 
“most” indicates 9-11 responded accordingly. The us of “many” indicates about 7-9 participants 
are being referenced; “several” indicates 4-6; “few” indicates 2-3. It will also be made clear if a 





Chapter 4 Results: Knowledge Needs & Lobbyist Strategy 
You can’t just assume that somebody else is going to take care of your issue or your bill, 
you know. (Sub2) 
Lobbyists have a, for the most part, undeserved bad reputation. Most of them are very 
knowledgeable, very ethical, and probably know more than most legislators know, if you 
think about it. … So we’re resources not only to the legislators but also to the legislative 
staff that we work with. (Sub3) 
This is the first chapter presenting analytic outcomes from study data. There are two main 
sections in Chapter 4: primary Knowledge Needs and Lobbyist Strategy. The next chapter, 
Chapter 5, will present analytic outcomes focusing o  the lobbyist decision model for sharing 
information. 
The first section of this chapter looks in detail at the primary types of knowledge used in 
informational lobbying. Specifically, expert lobbyists actively develop knowledge about 
legislator interests (“legislator hierarchy”), the political forces affecting legislative districts 
(“political analysis”), and knowledge about the bill (“bill analysis”). They use this knowledge 
during different points in the lobbying process, including when developing legislative strategy, 
and then when selecting what information to share with a particular legislator. Lobbyists use 
legislative process knowledge to inform legislative strategy development. This “process 
knowledge” is also examined briefly. 
The second section examines lobbyist legislative strategy. Specifically, study participants 
felt compelled to offer significant and often lengthy information describing legislative 
strategizing. The desire of lobbyists to share their insights was unanticipated and unsolicited, but 
48 
 
an overwhelming majority of expert lobbyists shared such during the interviews. That 
phenomenon led to recognition that information sharing with a single legislator about a single 
piece of legislation is one small part of a larger process—that of legislative advocacy and 
strategy. This insight helped situate information sharing decisions within its larger strategic 
context—alongside other legislative advocacy tactics. Such strategy, therefore, is important to 
understand. 
Knowledge Needs  
Knowledge appears to play a fundamental role in expert lobbying. Certain knowledge 
types emerge repeatedly as critical to lobbyist decision making. These three “primary 
knowledge” types are termed “political analysis,” “bill analysis,” and the “legislator hierarchy of 
interests” (referred to henceforth as the “legislator hierarchy”). Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
knowledge types study participants used to guide some f their decisions.  
 
Figure 4.1 Expert Lobbyist Knowledge Needs. The figure reflects the relationship between 
different types of knowledge, like bill analysis, legislator hierarchy, and process knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge about the legislative process) to particular decisions the lobbyist must make related to 
informational lobbying. Those decisions relate to both lobbyists’ legislative strategy and the 
kinds of information they should share with particular legislators. 
During both legislative strategizing and then during lobbying of individual legislators, 
lobbyists use these three knowledge types in different ways and to different extents to make key 
decisions. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship to different knowledge types and lobbyist 
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decisions. The current section describes these thrediff rent knowledge types in detail. 
Moreover, ways lobbyists in the study generate such knowledge (“knowledge strategies”) is 
explored. 
Lobbyists also use two other types of knowledge. The first, knowledge about the 
legislative process (“process knowledge”) is employed throughout lobbying, but especially while 
lobbyists are developing their overall lobbying strategy. Process knowledge is briefly explored in 
the next section when reviewing what expert lobbyists said about Legislative Strategy. Also 
during strategizing, lobbyists indicated taking account of what they know about a legislator’s 
hierarchy, political analysis, and the bill to determine which legislators might be “getable.” 
Once a legislator has been identified as “getable” during strategy development, the expert 
lobbyist then selects the information to share which will most likely “move” that individual in 
the desired direction. A critical question, however, is how such selection decisions are made. 
This is where the final knowledge type, the “Tailored Bill Analysis,” emerges. The Tailored Bill 
Analysis is examined in detail during the last section of the chapter, “Tailored Information 
Sharing Decision Model.” 
Bill analysis. All lobbyists indicated the importance of knowing substantive information 
about the bill. Most also saw their role as one of communicating such knowledge, or serving as a 
conduit of such between their clients and the legisator. Generally, lobbyists saw that being 
prepared to talk knowledgeably about a bill was their responsibility. Sub2 recalls being caught 
underprepared when meeting a legislator: 
He asked me a question, and I said I’m not ready—he was really sharp, [policy group] 
Chair and all that—taught me a good lesson, man: be ready, because some of these 
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legislators are really sharp…. I kind of learned from that time on to know my subject a 
little better. 
Issue expertise arises over time, and can serve as a fr mework for bill analysis. 
Additionally, most lobbyists indicated that they rely on others, including clients or in-house 
analysts (in the case of in-house lobbyists) to answer questions the lobbyist cannot answer. Sub3 
offers that:  
[Once] you work in an area for a while, you begin to become pretty familiar with what’s 
the policy and the laws…in some cases the judicial decisions that affect those areas. [But] 
we’re not always experts in our field. You know we rely on the groups we work for to 
provide that expertise. 
Bill analysis includes identification of various elements. These include the “upside, the 
downside, and who’s on what side.”  Sub9 points out how lobbyists need to “quickly understand 
what it [the law] does, and the impacts of that lawon a particular entity or association or 
industry.” 
At the same time, problems can arise when relying on clients for expert information. 
What a client shares with the lobbyist about a problem the bill is aimed at addressing might be in 
error or incomplete. Sub9 takes particular care in vetting client information and ideas: “[Y]ou 
kind of have to do almost opposition research, to make sure there’s nothing they are trying to 
hide, in terms of a possible complication in that issue.” More will be said later concerning the 
importance to lobbyists of sharing accurate information about legislation. 
Some legislators might request information about the extent of the problem, or how it is 
affecting different regions of the state. One lobbyist shared typical questions legislators ask: 
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Maybe it’s a problem in [city], but is that the only place it’s a problem? Or is this a 
problem in all the major metropolitan areas…?” … So you’re constantly having those 
kinds of questions posed to you, so you might as well try to understand that before you go 
in to talk. [Sub12; 36:47] 
If the aim is to promote a legislative solution, then some might expect information about the 
solutions used in other states. Sub12 also offered: “One of the questions that come up almost 
always with just about every piece of legislation is, ‘What’s happening in other states? How does 
this compare with the [X] law of the other states—the states around us?’”  
Feasibility and implementation can be critical to a bill’s success. This includes the likely 
cost of a bill, as well as its impact on state agencies. Sub 16 indicated that a serious objection 
from a particular state agency could be sufficient cause for a committee to kill the bill. Obtaining 
accurate cost or feasibility information can be difficult. Sub16 noted that if he suspects a client’s 
legislative proposal is likely to impact a state office or agency, he will contact the legislative 
liaison to discuss the proposal. He will do so well b fore seeking legislator support for the bill. 
Alternately, he also noted that state agencies are obliged to carry out laws that a legislature 
passes—even if they object. In this case, offsetting agency opposition can be accomplished by 
mobilizing “grassroots” support.  
Knowing the opposition. All lobbyists indicated the importance of knowing who opposes 
their bill or position. “Opposition” means the names of the organizations or interests that have 
been actively involved on legislative issues at the capitol. These are the groups which one 
lobbyist termed the “players” (Sub8). They are also the ones which a legislator might also hear 
from if a bill is of interest to them.  They are not, however, those groups which might also be 
opposed, but have no advocacy presence or involvement in state politics or policymaking 
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(Sub16). What’s more, every lobbyist also indicated the importance of knowing opposition 
arguments.  
Having knowledge about the opposition was advantageous for various reasons. For 
instance, Sub2 noted sharing opposition knowledge helped build trust: “…if I knew it, I always 
told them—even if it was bad for me. Because I wanted them to know that I would share 
information if I knew, and then they trusted you more, I think.”  
Listing the opposition is important, but so is offering the opposition’s arguments. Sub2: 
“If I know [the argument], absolutely [I would share it]. Yeah. Because sometimes they’d ask 
you that. So if they ask me, absolutely. I would say, ‘Here’s what I think…’” 
Rationales for sharing opposition arguments can go bey nd trust building. Sub5 offers, 
[W]hen a legislator comes to me and says…“Who’s against this issue?” Then I have to 
explain, “well, …” I have to be honest with them because a lobbyist on the other side is 
going to tell him the same story, and if I lose credibility with the legislators, I’m 
ineffective as a lobbyist.  
In this case, Sub5 recognizes—as do most other lobbyists—that legislators will likely be hearing 
from the opposition, and to withhold what they know about the opposition’s arguments or 
concerns might jeopardize their “credibility.”  
Knowing opposition arguments also appears to be particularly important in preparation 
for sharing information with a legislator. Specifically, lobbyists employ their knowledge about 
opposition arguments to develop rebuttals, which they will share with legislators as part of their 




Political analysis of a bill: Tough issues, tough bills. Several lobbyists made evaluative 
reference to bills and issues as “tough.” For example, one admitted: “I’m fortunate to not 
necessarily work on things that are quite so tough” (Sub6). Bills evaluated as “straight-forward” 
are usually those with limited or no ethical or moral dilemmas attached (summarizing Sub8). 
Morally or ethically challenging issues identified by a couple of lobbyists included abortion, 
gaming, and marijuana legalization. Other such issue  might include criminalization of drug 
possession, gay marriage rights, and opioid addiction. Taking the perspective of a legislator, 
Sub4 explains that an issue is “key” in a district when it “is really, really hot…[when it is] 
something constituents are really…[concerned about]?” 
The degree to which a bill will incur opposition might be a key factor related to vote 
difficulty. Differentiating between experts and non-expert lobbyists, Sub9 notes, “So somebody 
who’s newer… would have missed explaining …he may hve explained who the opponents are, 
but not what their arguments would be, or how opposed…how strongly opposed that the issue 
will get.” 
Bill analysis knowledge strategy. Most lobbyists discussed techniques for developing 
relevant knowledge about a bill to one degree or anther. Most of these were relatively informal 
approaches. For instance, concerning legislation initiated on behalf of a client with greater 
expertise, lobbyists would familiarize themselves bfore communicating with legislators. Asked 
about such preparation, Sub10 offered: “I would ask the [client] company for as much 
information as I could possibly get. Read up on it. Read the issue; know the issue.” 
In bills introduced by others, several lobbyists also indicated seeking information about 
the legislation directly from the sponsoring legislator. One lobbyist described this approach: 
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But the first thing you do is go directly to the legislator, and say, “why did you introduce 
this? What are you trying to accomplish?” Sometimes th  member will say, “I’m doing it 
for a constituent, but I know this bill is going to take a couple years to pass. I’m not 
moving it this year… (Sub15) 
In this approach, the lobbyist can facilitate both bill analysis and political analysis by seeking 
information directly from the bill sponsor—a practice several lobbyists acknowledged. The 
lobbyist tries gathering information about the sponsor’s intent (“What are you trying to 
accomplish?”). The lobbyist also tries to understand how much political support or momentum a 
piece of legislation currently has. In the above case, the lobbyist learns the bill is not likely to 
build momentum or “move” through the legislative process soon. In that regard, the lobbyist 
could allocate time and attention to more currently pressing bills.  
A few lobbyists indicated seeking assistance from legislators in order to analyze a bill (or 
proposal) for elements to which still other legislators might negatively react. Sub3, for instance, 
noted how to engage supportive conservative legislator  to identify “red flags” which fellow 
party members might find challenging in a piece of legislation.  
During analysis, bills are deconstructed in particular ways that describe the legislation, 
including its intent (from the perspective of the bill’s sponsor), and its likely affects or outcomes. 
The lobbyist also evaluated those outcomes (the “upside” and the “downside”). Bill analysis also 
includes identification of interests most likely to c me out as proponents or opponents of the bill. 
What’s more, knowing the arguments of those opposed to the lobbyist’s position is especially 
important to expert lobbyists. 
 The purpose of bill analysis, based on recurrent themes during interviews, is to be 
prepared to communicate with legislators about the bill. Lobbyists use various means to learn 
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what state legislators most want to know about any bill. They are also able to call upon others, 
including clients or colleagues in their firm or organization, if they need assistance in analyzing a 
bill. They also anticipate the need to make compelling arguments for their cause. To facilitate 
such preparation, they analyze information on the views and arguments of the opposition. 
Moreover, lobbyists recognize that they do not need to know the arguments from all the 
opposition groups in the state. Instead, they need to know about the organized interests from 
whom the legislator is most likely to hear, that is, the “players.”   
Political analysis. Almost all lobbyists interviewed mentioned the importance of 
knowledge about legislative districts in relation t lobbying and information sharing. Sub3 
termed this “political analysis.” 
So, you also have to know where they come from, knowi g geographic orientation of 
members is pretty important. …we always try to go in w th an understanding of where 
people’s districts are, what kind of political environment they are, what kind of 
demographics they have… I consider that part of the political analysis. [10:42] 
Describing a visit to a legislator, Sub2 points outthat the knowledge gained by driving in 
the area helped to understand the district, and how to make sense of the legislator’s likely 
positions on different bills.  
You just really quickly realize the differences—a suburb almost, quickly you see the 
differences between [state regions]…So, that was helpful, kind of get a better 
understanding. Then you kind of understood them when t y came up to you with a 
certain issue…maybe I didn’t agree, but I might understand better why he was taking the 
position he was.  [41:24] 
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Sub2 adds,” And if they’re not there, most of them are very happy you stopped by or cared 
enough to try to understand their area.”  Interestingly then, making an effort to learn about a 
legislator’s district might affect the legislator’s perspective of the lobbyist.  
Lobbyists’ descriptions indicated that such analysis includes knowledge about a 
legislative district, including its geography, population, infrastructure, size, and economic state. 
Sub4 offers still more aspects of what one should know as part of political analysis such as 
information about a legislator’s constituents, including the size of various religious groups, racial 
groups, “urban” versus “rural,” etc. Such information is aimed at estimating how a district might 
react to “key” issues or bills.  
While the details lobbyists offered about district-level politics were important, what was 
not said might also be significant. Conspicuously absent was mention of political party 
dominance. That is, no lobbyist indicated how he/sh used information about the percentage of 
constituents voting Republican versus Democrat to analyze and understand district-level politics. 
Perhaps lobbyists find other district-level information more valuable to the extent it 
relates more directly to how their bill might be received. So, for example, information about 
public employee union numbers in a district would be very useful to know if a lobbyist was 
working on a bill concerning state pension reform. Such a hypothetical bill might draw more 
attention of constituents in a district with many state employees, compared to districts with very 
few.  Most lobbyists interviewed usually worked on a relatively narrow range of issues, and with 
a similarly narrow range of clients. Their issue knowledge was often part of the expertise they 
applied in their efforts—including knowledge about typical proponent and opponent groups and 
interests (i.e., visible “players” at the state capital, per Sub8).  
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Bill analysis can intersect with political analysis in the lobbyist’s estimation. That is, a 
lobbyist might estimate that the same bill will be tougher politically in one district and easier in 
another. So, state funding for abortion might be less tough, and less likely to engender organized 
resistance, in districts where Catholics are significantly fewer in number, all else being equal.  
As examined in the next section on Legislator hierarchy, the level of difficulty a 
legislator might have in casting a particular vote plays a central role in who the lobbyist selects 
for lobbying. When examining the decision model developed from the research, it will be shown 
how vote difficulty also informs the kinds of information lobbyists need to share with a 
legislator—in order to win (or sustain) his/her legislative support and commitment.  
Legislator hierarchy. Information about legislator philosophies, bills they have 
sponsored, and voting records on major legislation represent elements in what one lobbyist called 
the legislator “hierarchy of interests” (Sub4). The objective for gathering such information is 
related to the lobbyist’s business of influencing decisions and determining the fate of legislation. 
So you develop a hierarchy about [the legislator’s interests], and your job as a lobbyist is 
to both understand the hierarchy, and to know where that individual sits on certain things, 
what tends to get his attention, and by knowing those dynamics, you are in a position to 
know how you might be able to influence him or what might be able to influence him. 
And that’s what you’re trying to do, as a person…as an advocate. [Sub4: 12:00] 
Herein, “legislator hierarchy” is meant to represent the sum of knowledge a lobbyist 
possesses about legislator’s interests, priorities, values, beliefs, and so forth, which might affect 
his/her future voting decisions.  
Sub9 identifies a number of factors relevant to approaching two legislators to serve as 
sponsors of a bill: “Both of them have a background in [industry] issues, and had—at least in the 
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case of [legislator X]—personal connection with [industry retailers]. And they were generally 
aware of the issue.” 
Background knowledge, then, can also mean the legislator will see “the merits” of a bill 
“right away.” Professional background, including professional training, military experience, and 
veteran status, were also mentioned as potentially relevant information about legislators. 
Committee membership and the length of their tenure on those committees can also be a way for 
lobbyists to analyze a legislator’s “knowledge base” on an issue, according to a few lobbyists.  
Some lobbyists also noted that legislator issue knowledge can come from those around 
them. This includes knowledge from family members. Reflecting on approaching a 
knowledgeable legislator about a bill, Sub12 states: 
And I go into her office knowing that whatever I say she’ll probably run past her 
daughter and say, “you know, I’ve had this lobbyist in, and he is proposing that we do 
such-and-such, on the training of [professionals]. What do you think about that?”  
Lobbyists can update what they know about a legislator’s priorities, including their 
values, and the strength of those values and beliefs. Seeking a co-sponsor, Sub9 notes the new, 
more refined understanding they developed about a legislator’s issue position after a meeting. 
Confirming the researcher’s paraphrasing, Sub9 states, “It was information about his principled 
stand on Home Rule, yes.” Sub9 then affirmed how this new knowledge about the senator’s 
principled commitment to Home Rule, or the importance of local self-governance, would be 
stored in memory for later reference.  
Legislator hierarchy knowledge strategy. Developing knowledge about a legislator can 
be accomplished in various ways. Part of this occurs through working together. As Sub2 
suggests, “When you work with them some, you get to know them a little bit.” 
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Learning about a legislator’s priorities can require t me, effort, and persistence. Sub2, 
being a new lobbyist with the organization, was able to learn about a legislator’s views and 
priorities by actively pursuing in-person contact.  
I’d go see him and he’d blow me off. And I’m thinkig, what’s going on here? I figured 
out he had a really, really good relationship with [my predecessor…so what I did was, the 
next time I went to [the legislator’s district], I didn’t call him, I’d just stop by his office. 
Best move I ever made.  
Other lobbyists also noted the importance of meeting a d just having “general 
conversations” with a legislator as a means of learning about them. One lobbyist noted the value 
of noticing pictures and plaques on the walls of a legislator’s district office, stating, “It tells a 
little story about them” (Sub14). Generally, the “story” one can generate refers to several things. 
These could be the types of organizations that havegiven the legislator awards. Images and 
pictures on the legislator’s desk can be interpreted for information about family and 
relationships. Other personal items might indicate the legislator’s background, interests, etc.  
Such personal knowledge can also be used to establish a relationship with a legislator, as 
a number of lobbyists indicated. Sub7 noted how they actively ask legislators about their 
children, or other experiences they have in common. Sub5 makes references to unique events 
they have shared with a legislator.  
Several lobbyists reviewed how they develop knowledge about a new legislator. For 
instance, Sub10 points out the potential value of the legislator’s district characteristics. 
I get to learn what part of the state they’re from, so that’s a whole different ball game as 
well. So, you can approach a member from [a large city] differently than you can 
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approach a member from [a rural area]. …I know a lot of these districts very well. And 
other areas of the state and what potentially would motivate them.  
Geography can also be placed within the context of party affiliation, as Sub9 outlines. 
The first thing we look at is, you know, if they were elected, who was [ ic]  the electors 
that supported them, you know. So if it’s a Democrat in a Republican city, that’s one 
dynamic. If it’s a Republican from the suburbs, that’s nother dynamic on [sic]  where 
they might be.  
Analyzing voting records becomes an important knowledge strategy for lobbyists. 
Analysis would involve tracking down the legislator’s vote on relevant bills. As Sub15 points 
out, 
I would call somebody and say, “I want their top 10 [issue X] votes.” Okay?...that’s 
public information, and you kind of see, you know, what side they lean, did they typically 
vote with [one side or the other] side?... most of these people develop a pattern that they 
don’t deviate from.  
For new legislators without voting records, one lobbyist noted that “you watch how they 
vote on bills early on, and you kind of get a sense of where their priorities are” (Sub9). Sub3 
recalls being completely surprised when a legislator sp nsored a bill which was contrary to her 
known history. 
I had an experience where a legislator whose [modus perandi] was pretty well known, 
who filed a bill that was totally against what we thought would be her philosophy and her 
character. She even admitted it to us in a call. She had her reasons for doing it, but we…it 
was just kind of surprising. 
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Publicly available information, such as “candidate questionnaires” (Sub9), might be used 
to obtain basic knowledge about issue positions. Another publicly available source of 
background information several lobbyists identified s biographical statements published by the 
members or elsewhere.  
 One lobbyist offered a particularly proactive approach to gathering information and 
understanding a new legislator’s issue positions. Declaring, “My job is to get to know them fast,” 
Sub15 continues: 
I don’t start to get to know them when they just become a legislator. Every year in 
September when candidates start passing petitions, y u start looking at these people to 
see [sic]  whose running. Then you look to see, “alright, does [sic]  any of them have a 
[issue X] background?”…[Then, you] start following their campaigns.  
Gathering information about the legislator is purposeful. Sub15 concludes, “It’s all about finding 
common ground with them at any moment. “ 
Beginning with an examination of biographical statements, Sub16 also notes the 
importance of how a new legislator was elected. Sub16: 
Then I have to look at how did they get elected or nominated? An incumbent from the 
same party, the primary, or did they defeat somebody from the other party? Maybe they 
worked for a [client organization] themselves—so they’re sympathetic to my point of 
view, or at least I can use it.  
One lobbyist mentioned learning surprising new information about a legislator’s issue 
priorities by listening to his speech during a House floor debate. Sub6 noted that what they 
learned still needed to be verified: 
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… Yeah, how can we follow up and see if he’s kind of willing to work [on our issues]… 
it takes a little time to see how far people are really going to go, if it’s lip service or real 
effort. 
So, just as voting records are used to identify patterns and consistency on issues, so are other 
indicators, like what legislators say publicly.  
Some of the above approaches might be applicable to analyzing or updating current 
legislator hierarchies. Some other techniques might be useful for new lobbyists, or lobbyists 
seeking information about new legislators. At the end of the day, however, the aim is to identify 
what will “move” the legislator, and then what will “heavily move” (Sub4) that legislator. 
Lobbyists in this study appear to regularly update their knowledge of legislators and their 
priorities. There can be points where lobbyists might reflect on what they have learned. When 
asked, one lobbyist shared a particular process, which takes place “all in the head:” 
We do sort of this quiet, internal process …kind of after the session, where we do kind of 
have a chart of, like, “Who’s your go-to champion? Who are your good supporters? 
Who’s the sort of crowd of people in the middle you don’t know that well, we’re not 
really sure where they are?” 
Analyzing legislators in terms of their degree of support is part of the reflection, but so is 
assessing degrees of legislator opposition. Sub6 continues, “[There’s] … two categories of 
people who oppose us and are worth continuing to talk to, and those where…you’re never going 
to change her mind, she’s not going to change ours, we’re … going to leave her alone.” In this 
case, the lobbyist’s updated knowledge about legislators is being used to assess the entire 
legislature. The assessment has to do with general evaluations and sorting legislators into 
categories. Those categories are related to the degr e of support or opposition on issues the 
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lobbyist typically works on. Like other lobbyists interviewed, Sub6 uses categories reflecting a 
continuum, from highly supportive legislators (“your go-to champions”) to adamantly opposed 
(“you’re never going to change her mind”), and points i  between—including those who “we’re 
not really sure where they are,” also known as “undecided” legislators. Sorting of legislators into 
such categories plays an important role in the lobbyist’s legislative strategy, which is explored 
next.  
Legislative Strategy 
Context matters when empirically investigating real-world, naturalistic decision making. 
The lobbyist’s legislative strategy is a critical context within which information sharing takes 
place. This section briefly covers lobbying strategy from the perspective of study participants. 
This will primarily focus on how strategy includes choosing which legislators to approach in 
order to reach the desired legislative outcome (bill passage, killing the bill, etc.). At the stage of 
legislative strategy and legislator choice, lobbyists are seeking to identify “getable” legislators. 
Those typically are the legislators whose position is either unknown or undecided. They use their 
knowledge about legislator priorities and their bill analysis to generate a “feel” for the 
legislator’s likely position.  
Also in this section, process knowledge is examined briefly. Here process knowledge 
certainly includes understanding the rules for bills being introduced, assigned to a committee, the 
reading of bills, and the like—that is, formal legislative process knowledge. Lobbyists also 
insisted on talking about the ways their work included sharing information with legislative staff. 
This is a different type of process knowledge—that of communication processes and the flow of 
information to legislators.  
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Several lobbyists acknowledged the complex nature of their work. The work of 
advocating for or against a bill can be arduous, fast p ced, and involve coordinating or 
contending with many different individuals. Sub12, likening legislative strategy to a game of 
pool played by an expert, explained this metaphor.  
When I look at a piece of legislation or an issue, I am looking at multiple, multiple, 
multiple factors. Not only am I thinking about first reading, second reading, third reading 
in the first chamber, and the second chamber, I’m thinking about what’s going to happen 
with which agency’s going to have to implement and work with this law? What’s the 
governor going to do? How many organizations are going to come out in favor or support 
of my bill when it’s going through the legislature? What’s the composition of the 
committees where the bill may or may not be assigned? Who is going to be the sponsor 
of my bill in the first chamber? Who is going to be th  sponsor in the second chamber? 
And I’m looking at all of those things to a degree at the same time.  
What Sub12 offers is more than a description of howa bill becomes a law and elegantly 
communicates the connections between legislative process and strategy. Such strategy includes 
anticipating all of the places where the bill will be discussed and debated, as well as specifically 
who will be doing the debating. Political support and opposition is also being assessed, as is the 
likely reaction of whatever agency it is that will be responsible for the bill’s implementation.  
Moreover, even when one games out a strategy, the expert lobbyist must be prepared to 
address unanticipated changes. Picking up the pool player metaphor, Sub12’s review of lobbyist 
strategy concludes with: 
But, just like the pool player, I start…I’m going through all this. And I get to the second 
Chamber, and all of a sudden, I don’t get assigned to the committee I think it’s going to. 
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All of a sudden, the AFL-CIO comes out in opposition t  my bill. All of a sudden, 
somebody in the governor’s office has researched this issue, and says, “No, no, no, we 
don’t like this.” And I in turn have to shift all of my thinking and all of my strategy if I’m 
going to be successful. That’s kind of a good analogy of what happens if you get really 
good at lobbying. [40:18] 
Sub12 elegantly expresses a comprehensive vision of lobbying strategy, which mirrors 
sentiments expressed by most study participants. Thi  includes the need and ability to devise a 
plan, but then also adapt the legislative strategy in the face of various contingencies. Legislative 
strategy also focuses on achieving a specific goal. Sub15 clarifies, 
There’s bills that you’re trying to pass that you want to advocate to help your [client]; 
there’s bills that you’re trying to oppose, that you want to stop from hurting your [client]; 
and then there’s other bills that you kind of monitr [for changes]. ….Rarely does a bill 
pass the House and Senate and get signed without any ch ges from its introduction. 
Most of the bills study participants discussed were what many would consider small, low-
salience issues. Sub2 offered an important observation concerning the nature of policymaking 
and its impact: “You gotta care about the small ones too because small issues become big issues. 
You make improvements here and improvements there, pretty soon you got something.” Just as 
small bills can lead to large positive changes over time, small bills with marginally negative 
effects can create cumulative negative impacts overtime. As Sub2 notes, “[if clients] get enough 
bad stuff against them, that impacts them, too. So I really paid attention to little things, more than 
the big things, because that’s what made the difference.” 
Policy change also requires time and perseverance.  As Sub4 points out, “[On] any issue, 
it’s not always a cut and dried, one-session, one-moment thing, you know. Sometimes, I’ve even 
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told clients, you know, we can do this, but it’s gonna take maybe four or five years.” Sub4 then 
offers a glimpse into protracted legislative strategy: 
Because first you got to make people understand that it is an issue, then you have to show 
them how and where it impacts upon them, and then you got to figure out a strategy, how 
are you gonna be able to sustain this over time. So that happens a lot. [23:04] 
Contract lobbyist firms negotiate with clients the erms of their contracts, based on 
estimates of how much work will be required to achieve the client’s goals. One lobbyist, 
employed by a firm, noted that their firm underestimated how long a bill would take to pass 
when negotiating with one of its clients. This underestimation meant the firm underbid the cost 
of its work, completing the project anyway, but at a financial loss.  
Strategy then involves building support for one’s lgislative goal. Sub9 outlines this 
process, in relation to seeking bill passage: “You identify legislators who will sponsor it, both the 
chief sponsor, and additional sponsors who will go on as co-sponsors.” Sub9 explains the 
strategic value of building support over time for a bill: 
So you’ll go to multiple legislators, so that they will sign on, so that when it comes up on 
an analysis right before the floor, you’ll see multiple names associated with that effort. In 
addition, after you identify those legislative spons rs, you’ll also want to go and seek out 
allied organizations. So you build—especially on cotr versial issues as this one 
became—you want to build a strong coalition of like entities that support that effort. 
Sub9 points out that generating a lot of initial support, as well as interest group support, for a bill 
increases the likelihood of its acceptance. Alternately, if the goal is to oppose or kill a bill, 
reducing that initial support becomes an important strategy. As a few lobbyists indicated, the bill 
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analysis Sub9 mentioned above, which accompanies the bill during its final reading on the 
chamber floor, lists both opponents and proponents.  
Legislative strategy includes carefully planning how t  work with legislative leaders, 
including within committees. Several lobbyists spoke directly to addressing the issues and 
concerns of legislators in leadership positions. Sub8 offered the following: 
Committee Chairs control what gets heard in committee. [There] are some committee 
Chairs that won’t even let a bill be heard unless they are “agreed to”,…[while other 
Chairs are] not like that. So you’ve got to convince the chair that they’ll call the bill, and 
then you want to go to the minority spokesperson [fr his/her support]. 
Here, “agreed to” means that all interest groups having a stake in the legislation (and who are 
“players” in the state capitol) must be in agreement on the legislation before it will be introduced 
by the committee Chairperson. Sub8 then offers particularly interesting process information.  
So, when they have their little pre-meeting before committee hearing, they have [all the 
information about the bill, including analysis, proonent and opponent arguments, etc.]. 
…{I]n many instances, I have come into a committee prepared to testify and they just 
pass it out without any comment from me at all. [1:02:39] 
Legislative process knowledge. What emerges from this review of strategy is the 
detailed knowledge lobbyists have about how bills become laws. Such knowledge is more than 
what one might see in a typical flow chart on a state website. Rather, lobbyists know substantive 
information about decision makers in key positions. For instance, they know committee leaders’ 
habits and proclivities, some of whom hold “little pre-meetings” to decide which bills, assigned 
to their committee, they will actually hear. Expert lobbyists will then seek to meet the specific 
expectations of those legislators.  
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The source of such legislative process knowledge can include experience. As Sub3 
indicated, it took “a couple of years” to understand this process, quickly following with, “and 
things are always changing.” (in terms of personnel, procedural rules, and so forth). Nonetheless, 
this knowledge is invaluable to these lobbyists. As Sub10 offered:  
I know the process, right? And I know the…if a bill gets into a certain committee, who 
the chairman on that committee is, are there subcommittees on that committee? Are 
there…what is the make-up of that committee? Is it more liberal, is it more conservative, 
is it a committee where the members understand the industry? You know, so, yeah, I have 
all this specific kind of institutional knowledge, right?  [33:54] 
Pre-legislative strategy. The bulk of what has been described thus far has been about 
bills being actively prepared for introduction into the legislative process, or bills already 
introduced. Several lobbyists also indicated they engage legislators as part of their strategy to 
develop passable legislation. While the former reflects legislative strategy, the latter is referred to 
henceforth as “pre-legislative” strategy. Several lobbyists saw pre-legislative strategy as an 
opportunity to rework legislation which was not currently politically viable. Sub11 discussed 
what happens if the lobbyist sees no possibility of putting “together a path to a majority.” 
[Then] sometimes you have to tell your client, “We can’t pass this thing—at least not this 
year. We need to either change it, modify it, or forget about it and do some work over the 
summer—district visits—and educate some people over the summer, and come back.” 
[23:04] 
Examining legislative strategy offers a big-picture vi w of lobbying. The more than 60 
pages of data generated on this theme is summarized in a highly condensed form here. The 
lobbyists for the most part insisted on framing information sharing decisions within this larger 
69 
 
context of legislative strategy. That is, information sharing is set by lobbyists within this much 
larger, dynamic strategic context—just like other tactics, such as media campaigns, giving 
testimony, or preparing clients to meet with legislators or their staff. 
Keeping the larger strategy in mind, it is critically important that lobbyists be strategic in 
whom they engage. Most lobbyists pointed out the importance of committees, and how the 
committee to which their bill is assigned can make  big difference. What’s more, the lobbyists 
recognized the importance of being even more strategic about which legislators they should 
approach—even within a particular committee. The next s ction explores how study participants 
identify or select specific legislators to approach nd engage with information.  
“Getable” legislator selection. In discussing strategy, many lobbyists offered ideas 
about whom they should lobby to achieve their legislative goals. Earlier, it was discussed how 
lobbyists like Sub6 evaluate legislators at the end of the legislative session, categorizing them on 
a continuum from “your go-to champions” to those whose mind you are never going to change 
opponents. Then, there are those in between, i.e., legislators whose position is unclear.  
When it comes to deciding whom to lobby on a particular bill, having committee leaders 
on your side is imperative, as almost all lobbyists at ested. Then, building a winning majority of 
legislators to support the lobbyist’s position is criti al. To do so, lobbyists must not only reaffirm 
the commitment of supporters and champions, but also secure legislators in the middle, or 
undecided about the bill or issue. Sub11 used the term “getable” to describe those legislators they 
believed could be persuaded to their side of the issue: “And these 10 guys are getable. They may 
not be. I have reasons they might be able to vote with me. And then you go work them” [21:18]. 
These reasons, according to that lobbyist, stem frowhat they know about the legislator, and 
how a bill will likely affect a legislator’s district and constituents.  In other words, the lobbyist 
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uses the three knowledge types—legislator hierarchy, political analysis, and bill analysis—in 
identifying “getable” legislators. At the stage of legislator selection, however, Sub11 also 
mentions the probabilistic nature of the selection process, by adding, “They may not be.” That is, 
this is Sub11’s best guess as to whom might be persuaded to vote in their favor on the bill. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship between knowledge types and identifying “getable” 
legislators as part of the overall strategy. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Lobbyist Strategy: Identifying “Getable” Legislators, based on Lobbyist Knowledge. 
Identifying legislators who are unknown or undecided and “getable” reflects one of the first 
points where lobbyists employ knowledge about the legislator, the bill, and district-level politics.  
Another way of viewing the matter is by the extent to which the legislator will perceive 
the vote as “difficult.”. Sub1 recalled concerns when asking a legislator to make a difficult vote 
in favor of a bill: “There might be some negative pr ss he gets … maybe some negative 
editorials [in the legislator’s district], and that’s going to make it difficult. It might be used as  
campaign slogan against him at the next election.” 
There are various ways lobbyists work with legislators when they are asking for such a 
vote. These will be examined later, when exploring the decision model. What is most relevant, 
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however, is that a vote’s difficulty level will in turn affect which legislators are getable, or 
selected early for lobbying. 
Every lobbyist admitted that not all legislators will be getable on every bill. At the same 
time, there appear to be legislators who, for particular reasons, should not even be considered. 
Asking those legislators for their support represent  what Sub11 refers to as “political suicide.” 
Never ask a legislator to vote for or against a bill that he thinks is going to cause him to 
lose an election. And that’s something you got to kn w by knowing the legislator, by 
knowing the district, by knowing the history [of the issue or bill].  
Sub11 qualifies the point by adding, “I don’t think there’s any issues out there—single issues—
that will cause somebody to lose the election.” They t n conclude, “But it’s a subjective 
standard for the legislator.” That is, lobbyists privilege the legislator’s perspective about the 
potential consequences of a particular vote over thei own. This reflects a process of perspective 
taking.  
Another lobbyist offered a perspective on making good decisions about which legislators 
to ask for their vote. Unequivocally, the lobbyist would never ask a minority party member in 
leadership, for instance, to vote for a bill that ws antithetical to the party’s ideology. According 
to the lobbyist, doing so would not only be ineffective, but could jeopardize the lobbyist’s 
credibility and reputation for “good political judgment” in the legislator’s eyes (Sub17).  
Up to this point, “getable” has been used mainly in terms of identifying legislators who 
might be persuaded to vote in the desired direction. It was not used in relation to other 
legislators, such as those the lobbyist might approach to sponsor a bill (those “go-to champions” 
of Sub6). Identifying likely bill sponsors (called “chief sponsors” by a couple of legislators) also 
reflects a strategic decision of the lobbyist.  
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Communication process knowledge. Communication process knowledge includes 
understanding how both direct and indirect information sources can affect legislators 
individually and collectively (i.e., in committee or n the Chamber floor, during final voting). 
That is, if lobbyists are to affect a bill’s fate, hey must recognize how important legislative 
staff—committee staff and personal staff—are to that outcome. Talking with those staff about 
the bill, then, becomes part of an expert lobbyist’s rategy. It is also a place where knowledge of 
bill analysis, legislator hierarchy, and political analysis are used to inform what the lobbyist 
shares. When asked about what non-expert lobbyists might miss, Sub9 emphasized: “There are a 
lot of lobbyists who even now fail to meet and brief staff, the legislative staffers.” Figure 4.3 
makes clear the multiple targets for expert lobbyist information sharing.  
 
Figure 4.3 Lobbyist Targets for Information Sharing. Lobbyists regularly indicated that they not 
only shared bill-related information with individual legislators, but also legislator staff and 
committee staff to which their bill was assigned.  
Working with legislator staff. Almost all lobbyists indicated that working with staff was 
at least as important as was working directly with legislators. Frequently, legislative staff is 
present at meetings with legislators. As Sub3 stated, “So there’s a lot of different 
communications. A lot of times it’s with the staff.” Sub3 continues, “So we’re resources not only 
to the legislators but also to the legislative staff that we work with.” Though this study did not 
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investigate this dimension, information lobbyists volunteered on the topic is reviewed briefly 
below. 
Working with staff involves cultivating relationships, including through interaction. Sub7 
describes, “When I’m down there in the legislature, I stop in the office and get to…I know I 
won’t be able to see the legislator, but I’m there to talk to the staff if they have any questions.” 
Staff represents additional access points to legislators. Sub14: “Staffers are also very key, 
sometimes, sometimes, legislators are just hard people t  get to in general. Sometimes staffers 
will help broker that meeting, and get that to take place.” Sub2 also noted that personal staff 
might be important when the aim is to keep the legislator and office abreast of bill changes. 
Several lobbyists indicated they would be certain to leave information, such as fact sheets 
and reports, with legislative staff. One lobbyist (Sub13) indicated they would provide talking 
points to both the legislator and his/her staff to address calls or emails on a contentious bill, upon 
request. Another (Sub10) noted they would provide staff with a full report on an issue, but only 
give the legislator an “executive summary.” Several lobbyists said they offer briefer versions of 
information to legislators and materials with additional details to staff. All three knowledge types 
are used with a legislator’s personal staff. Moreover, information shared with personal staff may 
include even more details, as well as reassurances that the lobbyist and client will be available to 
address any questions they might have later. 
Sub3, referencing drafting of new legislation, remarks on the importance of working to 
inform staff: “And the people you really have to explain it to are not necessarily the legislator but 
the staff that analyzes it and works with you on it.” Sub3 recognizes that the staff person will be 
on hand to respond to immediate questions from the legislator. Several study participants 
indicated that the lobbyist (or their client) could then offer more information in the event the 
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legislator has additional questions. Working with personal staff, then, is a means for indirectly 
sharing information about a bill with the legislator.  
Information sharing is one purpose for working with s aff. Lobbyists also seek 
information from them. Sub15 describes seeking information about a bill sponsored by an 
unresponsive legislator: “I go to their staff and say, ‘Can you help me out?’ or ‘Can you have 
these questions asked?’ Because I can’t get these questions answered.” In this case lobbyists 
recognize that staff can help facilitate their own bill analysis. Elsewhere, Sub15 refers to how 
they work with staff for quick, expert advice on the significance of amendments: “I would call 
this guy, [Name]… who’s brilliant on tax policy, I said, ‘[Name], do we care about this?’ And if 
he said ‘no,’ I didn’t think about it again.” 
Working with committee staff. The experts in this study recognized that committee s aff 
generates bill analyses which will be evaluated as factual and objective by legislators. Meeting 
with staff provides an opportunity to address staff questions, according to Sub6: “They write the 
analysis that folks see, so you really want that anlysis to look like your fact sheet. [All] these 
things you can try to do up front, create less opportunity that a debate goes off the rails.” Several 
other lobbyists concurred that sharing their bill analysis with committee staff was strategically 
important. One lobbyist, Sub5, clarified this: 
[The] staff analysis is given to all the members of the Democrat side, the Republican 
analysis is given to the Republican side. And if they are in sync with one another, the bill 
will have a much better chance of passing out or dying in that committee. [1:17:44] 
Sub5’s point needs a note of explanation. Each state can offer different levels of staff support for 
legislative committees. Study participants were from a state that provides separate committee 
staff for Democrats and Republicans.  
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The analysis here indicates that lobbyists include personal and committee staff as targets 
for information sharing. This reflects a much larger communications strategy operating than one 
might otherwise recognize. Figure 4.4 graphically il ustrates this finding. More about this is 
presented later in the discussion of study implications. 
 
Figure 4.4 Expert Lobbyists Share Information as Strategic Communications. Lobbyists emphasized the 
necessity of communicating directly with individual legislators. They also made it clear that they work 
with other members of the legislature, including committee staff and legislator personal staff, as ways of 
sharing information. Approaching information sharing strategically, in this way, increases the likelihood 





Chapter 5 Results: The Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model 
Anybody who says you go out and sell one message one way  
is not going to be a successful lobbyist. (Sub15) 
This chapter focuses on lobbyist decisions about sharing information with state 
legislators to achieve various legislative and pre-legislative objectives.  The decisions are 
represented by the Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model. (See Figure 5.2, at the end of 
the chapter, for a graphical representation of the decision model.) The model represents the five 
key steps expert lobbyists follow as they decide what information to share with a particular 
legislator.  The section looks at each step in depth, offering thick description of what study 
participants stated, as evidence of what is being proposed in the corresponding Step. Each Step 
description also includes identification of various elements. These elements include choices 
available to the lobbyist; knowledge needs associated with the step; and corresponding 
knowledge strategies used to generate knowledge needed at that step. Institutions, in the form of 
rules and norms, are also identified during the various steps where applicable.  
Expert lobbyists are selective about the information hey share with state legislators. The 
selection process is one of tailoring. Lobbyists tailor their information by using what they know 
about their bill, the legislator hierarchy, and thelegislator’s district.  Experts also use short-cuts 
to expedite information sharing with legislators. How lobbyists employ short cuts is also 
examined. 
In the following section, a detailed examination of the Tailored Information Sharing 
Decision Model is presented. The 5-step decision model reflects how expert lobbyists in the 
study select information they share with individual legislators. The five steps are: 
Step 1: Decide the “Ask(s)” 
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Step 2: Strategy Selection 
Step 3: Obtain and Select Information 
Step 4: Plan Delivery 
Step 5: Deliver and Evaluate the Ask(s) 
Each step is discussed, along with choices available during that step. Where lobbyists use 
specific types of knowledge, those types are identifi d. Strategies lobbyists use to generate 
relevant knowledge are explored.  
Step 1: Decide the “Ask(s)” 
The first step a lobbyist must take is to decide what t ey are asking of the specific 
legislator. Some scholars refer to this as the “proximate political objective” (Hall & Deardorff, 
2006). More than one interviewee referred to this as the “Ask.” (The “Ask” will be used 
henceforth when referring to the proximate political objective in study results.) 
The Ask, or asking for what you want, is essential. As Sub2 notes concerning a desired 
bill amendment, “At any rate, they changed it. The Senate approved it and it went back [to the 
House], and so if I never asked it would never have got done.”  
For most lobbyists, making an Ask was very simple. Sub6: “But when it comes to bills 
you can have more concrete Asks around, ‘would you be a bill sponsor?,’ then you, you just start 
asking them and you get a sense of who really emerges.” In this case, Sub6 had already narrowed 
the field of potential sponsors, based on issue priorities and voting behaviors.  
Pre-legislative Asks. There were two primary goals or Asks lobbyists made that would 
constitute pre-legislative Asks. Specifically, these were getting feedback on a proposal and 
increasing a legislator’s understanding of a proposal. Asking for feedback can be used to alter the 
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proposal to increase likelihood of passage. Feedback c n also be used to gauge the level of 
support for the proposal.  
Several lobbyists indicated meeting with legislators to discuss legislative issues and 
proposals. Sub12, reflecting on changing a strategy in working with a powerful committee 
leader, noted, “And so early on in the last two years anyway, what we’ve done, in the last two 
years anyway, we’ve gone in and sat down and talked to her ahead of time.” Such meetings 
usually took place at the district office, during summers, when time was more plentiful. 
A few lobbyists also sought feedback pre-legislatively to assess a bill’s political 
feasibility. Such meetings included getting information on how to draft the bill to increase 
support and dampen opposition. Sub6 relates how they “use closer friends as informants:” 
There are sort of leaders on our issue, and people we think are influential, we might want 
to talk to, to get their read. If I have an idea but I’m not sure how it’s going to go over, I 
might say, “[Representative Y] …what do you guys think, if we brought something like 
this? How do you think the caucus would react?”  
Pre-legislative objectives can include sensitizing legislators to new issues. Sub11 recalled 
how passing a bill, which was new for the state, but which several states had already passed, 
required engaging legislators for years with information: “So you started educating people on 
what the advantages of the plan were, and not oversell it, and we eventually passed it. It took a 
few years to do, it didn’t happen in one year.” Providing information on proposed legislation can 
also be a mark of lobbyist expertise.  
Legislative Asks. Legislative Asks are often associated with seeking bill passage. More 
than half the lobbyists indicated they would ask a legislator to serve as sponsor (“chief sponsor” 
or “principal sponsor”) for a bill they wanted to introduce. Identifying a potential bill sponsor is 
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“one of the first key decisions” the lobbyist makes (Sub9). It can be driven by the lobbyist’s 
strategy, including knowledge about likely committees one’s bill would be assigned to. Sub8 
offers the norm that: 
You typically will choose as a bill sponsor someone that either sits on that committee that 
you have a good relationship with; hopefully it is he chair. Or you choose a legislator 
that you’ve worked with before, who has a reputation for working well with you, and 
supports your issue. 
Lobbyists are also cognizant that bill sponsorship can mean asking the legislator to face various 
challenges. As Sub10 said, “I try to find a very good sponsor, somebody that I know cares about 
the issue, cares about it deeply. So that they don’t just give up on it.” Strong relationships 
facilitate obtaining bill sponsors, as Sub3 notes, “[if you] give them a bill and it sounds half-way 
plausible, they’ll sponsor it for you.” 
Lobbyists frequently noted they might ask a legislator to sign on as a co-sponsor, or to 
“support” the bill by casting a “yes” vote. These approaches often happen when lobbyists are 
promoting a bill introduced by others,. Asks can also increase progressively, from lesser to 
greater commitment. As Sub15 offers,  
[The] first thing is to get a legislator to tell you they’re interested in your bill, that they 
support your bill, and secondly, if they support it, would they be willing to sponsor it or 
co-sponsor it. So it’s a methodical process. [12:38] 
Much of what has been identified thus far is related to undecided or other “getable” 
legislators. Lobbyists also make Asks of other legislators along the continuum. For instance, a 
few lobbyists stated they seek confirmation from legislators they know already support their 
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issues. Sub 11 affirms this point, indicating, “[You] might firm them up, [saying to the legislator] 
‘I assume you’re okay with that bill?’ And that might be the end of the conversation.” 
Opposed legislators. Lobbyists approach not only legislators who are undecided, 
“getable,” or already supportive; they also approach opposed legislators, under varying 
circumstances and with different objectives.  Study participants offered a nuanced understanding 
of the objectives they seek when talking about a bill with opposed legislators. In particular, Sub 
11 offered a unique perspective noting that lobbyists should always talk with whoever is the 
opinion leader associated with the bill of interest. Even if that person is opposed to the bill, it is
imperative he/she be approached: 
If a bill comes up, they’re going to say, “Joe, is this a good bill, a bad bill, what do you 
think about it?” Do they always follow him? No. But you always go… you better talk to 
him and try to get him on board, because he’s viewed as the in-house expert. [1:05:30]  
Talking with opposed legislators is clearly of strategic importance. The lobbyist can also 
increase likelihood of bill passage by dampening down pposition. Sub3 mentions the effects of 
addressing an opposed opinion leader’s questions: “[The] one thing she didn’t do was she didn’t 
debate it on the floor. You know if you can’t get them to vote for you, if you can at least keep 
them quiet, so that they don’t influence anybody else, that’s important.” [38:15]  
Other lobbyists identified other objectives in relation to opposed legislators. Sub9 stresses 
the normative nature of talking with opposed legislators: “[Talk] to everyone to make sure they 
understand why we want them to vote against the bill. … at least they’ll be contacted on it. The 
worst they can do is disagree with our position.” Sub9 then points out that a legislator’s “no” is 
only a first step: “And then you try to understand that ‘no,’, and try to get that ‘no’ to a ‘maybe.’ 
And then if you get to a ‘maybe’ you go to the next step and try to get to a ‘yes.’” Lobbyists may 
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also ask the legislator to effectively oppose the bill by “taking a walk” and not voting on the bill 
at a critical juncture in the legislative process.  
The objective of talking with opposed legislators, then, might not be to “move” them to 
change their mind or their vote. Instead, it might be to dampen their opposition, or to understand 
the legislator, as well as invite the legislator to “understand” the other side of the issue. 
Moreover, working with opposed legislators can also reflect a long-term view of lobbying.  
Sub14 qualifies talking with opposed legislators, stating, “They’re not ignored, but we 
might be respectful and not try to push them very much either.” Part of Sub14’s point was that a 
legislator might oppose one of the lobbyist’s bills, and yet support another—even during the 
same legislative session.  Almost all the lobbyists both echoed and emphasized the need to 
respect legislators regardless of their position on any bill.  
Insider lobbying. A lobbyist can also ask legislators to lobby other legislators on a bill. 
This Ask is known in the literature as “insider lobbying,” and only rarely came up when 
discussing incidents with lobbyists. In one instance, Sub3, working with a “favorable” legislator 
from one party, had identified about ten caucus members who might be “getable,” but their bill 
position was unknown.  Sub3 relates:  
[A] number of his colleagues… they were not favorable or had some significant 
questions and were not giving us any sign that theyw re going to jump to our side 
anytime soon. And we kind of relied on him,… He offered to talk to maybe five of his 
colleagues that he felt particularly close to, to convince them. 
A final objective the lobbyist might pursue through information sharing is related to bill 
passage. These incidents went well beyond asking a le islator for their vote. Rather, information 
was being shared, and other activities were being co ducted, in close coordination with the 
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legislative bill sponsor. Sub1 described sending information to a Senator about a bill being 
debated in a House hearing and offered a perspective concerning why such arrangements 
between lobbyists and legislators exist: 
Legislators have a million demands on their time, from committees they chair, to 
constituents visiting them, to just the rigmarole of the schedule they have. And if they 
have trust in lobbyists working on issues they deeply care about, that’s a function of them 
not being able to be everywhere at once. 
Such incidents reflected a process of subsidization of the legislator, acting on behalf of the bill 
sponsor, or acting like an additional staff person for the bill sponsor.  
Lobbyist Asks might be singular or reflect a combinat on. That is, the lobbyist might 
begin by asking a legislator to support a bill, butthen follow that Ask with another representing 
even greater support or commitment. This might come in the form of signing on as a co-sponsor, 
or engaging colleagues as part of insider lobbying, for example. Figure 5.1 presents the types of 
Asks a lobbyist might make during Step 1. 
 
Figure 5.1 The Variety of “Asks” made of Legislators. During Step 1, lobbyists must decide the 
proximate political objective of  the “Ask” they want to make of each legislator in order to 
accomplish their legislative goal. Asks may be made in r lation to proposed legislation (pre-
legislative Asks), a new bill, or bills currently under legislative consideration. Lobbyists also 
combine Asks, for instance, seeking legislators’ understanding as a prelude to asking for their 
vote, support, or sponsorship.  
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Step 2: Strategy Selection 
Three primary strategies were identified which guided information sharing decisions: 
informing; persuasion; and subsidization or subsidy. These strategies are examined next. How 
lobbyists appear to combine strategies is also explored. 
Informing strategies. There are essentially two aims when employing an Informing 
strategy. First, informing is used when the Ask is to increase understanding, or to dampen 
opposition to an issue or piece of legislation. Second, informing strategies can be used to obtain 
feedback on current or proposed legislation. 
Informing to increase understanding and dampen opposition. Sub3 indicated the 
importance of informing individual legislators, espcially to increase understanding of more 
technical bills: “But there was a disagreement…so in vetting that, we had to go to our sponsor, 
and explain to the sponsor what we’re trying to do, it’s …a legal process that a lot of people 
don’t understand.” In this case, Sub3 uses extensiv knowledge to help explain what a bill seeks 
to accomplish, assisting the legislator (the sponsor) in understanding the bill. This helps prepare 
the sponsor to address concerns and “disagreements” from other legislators. Several other 
lobbyists also recognized the importance of helping sponsors in this way. 
Sub11 also noted the strategic role played by informing, but as a strategy to new 
legislation becoming law: 
[That] bill had been out there for forever. And eventually, I don’t say you wore people 
down, but I think the social mores changed, the attitudes changed and that kind of thing. 
But that bill was a long time coming of just…of putting fact sheets in front of 
[legislators], having constituents talk to them who were affected or afraid they might be 
affected, and that kind of thing. [39:00] 
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In this strategy, information is being shared to also increase issue salience among legislators.  
Informing for feedback. Informing can also be a strategy for generating feedback on a 
piece of legislation. Sub6, recalling efforts to draft a bill that failed to advance through the 
legislature, points out: “[But] we met with …you know, you brainstorm ‘Who are some of the 
folks who would have an opinion about this?’ Talk about what we’re trying to do; show them the 
language; get their feedback and input.” [17:50] In this instance, Sub6 revised the bill (“made 
pretty extensive changes to the language we had last ye r over [the] summer”), facilitating the 
bill’s passage by a wide margin when it was refiled. Several other lobbyists shared similar 
instances of soliciting feedback on bills from legislators, including identifying “red flags” in the 
language, etc.  
It should be emphasized that informing strategies reflect both one-way and two-way 
information sharing processes. One-way information sharing reflects the goal of changing the 
legislator in some way. This might include changing what they understand about an issue or a 
bill, serving an “enlightenment” purpose.  Two-way information sharing captures how lobbyists 
not only share information about current or proposed legislation, but also intentionally seek 
information about such from legislators.  
Informing legislators can work to pre-empt questions at key junctures, for example, once 
it has been assigned to committee. Sub3 reflects, working with committee members, “[Once] 
somebody starts asking questions, they get totally on the wrong track, they don’t understand the 
bill, so they’re asking questions that have nothing to do with the bill, …and it throws the sponsor 
off.” Informing then serves to address questions before they are asked, thus limiting the 
likelihood of “inappropriate” questions being asked. 
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One lobbyist (Sub13) also indicated having to inform a Minority party leader about the 
“politics” of another caucus member’s district. This was done to help the leader understand why 
the caucus member should be supported in voting for a bill, even though that vote was contrary 
to their party’s official position. Here again, the aim of informing was to dampen opposition—
not to a bill, but to a fellow legislator’s vote onthat controversial bill. 
Understanding does not necessarily mean agreement. That is, a legislator might 
understand a proposed legislative change, and be uncertain about whether to support or oppose 
such. Helping legislators move from understanding to deciding, including voting for or against a 
bill, is at the heart of persuasion strategies. This also draws attention to how strategies may 
operate in combination.  
Persuasion strategies. Persuasion involves convincing legislators about how their 
decision relates to their interests and priorities. This might mean drawing attention to how a bill 
is important, and how its outcome is related to the legislator’s interests. In the above case, Sub13 
convinced a party leader to support a caucus member’s difficult vote by not openly chastising the 
member. The member then had the latitude to vote accordingly, thereby not jeopardizing 
reelection.  Without the leader’s support, the membr may have voted otherwise, and likely 
would have lost reelection. Losing one more seat in n upcoming election would be anathema to 
the Party leader. 
Sub4 recognizes that persuasion can involve appealing to a legislator’s preferences: 
“[You] just come up with another idea to see if you get their attention, get their interest, …. It 
still goes back to that hierarchy, you know, “what do they care about?”—they should care about 
saving this money,…” In persuasion the lobbyist attempts to draw the legislator’s attention to the 
bill or issue. Another lobbyist, Sub10, referred to this as “making the argument” or taking “the 
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angle” with a legislator. This latter reference to sport fishing suggests the lobbyist is seeking to 
catch not a fish, but a legislator’s attention, support, vote, etc. through argumentation. 
Sub5 put it succinctly, concerning efforts to oppose a bill: “So anyway, you put out 
scenarios where this thing could go totally wrong.” Sub11 discussed trying “to target four or five 
[Minority party legislators] we thought were susceptible to the argument and you could go after.” 
[39:18] Persuasion, then, involves evaluating legislator argument susceptibility.  
Lobbyists also seek to persuade legislators to champion a bill as bill sponsors or co-
sponsors. As Sub9 recalls, “We actually went to [Representative X’s] district office, early on, 
because [we knew, based on their background], we knew she would understand the issues.” 
Persuasion can include enlisting the assistance of supportive legislators in persuading 
other undecided legislators. This was the case when Sub3 approached a strongly supportive 
legislator to look over a short list of undecided fllow caucus members and identify those they 
might “feel comfortable talking with” about the bill. Persuasion can also be aimed at asking 
supportive legislators to help dampen opposition. Sub6 made reference to recruiting supportive 
legislators to defend the bill in case an opposed opini n leader decides to challenge it during 
debate: 
We’ve asked some of our friends to be prepared if that person does get up and say certain 
things, that they try to counter it. You can do some of that.[20:58] 
Persuasion can aim to increase legislator awareness of certain outcomes. Sometimes, 
those efforts might not be sufficiently convincing. Like several other lobbyists, Sub11 offered a 
general perspective on those types of legislators: 
[If] your judgment is “I know I’m going to put 500 people or a thousand people out of 
work, but I think it’s more important to fund a road program,” [then] okay, you’re the 
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legislator. That’s your judgment. All I can do is make you aware of what I think are the 
consequences of your action or inaction is. [59:54] 
Sub11, like other lobbyists, recognized they would never be successful informing, persuading, or 
otherwise “moving” every legislator on every bill.  
Subsidy strategies. Once a legislator agrees to sponsor a bill, lobbyists can then pursue a 
strategy of subsidization. To review, the informational lobbying literature indicates subsidy 
includes providing labor, costly information, and political intelligence.  
Most lobbyists in this study indicated working with sponsors to subsidize the work of 
those legislators with their own labor. Lobbyist labor included providing the sponsor with 
additional information, such as talking points which could be used during debate. Several 
lobbyists also indicated they or their clients could be called upon to give hearing testimony, or 
even act as the expert during hearings, and respond to committee members’ questions—on behalf 
of the sponsor.  
Labor could also include reporting on progress being made in relation to a bill. Sub1, for 
instance, provided such information on a bill undergoing revisions in the House to the sponsor of 
the same bill in the Senate.  
Labor can include writing the bill language. Several lobbyists indicated they participated 
directly in writing of draft legislation, including in coordination with a sponsor. As Sub12 
recalls, “So we’ve had a mutual respect and she’s ben the sponsor for a number of our bills, and 
on one occasion, we had prepared a bill ahead of time, [and] took it into her before she filed it.” 
Sub1 also noted how they participated in “editing ad negotiating provisions” of a bill. 
Sub3 outlines the steps undertaken on behalf of a piece of legislation: “Once we secured 
a sponsor, we had to write the bill. We wrote the bill, got some groups to support it, and then we 
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talked to some of the other committee members.” In this case, subsidization of writing the bill 
and gathering political support reflects efforts made by Sub3 and lobbyist colleagues as part of 
the overall process of pursuing bill passage.  
Learning of lobbyists’ ability to work so closely with a legislator and the lawmaking 
process might alter one’s image of who is actually responsible for making state law. That said, 
one must also wonder under what conditions a legislator might engage lobbyists in such a close 
collaboration. Sub12 offered the following: 
If you have this confidence with the lawmaker, you can go to a lawmaker and say, 
“we’ve got an idea about this particular legislation and we want to try to prepare, and can 
we go ahead and get it drafted?” and they’ll say, “Sure, use my name.”   
This was not the only mention of such close collabor ti ns between lobbyist and legislator. It 
also speaks to the significance of relationship. That is, lobbyists are capable of earning the 
confidence of legislators over time. Such confidence can then be rewarded by lobbyists’ direct 
participation in writing legislation, for example. 
This doesn’t necessarily mean the legislator completely abdicates responsibility for the 
bill. In fact, Sub12 noted that one bill drafted with this type of agreement was soundly rejected 
by the intended sponsor. Upon reading the draft legislation, the legislator told Sub12, “No, no, 
no, I disagree with this. I can’t sponsor this. You go find somebody else if you want to introduce 
it.” 
Several lobbyists noted they do not restrict providing their labor to bill sponsors or co-
sponsors. Sub13 pointed out: 
And you know sometimes legislators or staff will, they’ll even ask us for talking points 
on how they can, they may get two dozen, or 200 emails about something. Some…not 
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always, and not all legislators, but sometimes they’d like some help in, “what do I say to 
them about this that and the other thing?” 
Relatedly, Sub1 noted that a legislator realized that his Ask on a bill represented a tough vote for 
him.  The legislator then requested the lobbyist organize town hall meetings and send 
information to the legislator’s constituents, to “educate them” on the issue. Clearly these requests 
by the legislator represented lobbyist labor.  
Subsidy strategy has usually been associated with bill sponsors or co-sponsors. Mirrored 
by several other lobbyists, the above scenarios provide evidence that lobbyists subsidize or 
provide costly information (e.g., talking points, etc.) to non-sponsors as well. Such legislators are 
usually those whose votes are “tough” or more difficult to get than other legislators. In those 
cases, lobbyist subsidy serves to support legislator ’ difficult decisions by providing “decision 
support.” This represents a useful refinement of legis ative subsidy theory. 
Combination strategies. Three primary strategies have been identified as emerging from 
data analysis: informing, persuasion, and subsidy. It would be a mistake, however, to suggest 
that lobbyists always choose one strategy and exclude all others. Rather, study participants 
typically used more than one strategy at a time, or used strategies sequentially, but in doing so, 
they appeared to emphasize one strategy more than oers. The primary was determined by 
identifying the lobbyist’s proximate objective. So, if the lobbyist wanted to help a legislator 
“understand” something, then the primary strategy would be informing. Alternately, if the 
objective was to “move” an undecided legislator to cast a particular vote, then the primary 
strategy would be persuasion. Sub9 offers a clear example of a combination strategy:  
[We] wanted to make sure she fully understood what could potentially happen so 
that…so we gave her the opportunity of saying, we’d love to have her as chief co-
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sponsor, but we understood that you know, if this goes…if it happens that the opposition 
becomes so hot, she would be free to decide to go off, if she chose to. [20:59] 
In this incident, Sub9 provides substantive information about the bill and about the likely level of 
political opposition, in an effort to fully inform the legislator’s decision concerning becoming a 
“chief co-sponsor.”  This reflects the combination strategy of informing and persuading. 
Lobbyists might use strategies sequentially and reiteratively as well. For instance, as 
noted above, Sub3 said: “Once we secured a sponsor, we had to write the bill, we wrote the bill, 
got some groups to support it, and then we talked to some of the other committee members,…” 
So, a lobbyist might begin with generally informing a legislator about a bill, followed by 
persuading the legislator to become a sponsor, and then writing the bill. This reflects an inform-
persuasion-subsidy sequence of strategies. The lobbyist might then work to persuade other 
legislators for their vote. Figure 5.2 graphically illustrates strategy choices.  
 
Figure 5.2 Lobbyist Information Sharing Strategies. Three primary strategies are available to 
lobbyists: informing, subsidy, and persuasion. These may be used independently, sequentially, or 
in combination. For instance, a primarily informing strategy is used to increase legislator 
understanding of a legislative proposal during the pre- legislative phase (left of the vertical 
dashed line). Informing overlaps persuasion or subsidy, in order to persuade legislators for their 
sponsorship or vote—reflecting a combination strategy.  
Step 3: Obtain and Select Information 
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Step 3 represents the point at which the lobbyist selects the information to share with the 
legislator. Lobbyists interviewed actively use their knowledge of the legislator, the legislator’s 
district, and the bill to guide this information selection process. They choose the information they 
believe is most important to the legislator.  
Lobbyists share different types of information, in various formats. In this section, those 
types and formats are explored. These include fact sheets, which represent the foundational 
information a lobbyist will typically present to a legislator and their staff. The fact sheet reflects 
the most important information about a bill or issue. Expert lobbyists also then select more 
specific information about a bill, which they predict is most important or of interest to a 
particular legislator. This selection process is guided by the lobbyist’s “analysis” of what they 
know about the legislator, their legislative district, and from their bill analysis. This analytic 
product is called the Tailored Bill Analysis. How lobbyists appear to conduct such an analysis is 
examined at the end of this section. Lobbyists alsoprovide specialized information to meet 
particular needs of specific legislators, as part of lobbyist subsidy.  
Fact sheets. All lobbyists emphasized the use of the one-page “fact sheet,” also referred 
to as the “one-pager” or “pass-out.” Generally, the fact sheet is a brief, one- or two-sided 
document, presenting carefully worded information about the bill. Almost all the lobbyists said 
they present these fact sheets to both legislators nd their staff. Sub15 offers that bills they are 
“pushing strongly” will require developing a fact sheet: “[We] will put out a general fact sheet 
that we will send to every member of the General Assembly. [It] just says, ‘Here’s the bill… 
Here’s what it does,… why we’re supporting,’ and we’ll blast it out.” This particular approach 
might be part of an informing strategy. Moreover, it offers the same information to every 
legislator. It reflects what some might also call an “info drop.” It should be noted that none of the 
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expert lobbyists ever indicated this was the only approach they took in sharing information with 
legislators about a bill. Rather, it served as a foundation for additional, more selective 
information sharing and communication, which will be examined later. 
Developing effective fact sheets involves deciding what to include. Part of that decision 
is informed by what the lobbyist finds particularly important to legislators. When asked how they 
choose which points to include, Sub6 notes, “Well, if it’s important to that one guy, it’s probably 
important to others.” Sub6 finishes by saying: 
So if [a specific point] matters, we’ll make sure it shows up. And then it’s all about “how 
does that look? How are you bulleting it?” We’ve come a long way on getting a lot less 
words on the page, and the ones that are there are clearly the important ones. 
Information selected for fact sheets depends not just on knowledge about the bill, but also on 
what is known about different groups of legislators. This characterizes the process for several 
lobbyists interviewed as well. As such, fact sheets r flect a first phase of information winnowing 
by lobbyists.  The selection process is based, in part, upon group-level knowledge, reflecting 
information targeting. 
Sometimes an additional fact sheet might be created if opponents are disseminating 
counter-arguments. Sub9 recalls:  
Yeah. Sometimes we are creating another fact sheet at that point in time. We did in this 
case, created a “myth versus fact” sheet to counteract what was being said on this issue.  
Such was generated by Sub9’s firm after the bill had been passed out of committee, and 
was heading for a floor vote. According to the lobbyist, its purpose, in part, was to solidify the 
positions of legislators who had committed their votes for the bill, but were wavering in light of 
the opposition’s “rhetoric.”  
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A few lobbyists indicated they would also update a fact sheet if their bill was amended. 
Only one lobbyist indicated willingness to create a special fact sheet, but only for a committee 
with highly specialized legislative responsibilities and specialized, expert knowledge not held by 
other members of the legislature. (Such a committee might be one addressing tax policy, for 
example.) No one mentioned writing fact sheets specifically for Democrats or Republicans. 
Knowledge strategy: Creating fact sheets. Sub9 notes that fact sheets rely upon their bill 
analysis knowledge: “That is the first step—having a full understanding of the [bill’s] 
background.” The aim is to communicate information clearly and simply to legislators. Sub5 
serves as the de facto editor of fact sheets created by their firm. In addition to editing and 
purging of technical, industry jargon, Sub5 humorously frames this role: “[If] I can understand 
an issue and it’s explained on that [level], then most legislators can. ‘Cause I’m not the brightest 
light bulb in the world. …If it’s too long, too technical, they’re not going to get it.” This echoes 
what most lobbyists indicated were the general qualities of effective fact sheets. Other qualities 
included “simplicity” (Sub16), and “lots of white space“ (Sub2). Fact sheets might be formatted 
in different ways. Per Sub3, this includes “bullet-pointed,…text boxes, or even PowerPoint 
presentations.” 
For contract lobbyists, fact sheets can be generated by the client. As Sub10 points out, 
“So almost always…the client will prepare the information, sometimes we do, but it’s generally 
when we think an argument wouldn’t work with legislators.” Additionally, lobbyists can 
generate fact sheets based on the work of others. Sub9 explains how they utilized information 
generated by groups in other states seeking to pass similar bills. In that case, the fact sheet 
created “was an amalgamation of both original concepts of our bill, [state name] specific, and 
some of the similar continued arguments from other states.”  
94 
 
Argumentation. It is important that lobbyists be prepared to share what they know about 
their opposition. This includes not just who is oppsed to the lobbyist’s position. It also includes 
being able to share the opposition’s arguments that they will likely be presenting to the legislator.  
Once the opposition’s arguments are known, the lobbyist can use them to generate 
counter-arguments, which can be shared with the legislator. Sharing includes saying what the 
other side will present, plus the rebuttal to the opposition’s argument. Sub4 is adamant: “You 
always tell them the downside,” and then proceed to ou line what should follow: “[This] is what 
they’re going to say. And this is my response to it.” So when that guy comes to his office and he 
makes the point, they’ve already heard it—…[including] my response.” Sub4 offers how the 
legislator might then treat the opposition: “And myguy, he might say [to the opposition, when 
they visit], “Yeah, I know about that, but what about what [Sub4] says?” Now [the opposition’s] 
gotta explain again, [but] to my response.” 
Presenting counter-arguments or rebuttals can be pre- mptive. That is, expert lobbyists 
who are the first to talk with the legislator about the bill can make their perspective the reference 
point for the legislator on how to think (and vote).  This is done to neutralize the opposition. 
Sub4 refers to this as getting “out in front of thestory,” noting that trial lawyers use such 
techniques. Several lobbyists noted the value of this approach.  
One lobbyist offered an interesting caveat to this approach, indicating it is not without 
risk. Also referencing legal tactic, Sub11 said: 
Don’t anticipate a defense. Because you might…some f these bills, the opposition may 
not show up. You know, you’re assuming they’re working as hard as you are—maybe 
they are, maybe they aren’t; maybe they didn’t target the guy that you just left. 
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Presenting one’s argument along with rebuttals to opposition arguments becomes a rule, 
however, as Sub11 concludes:  
[But] I would rather [present the opposition’s argument] for two reasons. One, you got to 
assume the other side is going to work the member—they might not, but you got to 
assume that. And second, I think it’s important for y ur long term relationship with the 
member that they understand the other side of the argument. [1:22:46] 
The rule, then, is that lobbyists presenting opposition arguments with rebuttals to the legislator 
can result in an enhanced relationship, as well as p acing the opposition at a rhetorical 
disadvantage. 
Knowing both the position and the actual arguments of hose who oppose their position 
appears to be a key factor differentiating expert from amateur lobbyists, and can affect the 
lobbying strategy. For instance, Sub8 talks about trying to prepare client’s members to talk with 
their legislators about a bill and the opposition: “And we try to tell our grassroots lobbyists [their 
legislators] will ask that question as well. And they are beginning, they do sometimes get that.” 
Sub8 then explains what happens instead: “[Our] grassroots lobbyists will go in, and really 
convince a legislator that this is a good idea, and then they get to the point of ‘what does 
[opposition group X] think about it?’, and they say [they’re opposed.’” But without presenting 
the rebuttal to the opposition group’s argument, the legislator’s position can change back, 
convinced instead by the opposition. To the extent Sub8’s grassroots lobbyists are less capable of 
indicating and rebutting the oppositions’ arguments, the overall legislative strategy effectiveness 
might be hampered.  
Knowledge strategy: Creating arguments. Argument construction can be a collaborative 
process. Arguments can also be identified by asking colleagues, even sponsors of bills previously 
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defeated, for their recollections (Sub10). This section will briefly explore how arguments are 
created. This will include examination of the importance of word choice as well. 
When asked, most lobbyists indicated they create arguments with the help of colleagues. 
As Sub15 stated, “You just say, “How do you think this works? What works and doesn’t work?” 
and you just got to get other people’s perspective to try to figure it out.” Sub6 pointed out how 
analysts in their firm often provide various arguments in relation to a particular bill. Their next 
step is to critically review those to determine which are most likely to “work” with legislators.  
Word choice. Most lobbyists indicated sensitivity to phrasing and word choice. Some of 
this sensitivity focused on making information “user-friendly” (Sub8), or putting information in 
“layman terms” (Sub2). Others indicated such care was aimed at eliminating confusing jargon 
(Sub5). Lobbyists seek help from supportive legislators to identify and eliminate words or terms 
which might appear to others as “red flags,” engenderi g unwanted opposition (Sub3). Sub3 
noted that those represent words which might have ideological connotations. They can often be 
replaced with less value-laden terms without affecting he bill’s meaning.  
In the following example, the lobbyist confirms the relationship between word selection 
and ideology in arguments. Here, “choice” is used intentionally to emphasize the conservatively 
held value of individual freedom and liberty in orde  to get a conservative legislator’s support:  
Sub15: [My] mission with the conservative representative is to say, ”We just want to 
make sure there are these [groups] available, and you can select who you want in the 
[provider group]. We’re not telling you who has to be in the network, but it just has to be 
some minimum standards.” And she loved it. It’s exactly what she wanted. She was like, 
“So, you’re not telling me… my constituents don’t have to go to…they just…I want to 
maintain a choice for them.” I said, “Exactly.”  
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Researcher:  Interesting. Did she use the word “choice”? 
Sub15: Absolutely.  
Researcher: And did you guys use the word “choice” as well? 
Sub15: Absolutely.  [18:36]  
Both word choice and phrasing of arguments can havean ffect on a legislator. Even the 
phrasing of the “Ask” is important. When preparing to ask a legislator to persuade other 
representatives from the same party by generating a list of ten names, Sub3 stated,  
You don’t know who he has relationships with. It’s really the way you couch it. You 
don’t say, “Hey, will you talk to so and so?” You would say, “Is there anyone you would 
be comfortable talking to?” You let him bring up the names. 
Sub3 is careful to limit assumptions, and phrases th  Ask to the co-sponsoring Minority party 
member as an open-ended question. Doing so makes the Ask an invitation rather than a directive.  
Tailoring. The communication process between expert lobbyists and legislators featured 
a very important characteristic as well, that of tailoring. At least a third of the lobbyists explicitly 
used the term to describe how they seek to go beyond the information on the fact sheet, and 
select information to meet the specific needs and interests of particular legislators. As Sub6 
pointed out, fact sheets are meant not as the end of i formation sharing, but rather the beginning. 
Sub10 frames this approach more in marketing terms of “knowing your audience:” 
When you go talk to…say you’re going to give a speech somewhere on your dissertation 
here, right? You need to know your audience. And it’s no different than me knowing my 
audience. And that’s why companies pay me, because they know that I know what…how 
to approach certain legislators. [20:06] 
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Assessing the audience includes determining what the legislator likely already knows 
about the issue or bill, and their relationship to the issue. As Sub5 states, “It’s always on my 
mind, ‘How do I approach her on this issue? What is her connection? What does she know about 
it?’” 
Sub10 adds, “I think you have to approach each bill differently, each legislator 
differently, and then make sure you understand the facts.” Tailoring is also reflected when Sub9 
notes how, as a lobbyist, they, “emphasize one point more than others, because that’s a higher 
priority message point [for a specific legislator] than the others.” Sub13 also offers how they use 
the fact sheet as the foundation for such selectivity, “I may have five things or three things, or 
six, whatever, but I’m pretty confident one or two things on [the fact sheet] that you’re going to 
pay attention to. I’m probably going to emphasize those one or two things.”  
In the case where the legislative goal is to kill a bill, the content of a message or an 
argument can include information that increases uncertainty about a bill’s effects. Analyzing 
arguments created to undermine support for a bill, Sub5 states: “So anyway, you put out 
scenarios where this thing could go totally wrong.” [1:02:20] 
Lobbyists also recognize legislators vary in their ability to understand information. As 
Sub6 said, [You] have to meet everybody where they ar , for some of them, they’re 
handling a million issues, and it’s just a capacity issue. There are other lawmakers, 
they’re never going to follow the rationale with you. [13:15] 
Information sharing, including tailoring, is, therefore, more conditional than determined. 
As, Sub13 stated, “I’m probably going to emphasize…”, while Sub6 offered “You just have to 
sort of modify…”  But how do lobbyists reduce or narrow down for themselves what they will 
share with a particular policymaker, beyond the fact sheet? Sub15 explains:  
99 
 
So, there’s 177 legislators and the governor’s office…. Before you walk into any 
legislator’s office, okay, you have to know the ground rules:… you have to know where 
they’re from; you got to know their background; you got to know how they got there; you 
have to know what their priorities are; and you have to tailor the message potentially 177 
different ways, okay? [10:57] 
Knowing about the legislators, including their priorities, is thus related to tailoring.  That 
is, lobbyists can use what they know about legislator priorities to narrow down the information 
which might be of greatest interest to the legislator. Another strategy is asking legislators or their 
staff what information they need (Sub7).  
Tailoring was especially important where the lobbyist was persuading a legislator for 
his/her vote, which differs from Information lobbyists select when seeking to persuade a 
legislator to sponsor a bill. Several lobbyists emphasized the importance of fully disclosing 
everything known about the bill (bill analysis) when seeking to persuade a legislator to sponsor a 
bill. One lobbyist stated, “You need to be completely naked” about the bill with such legislators. 
Describing a meeting with a potential sponsor, Sub9 noted, preparation involved “a lot of quick 
internet research of what had happened” on the issu both locally and in other states.  
Lobbyists also needed to obtain specialized information when working with a legislator 
as part of a subsidy strategy. Sub1 recalls texting information to a bill sponsor, updating the 
legislator in real time on questions asked about the bill during a hearing, amendments being 
considered, and information signaling changes in legis ators’ support for the bill.  
Knowledge strategy: Tailoring, and the Tailored Bill Analysis. All of the above 
emphasize some sort of relationship between what the lobbyist knows about a legislator, and 
how that knowledge facilitates selection of information to share. Less clear is how lobbyists do 
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the tailoring or “highlighting” (Sub7) of such information. That is, legislators might have many 
preferences or priorities. Sub4 shares the insight gleaned early on from political scientist Charles 
Lindblom: “[He] talks about the experience of trying to influence the legislators…that you 
develop a hierarchy of interests and things that will impact the, that will move the legislator.” 
This ordering then serves to guide their information selection process. Sub4 continues: 
And you begin to understand that, particularly as a member [of the legislature] you know 
that, for any given legislator, the number one thing should be basically, “is this really, 
really hot in my district, is this something my constituents are really…” Some districts 
are heavily Catholic, the abortion issue might be tough; or in a farming district, 
something like that; inner city district, there are going to be certain things; African 
American, there are going to be certain key things that…And so those legislators are 
going to be heavily moved by that.  
In this description, Sub4 states legislators have rnkings, and the lobbyist needs to learn how a 
particular legislator ranks their interests and priorities. This in turn aids in selecting the 
information and arguments believed to be most compelling to the legislator, in relation to a bill.  
Sub4 argues that legislators generally rank constituent interests at the top of their 
hierarchy. Another lobbyist pointed out, however, that sometimes a bill will have no direct effect 
on a legislator’s constituents. In that case, the lobbyist will have to examine other elements of the 
legislator’s hierarchy to guide information selection. For example, Sub13 wanted to get a bill 
passed that was written to circumvent the governor’s unwillingness to strictly adhere to a 
particular state law. The lobbyist knew that the opposed legislator who neeed to be persuaded 
was former military and strongly identified with the military and the rule of law. Sub13 
recollects, “And the [military nickname], his other role in life, that kind of, it doesn’t sit well 
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with them, when you’re not doing what you’re supposed to be doing.” Sub13 concludes: “So we 
literally had about an hour long meeting with him, and laid out, “here’s why you want to have a 
solid [X policy] …” discussion, and “this is the law currently that the governor should…[be 
following but isn’t].” With the assistance of a policy expert, the lobbyist provided extensive 
information about the bill, highlighting how the bill was only necessary because the governor 
refused to execute the law as currently written. Highlighting that the law was being undermined 
hit on the legislator’s priorities, and moved that legislator to support the lobbyist’s position. 
Tailoring is not necessarily a precise information and argument selection process. Rather, 
it reflects making decisions best approximating a legislator’s priorities and interests. Sub4 offers: 
But then, if you’re still trying to move that legislator, and it doesn’t hit upon that 
particular interest, then what might the next thing o  his hierarchy might be…it might be 
“party.” They might weigh, “I don’t really care about my district, but the party,” you 
know... And maybe not party, it might be “personal.” “It’s heavy in my district.” But if 
no one cares, I’m really personally… don’t like this, don’t …this is something that goes 
to my heart.”  
Other lobbyists also noted that some legislators are moved by more personal or “heart” 
arguments on particular issues (e.g., Sub6). Sub4 concludes: 
In the end if it’s not the district, or the party or the person, it might be “I’m going to this, 
quite honestly for my best friend,” or “I can use it as a trade-off.” Or it might be “I just 
don’t care one way or the other; I’m going to see which lobbyist I like more today,” [or] 
“How can I help my lobbyist friend?—you know… [12:00] 
Sub4 was not alone in noting that a bill might not be of any substantive interest to a legislator. 
Sub11 echoed the point that there are some bills which a legislator will simply not care about one 
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way or the other. In such cases, visiting or telephoning legislators and making the Ask might be 
all that’s necessary for their vote. 
A number of aspects Sub4 shared are striking. Lobbyists initially emphasize a bill’s 
relation to a legislator’s district. But then the bulk of their argument focuses on what they know 
about the legislator’s preferences. Those preferencs can be both personal and ideological about 
the legislator’s allegiance to party and/or the importance the legislator places on the bill or issue. 
Sub4 also notes that a legislator might not be deeply concerned about his/her own legislative 
district. This reflects lobbyists’ command of divers  types of knowledge they have of the 
legislator’s hierarchy. Lobbyists analyze such knowledge in relation to both the bill and the 
extent to which that bill addresses something “hot” in the legislator’s district. 
Tailored Bill Analysis. Much about a bill might be generally important. Analyses of a 
legislator’s priorities, district politics, and what is known about the bill allows the expert lobbyist 
to sift through what might be generally important, and identify that which will be most important 
to a particular legislator. “Tailored Bill Analysis” (TBA) is the phrase use to capture this analytic 
process. Nowhere during interviews did lobbyists decribe a methodical process where they 
analyze the interactions between their knowledge about the bill, a legislator’s hierarchy, and 
what they know about the legislator’s district. That is, the TBA is undertaken tacitly. Moreover, 
the TBA is not a precise process, but more an approximation of identifying what will most likely 
“move” the legislator in the desired direction on a bill.  
What might the TBA look like in practice? In one incident, Sub4 is seeking to kill a bill 
for a client. To do so, they must persuade legislators to vote “no.”  In the passage below, they 
offer an analysis of arguments based on their knowledge of what the bill does, what they know 
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about legislator interests, and district-level politics highlighting particular likely outcomes. The 
aim is to draw the legislator’s attention to those plausible outcomes. Sub4: 
This goes back to the hierarchy of needs, the hierarchy of interests. What’s going to be 
the most important to them? Is it going to be the guy who dropped you this nice 
campaign contribution, or is it going to be the guys in the community screaming and 
shouting and saying, “We’re gonna…I’m going to make you use every dime of  [the 
campaign contribution]. Your next election, you’re going to use every dime of it; if you 
make this vote, you are going to have three candidates against you, based upon that vote.“ 
[34:40] 
The excerpt reflects the lobbyist’s thought process, analyzing how they argued with a particular 
legislator to move them from “yes” to “no.” In this incident, Sub4 assumes the legislator wants to 
be reelected, and recognizes the significant campaign funds received from organizations 
proposing the legislation. The lobbyist presents information analyzing the probable effects and 
political ramifications of the legislator’s vote. Sub4’s objective in presenting the above argument 
is to tell particular legislators that voting “yes” on the bill will likely raise the legislator’s 
upcoming electoral costs significantly. The lobbyist goes still further by suggesting that there 
will likely be increased competition even in the primary race.  
Lobbyists use their legislator hierarchy knowledge to generate best guesses or predictions 
about that legislator’s decisions. Such predictions are also fallible. One lobbyist (Sub10) recalled 
talking with a newer legislator who was presumably supportive of a bill, based on the legislator’s 
ideology, what was known about the legislator’s predecessor, and about legislators from the 
same party and neighboring districts. During the exchange, the legislator refused to support the 
lobbyist’s position for highly personal reasons associated with the recent loss of a family 
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member. Sub 10 responded by saying, “I told the person, I apologized and uh I understand” 
Right? And “I know you’re not going to be with me.” You’re not gonna…I’m not gonna beat 
them over the head, right? Cause that’s ingrained.” 
Tailoring can require intelligence gathering about a legislator’s priorities. Lobbyists also 
indicated their approaches for zeroing in on exactly what a legislator wanted to know. Sub7 uses 
the term “tailoring” when determining how to prepare to give committee testimony: “Find out 
what the chairman wants. Ask the staff, “What is the c airman looking at in having this bill? 
What are they looking for? What information are they looking for?” And then you tailor [your 
testimony] based upon that.” Figure 5.3 graphically represents the relationship between lobbyist 
knowledge, the Tailored Bill Analysis, and information selection decisions. 
 
 Figure 5.3 Lobbyist Knowledge used to generate Tailored Bill Analysis (TBA). The three 
different types of knowledge—bill analysis, legislator hierarchy, and political analysis--are 
explored in order to separate out what might be most relevant to the legislator to hear or learn 
about the bill. The lobbyist then prioritizes such facts or information for sharing with the 
particular legislator. 
Step 4: Planning the Delivery 
To review, the lobbyist has determined the Ask(s) in Step 1, and the primary strategy (or 
combination) has been chosen in Step 2. Step 3 involved narrowing down and selecting the 
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information about the bill of highest priority to the legislator, based on the Tailored Bill 
Analysis. The final two steps, Step 4: Planning, and Step 5: Delivering the Information, reflect 
the nuts and bolts of actually sharing the information with the legislator. That is, these last two 
steps represent the “How” of information sharing as a tactic for getting what the lobbyist wants.  
The planning decisions in Step 4 are timing (including duration), place, and who should 
be “in the room,” delivering the information. 
Timing. Timing serves a strategic purpose. That is, there’s an advantage to being the first 
one to inform the legislator. Sub9 states the purpose of being first to present information to the 
legislator about a bill: 
[The] main goal is to make sure that you frame the message at the beginning and 
throughout the whole process, so that if somehow they hear something different, they’ll 
only have the knowledge base of, “I’ve already talked to this guy, he told me something 
completely different. Let me go back and check in wth the guy who told me first.”  
Sub9 continues: 
And so, if you’ve gotten to them first, and you have the relationships strong enough that 
you have, [the legislator] will call you and say, “Hey, I just heard this. Is this accurate?” 
or “I’m hearing this, what do you think about it?,” whether it’s a legislator or a staffer. 
[37:10] 
Being first in sharing information, with either a legislator or staff, offers an advantage—
especially when coupled with a strong relationship. S ecifically, the two elements increase the 
likelihood that the legislator will privilege the lobbyist’s information over that which is presented 
by the lobbyist’s opponent. Recognizing the importance of being first, Sub10 also adds, “You try 
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not to grab them while they’re busy. …I try to see th m in their office… to get to them early… 
to get them on a non-contentious day… before their committee starts.” 
During Step 4, lobbyists further prioritize information for the legislator if their time with 
the legislator is short. As Sub14 notes: ”[If] you’re going to talk to a leader, that might not 
typically have time to talk to you, …you’re going to go in with the key… fast bullet points, … 
‘these are the biggest, biggest pieces you need to know about this.’” 
The context for information sharing can be fast-paced and likely more so when the 
objective is to persuade the legislator to vote on a bill. Where the objective is increasing 
understanding, however, the lobbyist cannot assume the legislator will be familiar with their bill. 
This requires deciding where such information sharing might best take place, as well as the 
amount of time likely needed. Sub6: 
Some things are just complicated, and so sometimes that’  the frustration. Someone can’t 
sit still and kind of hear the nuances, so you have to think about, “okay, am I …” You 
know, there are times when you say, “Man, this is not a conversation I can have outside 
the House doors. I need to try to get him in his office.” Or “We need to go when we’re 
not in session and have like an hour of quiet-time in the district.” [13:01] 
This is also reflected in the ways other lobbyists indicated pursuing informing strategies with 
legislators—to understand a technical bill (Sub3), and during “educational tours” (Sub17). Even 
the format for sharing information can be influenced by what the lobbyist knows about a 
legislator. Sub4 develops plans for what to deliver based on personal knowledge of certain 
legislators. This can include deciding to provide a copy of a full research study or just the 
summary: “I just know the guy. …Certain ones are lawyers, certain ones, you just interact, you 
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drop [the full research report] on those you think are actually going to read it, and the ones you 
don’t, you drop the summary.” 
Scheduling. Timing can require scheduling a meeting, either at the legislator’s district 
office or at the state capital. It can be facilitated by the strength of relationship. Sub9: “So, yeah, 
it is sometimes just as simple as making a phone call, because you’ve developed that kind of 
strong relationship [over the course of ten years].” Concurring, another lobbyist explained, “If 
you’re not hooked up as a lobbyist… and not quite that connected with a legislator, then you’re 
going to be looking to schedule a meeting” by placing a call to the legislator’s office (Sub1). 
Deciding who should be “in the room.” Also important is determining who the best 
person is to share the information. During legislatve strategizing, several lobbyists noted that 
working in coalition with other lobbyists often determines who will talk with “getable” 
legislators based on strength of relationship. Sub3: “We had a number of groups working on the 
bill. We had … several conference calls, with the sponsor, and with the other groups. And 
everybody kind of… everybody had relationships with some people and they don’t with others.” 
Constituents. The lobbyist is often not the best person to deliver th  information. Almost 
all lobbyists indicated the preferred person to visit the legislator, especially at their district office, 
was constituents.  This reflects the adage, “All poitics is local,” as one lobbyist noted. Sub12 
states: 
[When] it really is difficult to work on an issue, you want to have the people closest to 
the lawmaker talking to the lawmaker. And the lawmaker, no matter what the lawmaker 
thinks of me as a lobbyist here in [state capitol], they’re going to be very, very attentive 
to the constituent from back in their district. [27:08] 
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Constituents who also represent other constituents might also influence a legislator.  
Sub1:  
Usually when you have clergy from a district who have fairly sizable congregations and 
influence in the district, you know, taking the time to organize them to come together, 
coach them to have a meeting with the representative—usually that’s enough to move a 
representative. 
Constituents can also serve a protracted strategy of changing a legislator’s position on an 
issue. Sub9’s approach reflects a coordinated use of constituents and lobbyist to change a 
legislator’s principled position on a bill. When asked whether the strategy is for the lobbyist or 
constituents to talk first with the opposed legislator, Sub9 offered: 
[We’d] still be the first one to connect with them to see if they’ve changed their position, 
and then if they haven’t, sometimes we’ll have to go that next step and start having their 
constituents call them….Then we’ll go back and we’ll r mind them, “You know, we 
weren’t sure if you were aware, but we know Mr. and Mrs. Smith from your district are 
actually part of our client membership.” And it’s like, “You know, I got a call from them 
the other day…” and then we go from there. [51:02]   
Above, Sub9 works to reinforce that the legislator’s constituents have a deep interest in a bill’s 
outcome. Another lobbyist indicated that coordination can include presenting different 
information to the legislator. Sub11 reflected: “Well, probably it would be more of a macro. You 
want the constituent to go in and say, ‘This is how it’s going to affect me.’ You might go to the 
legislator and say, ‘This is how it’s going to affect the state.’” 
Strategically, such grassroots efforts can be especially important with legislators who are 
undecided, as Sub7, representing service providers, offers: 
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[You] get the people involved who are in those particular constituencies and particularly 
the [legislators] that may be riding a fine line—they’re “yea, nay, not sure, whatever,”--
then we have to get the whole program going.…Actually, you need to have your [service 
recipients] calling. [34:30] 
Coordinating constituent visits includes preparing them to present information which is 
consistent with the overall lobbying strategy. To pr mote consistency, lobbyists emphasized the 
importance of constituents having both fact sheets and talking points. Sub8 points out the use of 
talking points to help prepare constituents for district visits: “So those talking points… are not 
just for the legislators. They’re also for the grassroots, so when they go in, they know what to 
say.” 
Sometimes more can be better—even if those sharing the information are doing so in 
ways that differ from professional lobbyists. Sub4 points out the importance of constituent calls, 
as part of a grassroots effort: 
They’re having their lobby day, and all of a sudden, you’re a legislator, and you’re 
getting …300 calls, that tells you, “Now wait a minute, I’m going to be careful before I 
jump into this thing. I don’t care how much I want to play ball with you [campaign 
contributor], I just got three or four-hundred calls telling me to vote no.” [25:00] 
Outside experts. At least a third of the lobbyists indicated the value of having an expert 
present or available to deliver information and answer legislator questions. Sub9: “Sometimes 
we’re not [the experts] in the subject matter. We always want to make sure, if we don’t know the 
answer, we can find the correct answer. And it’s avail ble to them as quickly as possible.” Sub11 
might bring in outside experts if the bill is especially complex or “technical.”  
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I’ve had clients do this, if it’s a tax question, we’ve had the person that’s the head of the 
corporate tax division…[from city, state] fly up to talk to the people in [committee]. I 
candidly couldn’t explain it. You know, it was some archaic tax stuff based off federal 
case law, based off … I’ll put them on the phone with each other. 
Sub13 adds an additional condition to bringing in outside experts: “I brought in one of my 
experts on [X] policy, a guy who understands [X] policy and can understand legislators, so he is 
good and effective in talking with members about the details.” That is, if a lobbyist is going to 
bring in outside experts, they must be adept at communicating with non-experts, like legislators.  
Determining whether an expert will be needed can be based on the nature of the bill (its 
level of technicality), and legislator expertise and i terest levels. As Sub15 describes: 
I know which of the group of legislators that are very interested in [issue X],…when I go 
to see them…it’s not going to be a five minute conversation, it’s going to be an hour 
conversation. … Those are the people who would say, ”Yeah, I want to talk to [expert ] 
So-and-so” “I want to talk to [organization executive] So-and-so asap.”  
Lobbyists make plans which minimize the amount of resources they expend while 
maximizing likely impact on legislator decisions. That is, the most efficient approach on any bill 
would be that the lobbyist herself or himself present  the information to the legislator. Using 
knowledge about the bill and each legislator narrows what needs to be shared. But as the bill 
becomes more technical, or as the vote becomes more difficult for the legislator, additional 
resources will need to be brought to bear. Those reources can include outside experts, clients, 
and constituents. Each additional element has corresponding costs of time, money, and effort to 
coordinate. Several lobbyists indicated the challenge of working with others, whether they were 
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fellow lobbyists or “grassroots” constituent lobbyists. Most of these challenges revolved around 
making sure those others shared consistent information with all legislators. 
Moreover, planning for information delivery is informed by both the lobbyist’s 
knowledge about the bill, as well as knowledge about the legislator. Planning can also include 
using district level information, in the form of organized communications from grassroots 
constituents, to draw a legislator’s attention to the bill or issue. Not only do lobbyists tailor the 
information they share, they also tailor their plans for delivering that information.  
Step 5: Deliver & Evaluate the “Ask” 
The myriad decisions concerning information sharing culminate when the lobbyist 
actually communicates with the legislator. Armed with knowledge about the bill, the fact sheet, 
and arguments and information most relevant to the particular legislator, the lobbyist is ready to 
deliver the information and make the Ask.  
Sub9 offers an example of recruiting a legislator to serve as a bill’s chief co-sponsor: 
We went and visited her in her office in the district, before we filed the initial bill 
language, and walked it through how the process would work, how the opposition may 
react…so we gave her the opportunity of saying, we’d love to have her as chief co-
sponsor, but we understood that you know, if this goes…if it happens that the opposition 
becomes so hot, she would be free to decide to go off, if she chose to. But with the 
background she had, and the knowledge bases she had, both on [industry] issues and on 
the opposition that was going to occur, she was able to stay strong, because her district 




The above offers a relatively rich and concise example of a lobbyist referencing all three 
knowledge types in making their Ask. First, bill analysis is offered (“how the process would 
work, how the opposition may react”). Sub9 notes the legislator hierarchy of interests 
(“background she had, and the knowledge bases she had”). District-level political knowledge is 
then mentioned (“her district was in favor…of regulations” in the area). The bill for which Sub9 
was seeking co-sponsorship was relatively tough, given the anticipated (and realized) level of 
opposition. This required the lobbyist, then, to be transparent with the legislator about the level 
of difficulty bill leadership might engender, politically.  
Tailoring the delivery. General ideas about delivery were also offered reflecting 
tailoring. Below is the typical approach Sub14 uses to deliver information and make the Ask: 
I think you do tailor them, again, back to the relationships with some of them that may 
know the issues, you’ve been working for years with them on it, you can go in there and 
“hey, I’m representing such and such. There’s a bill up in committee and we really need 
your support. You’ve voted yes on it in the past.” And they’ll say, “Oh yeah, I know 
which one you’re talking about. Okay, thanks!” And they’re done. Versus [giving] the 
whole educational piece. [51:00] 
Sub15 remarks that tailoring information delivery can be facilitated by knowing a legislator’s 
“saturation point:” 
There are some members—and that was my point about tailoring your message—there 
are some members that want the whole academic side of things. They’re going to want 
you to talk it through for an hour. There are other legislators who say, “Just talk to me 
until I’m okay.” There are other legislators who tell me “I’m okay with this,”—you’ve 
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got to shut your mouth and get out of there so you d n’t turn them against you. It’s just a 
matter of knowing, okay, you know, that saturation point with each legislator. [13:00] 
Sub15 noted that some lobbyists might have a pre-set idea of the time they will need to share 
information. Sub15’s approach, however, is to discern how much information is enough for the 
specific legislator, and share only that much. Several other lobbyists, including ex-legislators, 
echoed this approach. 
Not acknowledging the saturation point might result in certain penalties. Sub4 opines: 
“You’re gonna get on this guy’s last nerves. He’s heard you; he’s given you your day in 
court….unless you really got something different to say—just beating him some more won’t 
amount to much.” Sub4 recognizes “there’s a moment where” the lobbyist should stop talking. 
Interpreting nonverbal cues was also discussed as an important means of navigating interactions 
with legislators. As Sub14 points out: “[It] goes back to body language. You can tell that they 
shut the door on you, like, “That’s not something I’m going to be supportive of, just not going to 
be.” You can tell.”  
Several lobbyists indicated the importance of following informal rules of decorum when 
interacting with legislators. This included accepting when the legislator is not moved in the 
desired direction. As Sub16 offers, “I don’t get into arguments with people. And of course I 
know that’s just a waste of time. [You’re] opposed to the bill Senator? Fine. Thank you very 
much. I hope you will see it my way, but we’ll see.’” Other lobbyists also recognized the 
importance of not being upset by a legislator’s refusal.  
In addition to following rules of decorum, adherenc to such norms can also be strategic. 
As Sub4 noted: “And if nothing else, you might come back to this guy on a different issue, and 
you don’t want to have so pissed him off on this that you can’t talk to him again” [1:03:20].  
114 
 
Accepting a legislator’s initial refusal was not synonymous with giving up. Sub16 takes a 
slightly different direction: 
If I can find maybe some source of support that could be persuasive, or move it, [getting 
the legislator to say]”Well, maybe I’ll support it in committee, but maybe when the vote 
gets to the floor, I may not vote yes. Okay?”—So I g t the bill out of committee. [13:11] 
Here, Sub16 recognizes the nuanced nature of the Ask and would prefer that a committee 
member support the bill through to its passage. At the same time, voting the bill out of 
committee would mean critical progress as well. Sub16 shares a script for how to make this more 
nuanced Ask of the legislator during a meeting: ““I need to get the bill out of committee. Can 
you help me get it out? The Third Reading you can do as you please. And [our organization] 
won’t make any noise about it.” 
Other lobbyists offered examples of how they might p rase other types of Asks. Giving 
an example of attempts to kill legislation, Sub12 noted: “And lobbyists will many times say to a 
legislator, when they want to hold off on passing a bill, ‘Can’t we discuss this over the summer?’ 
‘Couldn’t we put this in a study committee?’” Where a legislative sponsor agrees, this offers the 
lobbyist, like Sub12, an opportunity to “back off a little…and not push all the buttons [needed] to 
kill the bill.”  
Tailoring also occurs during the in-person meeting with the legislator. As Sub7 offers, 
tailoring can be facilitated by carefully listening to the legislator, including to their questions: 
“[You] listen to the questions that they’re asking. Because that’s the information they are 
wanting more than anything else. And so, in any kind of conversation you have with a legislator, 
listen.” Sub6 also emphasized the significance of in-person engagement with the legislator to 
facilitate “nuanced” understanding: “But it’s sort f in that moment, in that conversation, where 
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you, depending on what you know about that person, and if there is a sort of a hook with them, 
that you’re using that in that conversation.” 
Sub12 extends the idea of listening to include critical analysis of what a legislator is 
saying:  
You have to try to understand what they’re thinking. Constantly you have to be analyzing 
the perspective of what they’re doing, why they’re doing it. You also have to think ahead. 
You cannot dwell solely on what is being said at the moment. You want to take it in, but 
you also want to understand why people are saying what they’re saying. Have there been 
additional pressures from organizations, leadership, constituents back home?...[11:00] 
Exchanges with legislators can be an opportunity to deepen understanding of the pressures, 
interests, and influences they are facing.  
Feedback. Many lobbyists emphasized the importance of the intraction as an 
opportunity for learning more about the legislator’s information needs. Sub10 offers: “And then 
[I’ll] ask the legislator, as we’re talking, to give me their point of view, right?–Why they believe 
certain things. So that I’m …understanding, you know, what they know about the issue.” 
Sub10’s approach was especially suitable for a legislator known to possess substantive 
knowledge about the issue or bill.  
Lobbyists can also ask legislators for feedback about their bill or proposal. Sub3 recalls a 
legislator’s feedback about word choice: 
There were certain things in the bill that he thought were red flags,…He said “maybe if 
we can put something in the bill… Maybe if we work n this or this, change a few words 




Legislator feedback about a bill can also present an opportunity to alter the legislation during the 
meeting, as Sub3 explains: “Sometimes we can address th  problem in a minute so that maybe 
they’ll come around, once the bill’s been changed….somebody might say “I don’t like this part 
of the bill,” and we’ll say “We’ll take it out.” 
Lobbyists actively sought legislators’ feedback, often by directly asking them for it. Sub3 
discussed a general approach to determining a legislator’  objections: 
I would ask them, “Specifically, what are you opposed to?”…”What don’t you like about 
it?” And more often than not, they’re certainly willing to tell us. It could be, someone 
heard from a constituent that they didn’t like it. And then they’ll give us the constituent’s 
name and number, and we’ll call the constituent and t lk to them. 
Most lobbyists indicated using feedback to modify or alter their legislation. Sub3 also added the 
use of feedback from the legislator’s constituents for such purposes. Questions can be both 
prescriptive as well as exploratory. Sub7 offers that meeting with legislators can be an 
opportunity for problem solving: “And ask them too, ‘What do you think we should do, because 
we have this situation?’ Get them to think, get them to actually … a conversation back and forth, 
getting them to come up with ideas.” 
Legislators’ feedback is not always direct, and someti es must be interpreted. As Sub12 
relates, concerning a bill the lobbyist was trying to kill: 
[The] sponsor who picked up the bill in the House was a sponsor I worked with in the 
past. She basically respected me, I respected her, and she said “this is something we can 
discuss over the summer.” Well, that’s legislative alk for “I’m not going to call the bill 
this spring before we leave here.” 
Learning this, the lobbyist recognized that there was additional time for strategizing.  
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Following up. Several lobbyists indicated using feedback and other types of information 
to decide how they should follow up. Here is an example of how sponsors coordinate with Sub 
15 to help pass a bill: 
[These] legislators talk, just like everybody else, and sharing information like, “Well, 
what did you hear from Representative X?” And the sponsor would say, “[Sub15], you 
got to get this one issue figured out, otherwise Representative X is not voting for us.” 
And it could be one minor issue in one minor part of the bill. And so I laser focus on that 
to take care of that issue. [1:01:22] 
The lobbyist in this case is indicating that, in situations where the lobbyist and legislator are in 
close collaboration (as during subsidization), information coming to the legislator about 
colleagues can then be shared with the lobbyist to upport the legislative effort. Subsidizing a 
sponsor, Sub3 recalls: 
And, uh, our sponsor, chief sponsor, talked to a bunch of people, and she then asked us to 
follow up on a few, which we did. A lot of it was by phone. I can remember maybe four 
or five personal visits in the district. 
Most lobbyists indicated they make certain to respond to legislator questions in a timely 
manner. There was no specific rule for how much time might elapse before the lobbyist needed 
to respond. However, Sub10 suggested: “It just all depends on what they’re looking for. I don’t 
like to leave things hanging, cause things in the General Assembly move quick. So you want to 
get to them before they vote.”  
Seeking to persuade a legislator, Sub3 described how t ey would follow up after working 
with the legislator’s constituent to address their concerns about a bill: 
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I would … ask the constituent to call and say you’re okay with it, or you would be okay 
with it if we made this change or that change. And we would make the change, and 
they’d be okay. And they’d appreciate us doing that, because then they don’t have 
to…you know, we’re basically doing them a favor by dealing with their constituents’ 
concerns. [59:30] 
In this case, the lobbyist notes that these efforts help to reduce the legislator’s workload. Even 
though the legislator is not the bill sponsor, such efforts still reflect a sort of lobbyist subsidy.  
Similarly, another lobbyist, Sub1, described actively working to educate constituents 
about a bill a legislator saw as a difficult vote. During their meeting, the legislator specified the 
number of town halls they expected, as well as the number of constituents who would need to be 
given information about the bill and issue, in order for the legislator to be able to support the 
legislation. Sub1 met those requests, sharing with the legislator that those expectations had been 
met.  
Following information delivery, several lobbyists ind cated they use feedback from the 
legislator in a few different ways. In the case of Asks concerning votes, they will update their 
database reflecting legislator vote status and overall vote count (e.g., Sub5). When working with 
other lobbyists in coalition, and where an argument has been especially effective, they might text 
other lobbyists about that argument (e.g., Sub10). New information about the legislator will be 
used to update their knowledge about the legislator pri ities, knowledge level, etc. And of 
course, where the lobbyist is actively collaborating with a sponsor to pass a bill, specialized 
information is exchanged, including determining next steps, such as legislators to approach next 
(e.g., Sub9, Sub3). 
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Figure 5.4, below, is a graphical representation of the Tailored Information Sharing 
Decision Model, based on study results. This decision model, based on Rasmussen’s (1996) 
decision ladder reflects the five steps expert lobbyists can take. It also draws attention to the 
types of knowledge needed during different steps, including the Tailored Bill Analysis used to 
narrow in on what information or arguments will be most important for a particular legislator. 
Short-cuts are also featured in the model, reflecting how relationships or prior knowledge about 
the legislator facilitate lobbyist information sharing with certain legislators whom the lobbyist 
“knows.” The decision model also reflects the ways lobbyists will use feedback in Step 5 to 
obtain additional information (Step 3), as well as to update what they know about the bill, issue, 
or proposed legislation—depending on the Ask. Information about the legislator arising from the 
interaction can also be used to update knowledge about the legislator’s hierarchy and politics in 




Figure 5.4 The 5-Step Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model. The decision model 
specifies the steps expert lobbyists take in selecting information about a bill or issue they predict 
will be most helpful and influential to individual state legislators. Knowledge needs are 
represented by yellow circles. Such knowledge is used first to identify “getable” legislators. The 
Tailored Bill Analysis is generated by examining what is known about the bill, the legislator, and 
politics in the legislator’s district. It is used to select information to share during Step 3. 
Tailoring also occurs in Steps 4 and 5, during planning and information delivery. Lobbyists also 
follow up after delivering information in various ways. 
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Chapter 6: Discussions & Conclusions 
The study was designed to generate knowledge about how information is shared with 
state legislators. Expert state lobbyists were interviewed to explore that question. Findings 
confirm that study participants use tailoring to select and present information to state legislators.  
The Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model reflects the “nuts and bolts” of expert lobbyist 
information sharing decisions. At the same time, expert information sharing as a policy practice 
is so much more. An integrative theory of legislative information sharing is presented which 
situates tailored information sharing within the larger, strategic context of expert lobbyist 
information sharing. In brief, this theory states that lobbyists acquire information about a bill 
reflecting a process of winnowing or active selection. This information is then processed by the 
lobbyist, and information is further selected and then shared with a particular legislator. 
Information is also shared with others around the legislator, strategically, so the lobbyist’s 
information is repeated. This chapter discusses these and other study findings.  
In this chapter, study limitations are presented first ollowed by an overview of study 
findings. An in-depth discussion of an integrative th ory of legislative information sharing 
follows. Discussion then focuses on how study findings address gaps in informational lobbying 
theory. Exploration will then focus on how study find ngs address policy practice questions 
concerning information sharing by nonprofits and other social workers. Following the 
discussion, the chapter provides implications of study findings for theory, policy practice, macro 
practice education and training, and future research. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.  
Study Limitations  
Qualitative designs are especially useful for discovering details of a phenomenon, like 
expert decision making. To that end, study findings offer rich insights into knowledge needs and 
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decision steps reflecting how expert lobbyists deci to share information with state legislators. 
As with all qualitative studies, however, a key limitation is the generalizability of study findings.  
In addition, recruiting from a single state might mean that the decision making approach 
reflected in the decision model is unique to those l bbyists and that state. Moreover, since the 
aim was to model expert decision making and only expert lobbyists were included in the sample, 
study findings might not reflect how less experienced lobbyists make such decisions. Future 
research might test the generalizability of tailoring as a communication strategy to see if this is 
practiced mainly by experts or by lobbyists of any experience level. Findings should also be 
tested for their generalizability to states with differing policymaking characteristics.   
An initial study aim was to investigate the role of rules and norms of information sharing 
decisions. Every lobbyist indicated that formal rules, i.e., state lobbying laws, had no effect on 
information sharing decisions concerning legislators. This is likely because state lobbying 
statutes do not regulate such activities. Analysis of nformal rules and norms generated abundant 
information, most of which has been sufficiently explicated elsewhere (e.g., Levine, 2009). That 
is, analysis of institutions added little to study findings. The state chosen for data collection was 
based on convenience, and not on the character of state lobbying laws. Future inquiry should 
include choosing states featuring particularly strict lobbyist regulation, in order to examine the 
role of formal rules and norms there. 
Data collection was to be guided through the use of a semi-structured, written interview 
protocol. That protocol proved to be unwieldy in light of both the complexity of what lobbyists 
were offering, and the researcher’s visual impairment. In particular, the protocol was overly 
prescriptive, and did not easily accommodate lobbyists’ desires to share other kinds of 
information, such as legislative strategy and information sharing with staff. As a result, the 
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protocol was memorized, and effort was made during subsequent interviews to ask questions in a 
similar order to the protocol to increase consistency across interviews. A question was also 
added to explore lobbyist knowledge about communicati g with staff. While the data generated 
through this modified approach were substantive and detailed, it is unclear how more strict 
adherence to the semi-structured interview protocol might have altered data, if at all. 
A single researcher collected and analyzed the qualitative data. Safeguards were included 
to increase the validity of findings, including member checking with subject matter experts, peer 
debriefing, creating memos, etc. Nonetheless, increasing the number of people who collected and 
analyzed data, including checking for inter-rater agreement, would enhance reliability and 
validity of study findings. Future research employing similar designs and methods should 
involve a team-based approach to both data collection and analysis.  
The Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) method usually involves two 
interviewers, with one focused on asking questions and probing, while the second seeks to 
generate the task diagram. Although a suitable substit te for task diagramming was developed in 
this study, it is unclear how more strict adherence to creating the diagram in situ might have 
altered study data and results.  
Discussion 
First, findings are summarized concerning lobbyist tailored information sharing, 
including recapping the knowledge needed to make exp rt decisions. Differences between 
experts and non-experts observed by participants are also summarized. Tailoring is a central 
study finding. Results also point to other information sharing decisions used by the same 
lobbyists, as part of different strategies and objectiv s. Second, these different information 
sharing approaches are discussed. Third, how study fin ings relate to the theory of informational 
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lobbying is explored. Finally, how the decision model and other study findings (including expert 
lobbyist strategic perspective) addresses skill and knowledge needs of nonprofits is examined. 
Lobbyist information sharing. This study concerns expert lobbying. Being “expert” was 
operationalized as having five to ten years of experience. Study participants handily met this 
requirement. Study findings illustrate that lobbyist expertise includes the gathering and analysis 
of information to create actionable knowledge. 
Bill analysis is one of those types of critical lobbyist knowledge. Going well beyond 
benefit/cost analysis, bill analysis also included identifying the likely level of opposition or 
support for bills, plus opposition arguments. Bill analysis knowledge was then used in 
conjunction with knowledge about the legislator’s hierarchy of interests, political analysis of a 
legislator’s district, and legislative process knowledge. Lobbyists reference this knowledge first 
during lobbying strategy, to identify getable legislators. Expert lobbyists then continue to analyze 
what they know in order to select and prioritize thspecific information which they predict will 
most “move” the legislator in the direction of their Ask. This selection process is informed by an 
implicit process of Tailored Bill Analysis. The result is tailored information sharing. 
The process of tailoring is clearly evident in lobbyist efforts to persuade a legislator to 
vote on a bill. Lobbyists take pains to identify the information most likely to move the legislator 
in the desired direction. The 5-Step decision model reflects that decision process of selecting or 
tailoring the information shared. An important point is that lobbyists sought to narrow down 
what they predicted might be most important and most oving to a particular legislator given 
legislator constraints. These include legislators’ time constraints and the amount of information 
they can reasonably process given the many issues they address. This was especially important 
125 
 
when legislators’ time was extremely limited, or a group decision, such as a committee or floor 
vote, was pending.  
Lobbyists use their understanding of legislators’ needs and perspectives to determine 
what will be most relevant to share—both generally nd with individual legislators. For instance, 
lobbyists appear to carefully prepare or review fact sheets to detect problems with clarity, word 
choice, brevity/length, and other factors. Arguments were also carefully crafted and refined over 
time.  
A number of lobbyists in the study indicated key differences they perceived between 
what they do in information sharing compared to less xperienced people.  Those with less 
experience, like trade or professional association member “grassroots lobbyists,” or newer 
lobbyists, might only have limited knowledge about a bill, including information about those 
with opposing views and their positions. Less experienced advocates may also be less likely to 
present the opposition’s arguments, ostensibly missing an opportunity to offer a rebuttal—and 
place the opposition on the defense.  
Experts in the study also provided information both directly and indirectly to legislators. 
The latter was accomplished in part by working with committee and legislator staff. The 
importance of communicating with staff also differentiates expert from non-expert lobbying and 
information sharing.  
Tailoring is only part of the story. Tailoring tells part, but not the whole, story of 
information sharing. Lobbyists indicated giving more information to legislators at certain times, 
in contrast to the selective information offered by tailoring. For instance, this occurred pre-
legislatively, when the legislator had more time and could give more attention, such as between 
legislative sessions, especially when a bill was more technical. In such cases, lobbyists increased 
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the information they shared to help a legislator understand a new legislative proposal or changes 
in a bill that failed to pass during a prior session.  
The amount of information shared might be greater at different points during the 
legislative phase as well. Lobbyists provided increased information to legislators they hoped to 
persuade to sponsor their bill.  At those times, full information about the bill, its strengths, 
limitations, level of likely opposition, and experinces in other states, could be provided to the 
legislator, reflecting a type of full disclosure. This wealth of information was offered, in part, to 
insure that the potential sponsor made a fully informed decision.   
Once the bill was moving through the legislative process, lobbyists sometimes needed to 
give information to certain legislators on a more limited basis. That is, specialized information 
was given to the sponsor, such as updates on the bill’s progress in committee in the other 
legislative chamber, vote counts, or even a special fact sheet to help the sponsor explain and 
defend the bill during floor debate. Co-sponsors were also given specialized information, like a 
list of getable fellow caucus members, to coordinate insider lobbying efforts. Allied legislators 
casting difficult votes were given talking points to defend their positions in the face of 
constituent opposition in their districts. Lobbyists ometimes gave updated fact sheets in the 
event a bill was amended or to counter new arguments by heir opponents. This illustrates the 
variation in both the types and amounts of information lobbyists shared, in part as a result of the 
strategy used, and the proximate political objectiv being pursued. Tailoring then served to focus 
and refine the information still further for the ind vidual legislator.  
Figure 6.1 offers a graphical way to understand howthe amount and specificity of 
information shared might vary. The y-axis represents level of information sharing, from “low” to 
“high.” The x-axis represents the extent to which information shared is more general (on the far 
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left) to more specific or specialized (on the far right). The vertical dashed line separates the Pre-
legislative from the Legislative phase. 
 
Figure 6.1 Lobbying Strategy, Information Level, and Information Specificity. Lobbyists may 
employ various strategies, including informing, persuasion, and subsidy. These may also be used 
in combination or sequentially. Different strategies might also be employed to achieve different 
objectives. A subsidy strategy might be used with a sponsor to move a bill to passage. Persuasion 
can be used, along with informing, to convince a legislator to vote “no” on a bill. Lobbyists also 
share detailed bill analysis with committee staff, creating one more way to inform legislators. 
Examples of information types shared are represented by large dots in figure 6.1. For 
instance, “Legislator tailored argument” is situated in the middle of the x-axis, between 
“General” and “Specialized.”  
The uppermost line is color-coded green, indicating use of the subsidy strategy. It begins 
with a point identified as “Fact sheet,” rises sharply to a point labeled “Potential sponsor full 
disclosure,” then slopes downward, terminating at a point labeled “Sponsor floor debate talking 
points…”. This line reflects the more labor- and information-intensive nature of working to first 
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persuade—symbolized by the initial parallel blue line segment—and then subsidize the work of 
one’s bill sponsor. More information is shared in persuading a legislator to sponsor the bill, 
reflected by the relative height of the “potential sponsor” point.  This symbolizes the lobbyist 
disclosing all that they know, in order to help thelegislator to make a fully informed decision. 
Once persuaded, the lobbyist will continue to subsidize the sponsor with additional, but more 
limited information. This specialized information can include vote updates, outcomes of 
negotiations with different interests, and political strategizing. Similarly specialized information 
sharing can also occur between lobbyist and co-sponsors.  
Lower in the figure, the blue line reflects the use of persuasion strategies. It too begins 
with a fact sheet, but then slopes sharply downward, until it reaches the second point, labeled 
“Legislator tailored argument.” This is the lowest of all points in the figure, reflecting not the 
effort the expert lobbyist makes but that the information shared is limited to what is most 
relevant and important to the legislator. At this point, the lobbyist presents and highlights 
particular facts or arguments which they predict will be most moving to the legislator, using the 
fact sheet as the foundation. An almost horizontal, d shed blue line continues to the right of this 
point, sloping slightly upward, and terminating at a point labeled “’Tough vote’ talking 
points…” The dashed line indicates lobbyists share such specialized information on an as-needed 
basis to support allied legislators.  
Figure 6.1 also features both solid and dashed yellow line segments, indicating the use of 
informing strategies. Most run parallel to legs of b th the subsidy strategy path, as well as the 
persuasion strategy path. Dashed lines indicate the strategy is used on an “as needed” basis. 
Their presence and positioning indicates the combinatio  of strategies employed by lobbyists as 
they share information.  
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Working with sponsors and co-sponsors appears to require more information sharing 
throughout the legislative process. This is reflected graphically by the upper green line always 
remaining superior to the lower blue line. This should be seen as a general, rather than absolute, 
pattern. For instance, a number of lobbyists reported having to supply more information to 
individual legislators, such as when trying to dampen the legislator’s opposition, or to persuade a 
legislator facing a difficult vote. 
Information about an issue or a legislative proposal is shared pre-legislatively. This can 
take place between legislative sessions, for instance, during an education tour. During such tours, 
the lobbyist meets with legislators to discuss the issue being addressed, potential legislative 
solutions, and seeks feedback to help modify the proposal. The amount of information is 
comparatively higher, and the amount of time needed to share such might be greater as well. A 
dashed and curved yellow line connects that point in Figure 6.1 to the point indicated by “Fact 
sheet.” This draws attention to the fact that lobbyists (and clients) develop fact sheets pre-
legislatively, in advance of the bill’s introduction by the legislative sponsor.  
A single, short yellow line begins at “Fact sheet” and terminates at the point labeled “Bill 
analysis to committee staff; TBA to legislator staff.” This line segment draws attention to how 
expert lobbyists indicated the importance of working with committee staff to influence staff bill 
analysis documents. Information shared with such staff is typically restricted to bill analysis and 
omits some of the information lobbyists shared with potential sponsors. At the same time, more 
information was shared with such staff than what might be offered through tailoring. The dashed 
line extending to the right of the “Bill Analysis…” reflects the process of lobbyists updating 
committee staff of changes in the bill as it progresses through the legislative process.  
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Lobbyists typically shared more information, based on their TBA (Tailored Bill 
Analysis), with a legislator’s personal staff than they might with the legislator. The objective in 
such cases is to help staff understand the bill and its impact on the legislative district. Legislators 
can then direct future questions about the bill to staff. If staffers are unable to respond, they can 
contact the lobbyist.  
Various factors might affect the amount of information a lobbyist will need to share. 
Generally, more technically complicated bills require more information and may require bringing 
in outside experts. Information sharing decisions were further influenced by legislator knowledge 
level. That is, a legislator who might be expert on the issue would require less general 
information from the lobbyist, or need primarily specialized information to refine understanding. 
Alternately, legislators with little prior knowledge might need more information (and time) to 
understand a particular bill. 
Further, highly salient bills—including those with significantly more opposition—not 
surprisingly—require more lobbyist effort to pass. Such effort included sharing more 
information, such as rebuttals to opposition rhetoric; repeatedly shoring up bill support; 
providing specialized information to legislators facing district opposition to their vote position; 
and so forth. Alternately, low salience bills appear to generally require less information sharing. 
Lobbyists likely engage in tailored information sharing in relation to a bill far more often 
than not. That is, lobbyists must provide a lot of information to persuade a legislator to become a 
bill sponsor, but they must do so with only a limited number of legislators. Once the sponsor is 
secured, they then must obtain many more legislator to build a majority—whether the 
legislative goal is to pass or kill a piece of legislation. Such majorities are created one legislator 
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at a time. It appears that tailoring plays a central role in creating that majority for expert lobbyists 
in this study.  
The importance of information tailoring to expert lobbyist information sharing is clearly 
evident in most of the decision model steps. That is, in Steps 3 through 5, lobbyists are selective 
about the information they share, with whom they share it, and even how they share it. These 
selection decisions are based on what the lobbyists know about the individual legislator 
preferences, interests, habits, district politics, and so forth. This likely is what is meant when the 
lobbyist says “I know” that legislator.  
Even strategy selection can be seen as reflecting the lobbyist’s analysis of what the 
legislator might require in order to be moved. That is, o obtain the vote of a legislator who 
requires little or no information, the lobbyist would select persuasion as the primary strategy. 
Legislators with a history of asking many questions will require a combination strategy of both 
informing and persuasion for their vote. That is, tailoring likely occurs even during Step 2, 
Strategy Selection. 
An integrative theory of legislative information sharing. Study findings lend support to 
an integrated understanding, or theory, of legislative information sharing. That is, expert 
lobbyists share information both pre-legislatively and legislatively, selecting from various 
information sharing strategies (e.g., persuasion, subsidy, and informing). Information is shared in 
tailored ways and otherwise. Lobbyists also share information with multiple targets, resulting in 
message repetition. Message repetition increases the likelihood that the legislator will understand 
the bill or issue in the way the lobbyist desires. One condition under which such information 
sharing takes place is when the bill is highly salient and faces significant opposition.  
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This integrative theory helps frame expert lobbyist information sharing is a 
comprehensive communication process. That is, every lobbyist indicated the importance of 
communicating with legislative and committee staff, in addition to legislators when sharing 
information. This result reflects a strategic approach to using information to influence legislator 
thinking and decision making. Expert lobbyists use multiple access points to inform, subsidize, 
and persuade legislators, with professional staff being a key entry point. One lobbyist pointed out 
a secret—that “Repetition, repetition, repetition” (Sub7) was necessary. A strategy underlying 
this comprehensive communication process of expert lobbyists, however, is how to get others to 
be the source of such repetition. Viewing legislative information sharing in this integrative way 
illustrates how such goes well beyond the “info drop” strategy for influencing legislator 
decisions.  
Information sharing and relevant theory. Both the integrative theory of legislative 
information sharing and the Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model address the central 
question of how information is shared with state legislators. These findings strongly suggest that 
lobbyists vary the information they share with state legislators in part as a result of tailoring. This 
reflects another possible explanation, along with bill type (Nownes & Newmark, 2016), as to 
why state lobbyists might give different kinds of in ormation to different legislators. Tailoring 
also helps clarify how information can vary as part of manipulative persuasion (Schnakenberg, 
2015). 
Public health research into tailoring focused primaly on research and issues of public 
health, and not how tailoring might be used to affect state legislative outcomes. Study 
participants used tailoring across a breadth of issue , They also used tailoring to directly affect 
policy outcomes. These findings offer strong preliminary support that public health tailoring 
133 
 
findings might apply beyond public health issues and research, and in relation to affecting state 
legislative decision making.  
Study findings also help identify and address certain g ps in what is understood 
theoretically about information sharing. The discussion continues by exploring how study 
findings address some of those gaps in the theoretical literature. 
Informational lobbying theory. It was noted during the literature review how significant 
effort was required to make aspects of the information l lobbying literature more coherent . For 
instance, the literature on persuasion as a lobbyist strategy required substantive integration 
before it reflected conceptual clarity and coherence.  It was pointed out that this was in contrast 
to the theory of legislative subsidy and subsidization strategy. Study findings continue to both 
clarify and enhance by extension informational lobbying theory.  
 Informational lobbying theorists contend that persuasion and subsidy are the two key 
strategies lobbyists use during informational lobbying. Study findings clearly reflect the use of 
those strategies as well. Moreover, study findings offer important, useful examples illustrating 
how some of the central concepts are operationalized in the real world of state lobbying. For 
instance, costly information offered as part of subsidization can now be understood as including 
bill analysis—and all that bill analysis entails. This is in contrast to more abstract indicators used 
previously, such as “policy analysis” for the same construct (Nownes & Newmark, 2016). Also, 
findings suggest that persuasion goals can be extended to include convincing supportive 
legislators to not only seek bill changes, but also to conduct “insider lobbying.” Persuasion can 
also be used to convince a supportive legislator to become a bill sponsor or co-sponsor.  
Informational lobbying literature does not specify how information is shared strategically 
to educate or inform legislators, but focuses primaly on persuasion and subsidy. Yet, study 
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participants frequently indicated sharing information with the primary objective of informing and 
educating. For example, one lobbyist indicated creating an “education tour” to inform legislators 
about a proposed bill and get feedback on that proposal. Another lobbyist used an informing 
strategy when they recognized a legislator’s opposition might have stemmed from confusion of 
terms used in a bill. In that instance, the lobbyist’s objective was not to persuade or change the 
mind of the legislator. Rather, information was shared in order to increase understanding, and 
lessen the legislator’s concerns about the bill. 
Other literature has identified how information is used to increase decision maker 
understanding (or reduce misunderstanding). For instance, in public administration, inquiry has 
included investigating how social science research is utilized (Weiss, 1991; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 
1980). Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) found that information can be used to develop conceptual 





Figure 6.2 Lobbyist Informing Strategy. Lobbyists use informing strategies pre-legislatively, to 
sensitize legislators to issues and proposals. Legislatively, lobbyists employ informing strategies 
to increase understanding, decrease misunderstanding, and correct misinformation. The 
objectives can be to secure and maintain a legislator’s vote or to dampen a legislator’s 
opposition. Informing strategies can be used in combination with other strategies. 
Figures 6.2 presents an elaborated specification of the informing strategy. On the far left, 
the figure illustrates how lobbyists share information with committee and legislator staff to 
inform their understanding of a bill. Committee staff receives bill analysis information, while 
legislator staff is given the Tailored Bill Analysis. The dashed lines around the text in the figure 
highlight the novelty of adding staff as targets of informational lobbying.  
Figure 6.2 also shows how lobbyists share introductory information to sensitize 
legislators to an issue or a legislative proposal under consideration. Clarifying information is 
provided to legislators to address questions and increase understanding. This can result in 
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obtaining a legislator’s vote or dampening a legislator’s opposition. Potential sponsors are 
provided complete, detailed information about a bill, to make certain their decision to sponsor 
the bill is fully informed. This latter approach also recognizes that informing can be combined 
with other strategies, like persuasion. 
Study findings about informing strategies help extend informational lobbying theory, by 
placing informing alongside strategies of persuasion and subsidization. Moreover, the theory is 
extended further by recognizing the ways expert lobbyists employ informing strategies to engage 
committee and legislative staff as a strategic aspect of informational lobbying. 
Nonprofit and social work policy practice. Much of the lobbying literature offers 
important descriptive or theoretical insight into lobbying and lobbyist use of information. At the 
same time, the generality and abstractness of much of that literature makes it less useful or 
insightful for those needing knowledge to inform policy practice decisions at an operational 
level. The bulk of that literature also focuses on federal level lobbying. Nonprofits need concrete, 
practical knowledge about how to share information with state legislators. Study findings about 
expert lobbyist information sharing decisions and tailoring provide substantive knowledge 
addressing those practice-level knowledge gaps.   
Specifically, the Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model displayed in Figure 5.4 
describes expert lobbyist decision making leading to tailored information sharing with state 
legislators. The decision model features clear steps, indicates choices available during each step, 
and specifies the kinds of knowledge needed to execute steps and make choices. The detailed 
results featured throughout Chapter 5 provide illustrative examples, including verbal scripts, 
which expert lobbyists sometimes employ, for instance, when making the Ask of a legislator. 
The “nuts and bolts” of tailored information sharing are included in chapter 5. Figure 5.4 is a 
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quasi “instruction sheet,” showing how the nuts, bolts, and other pieces fit together and relate to 
each other. The decision model might also serve as a tool to be used for guiding information 
selection and sharing decisions associated with stae legislative advocacy efforts. 
The model provides a simple view of tailored information sharing for those encountering 
policy practice and information sharing for the first time. Study results can also meet the 
information needs of other policy practitioners. For more advanced, or adventurous, nonprofit 
administrators, the model and corresponding detailed study results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 
offer more nuanced and complex descriptions and analysis of decision steps, options, knowledge 
needs, and knowledge strategies. Thus, findings offer varying levels of detail and complexity 
which can meet policy practitioners’ varying knowledg  needs. 
The decision model is empirically driven, based on analysis of data from multiple expert 
policy practitioners. As such, it goes beyond findings of single cases featured in lobbyist 
memoires and the like. It should be seen as more than just good description, however. The 
decision model highlights the mechanics of information selection and provision to policymakers, 
serving to demystify one causal mechanism of how legis ators obtain information used to make 
policy decisions. That is, these study findings point to the role played by people nearby who 
assist the legislator in acquiring and making sense of information. Those people include expert 
lobbyists, but also legislative and committee staff, constituents, lobbyist clients, and others.  
The decision model is certainly an important tool of practical importance to policy 
practitioners. Theoretical findings concerning both informational lobbying strategies and the 
integrative theory of legislative information sharing are also important. They help practitioners 
understand the larger social and strategic context of legislative information sharing in state 
legislatures. That is, study findings clearly situate individual instances of professional lobbyist 
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information sharing within the larger context of the lobbyist’s legislative strategy. These findings 
help alert nonprofit administrators to the importance of both having a legislative strategy, and 
then sharing information as part of that overarching, coordinated approach.  
For instance, specification of the informing strategy can be especially useful for nonprofit 
administrators to know and understand. That is, nonprofits might be more comfortable 
approaching state policymakers from the perspective that they are “educating” or informing 
them, rather than persuading or lobbying them. Findings concerning the informing strategy offer 
a particularly robust explication of what “informing” looks like from the vantage of professional 
policy practitioners. The informing strategy can be us d in multiple ways, both pre-legislatively 
and during the legislative phase, with various proximal objectives.  
Study findings further help alert nonprofits to thevalue of communicating not only with 
legislators, but also with the myriad staff that interacts with them. Thus, nonprofits are also 
encouraged to include staff as a potential recipient of their information. This conceptualization of 
informing as a strategy extends how nonprofit administrators can imagine sharing information as 
part of strategic policy practice.  
Findings from this study provide a glimpse into professional state lobbyist overall 
strategy as well. Along with using coordinated communication strategies, professional lobbyists 
are prepared to work over protracted periods of time to accomplish their policy goals. They take 
the long view of policy change, recognizing that small policies can lead to big changes. 
Professional lobbyists are also invested in monitori g bills proposed by others because they 
recognize how low-salience legislative changes which might negatively affect a client in small 
ways now can lead to bigger costs in the future. These findings can help draw nonprofit 
administrator attention to the potential significane of low-salience legislative initiatives.  
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Expert lobbyists’ protracted perspective reflects another critical element, that of being 
proactive. The Ask is just that, and as one lobbyist pointed out, one cannot get what one does not 
ask for. Expert lobbyists are adept at tailoring their Asks to make each one reasonable to the 
legislator. Doing otherwise puts the lobbyist’s reputation for good political judgement at risk. 
These sorts of findings help demystify policy practice. They make concrete what an advocate, 
like a nonprofit administrator, can reasonably ask of a legislator. 
Furthermore, the proactive, long-term approach of lobbyists to policy change (or 
stability) contrasts with reacting to bills or proposals made sensational by media elites. The 
larger strategy includes collecting and analyzing of information about bills, and then assessing 
the likelihood they will actually “get legs” and progress through the legislative process. Indeed, 
this type of monitoring of the legislative environment is costly in terms of time and lobbyist 
attention. However, lobbyists frequently acknowledg how they collaborated with other 
lobbyists in coalition, or in concert with organization staff, to generate and execute legislative 
strategies. Once again, study findings clarify for n nprofits that professional policy practitioners 
do not work in isolation, but instead often involve working collaboratively with others, including 
as part of larger coalitions. These findings, in turn, can assist nonprofits in recognizing the 
critical role played by effective coalitions over time. 
Implications of Study Findings 
Study findings have various implications. First, findings imply informational lobbying 
theories should be re-examined in terms of underlying assumptions. Second, study findings have 
implications for addressing nonprofit policy practice knowledge and skill needs. Third, findings 
have substantive implications for social work and nonprofit macro practice education and 
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training. That is, social work educators can use study findings to inform policy practice curricula. 
Fourth, findings can inform future empirical inquiry.  
Informational lobbying theory implications. Study results indicate that lobbyists use 
various informing strategies to influence legislator decisions. This expands the number of 
strategies recognized as part of informational lobbying theory, from persuasion and subsidy, to 
include informing. The emergent theory of information sharing also adds important depth to 
understanding how lobbyists share information. Not only does it expand the range of available 
strategies, but it expands the number and type of act rs with whom lobbyists share their 
information. In this way, study findings make an important case for extending informational 
lobbying theory.  
Currently, informational lobbying theory implies that strategies reflect mutually exclusive 
ways in which lobbyists use information to influenc policymaker decisions. Study findings, 
however, strongly suggest lobbyists employ strategies in more complicated, even blended ways. 
For instance, they might begin with informing, but as a precursor to persuading, and then 
followed by subsidization—all with the same legislator concerning the same bill. Such findings 
complicate the otherwise relatively parsimonious theory of informational lobbying, but in a 
useful way. That is, additional hypotheses may now be generated which reflect a more refined 
understanding of informational lobbying. For instance, propositions may be posed to reflect the 
conditions under which lobbyists use singular strategies, or combinations of strategies to affect 
legislators. One such condition might be if the lobbyist is working pre-legislatively rather than 
during the legislative phase. Study findings suggest informing is the primary strategy being used 
by lobbyists pre-legislatively with legislators. Then, during the legislative phase, it appears 
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lobbyists use informing as the primary strategy with both committee and legislator staff. Such 
propositions also lend themselves to empirical testing.  
Implications for policy practice. Scholars have argued that nonprofits should be more 
involved in informing public policy (Bryce, 2012). Yet many nonprofit administrators lack the 
skills and knowledge necessary for such practice (Bass et al., 2007; Kimberlin, 2010). 
Discussion thus far has focused on how nonprofit administrators and others can use study 
findings to develop or extend their knowledge about sta e legislative policy practice. Study 
findings also have implications for policy practice skill development. Two areas of such skill 
development are knowledge strategies and tailored information sharing. 
Lobbyists’ decisions were directly informed by three particular types of knowledge: bill 
analysis, legislator hierarchy, and the legislator’s district political analysis. The study also found 
that expert lobbyists employed various knowledge strategies, in order to generate those three 
knowledge types. Nonprofits and other policy practitioners can use the knowledge strategies 
from this study as frameworks for developing their own skills generating bill analyses, legislator 
hierarchy analyses, and district political analyses.  
Study participants relied upon their knowledge of the bill, the legislator hierarchy, and 
district politics early on, during legislative strategy development, to determine which legislators 
were getable and hence should be approached. This asse sment was based, in part, on a 
legislator’s issue position and level of vote difficulty. Analyzing a legislator’s bill position and 
vote difficulty level are critical analytic skills to policy practice success as well as signaling 
professionalism. That is, an advocate will be more successful if they make Asks of legislators 
that are politically feasible. Further, failing to recognize a legislator’s political limits can signal 
to the legislator the advocate’s political naiveté.  
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The three knowledge types are also used to develop the Tailored Bill Analysis. Study 
participants engaged in this integrative analysis often implicitly, but such figured centrally in 
their information selection decisions. Skill development should include enhancing a nonprofit 
administrator’s ability to analyze a legislator’s interests, their district political climate, and how 
those relate to a particular bill or issue. Then, skills should be developed which reflect using that 
Tailored Bill Analysis to select information most important to that legislator. 
The decision model can be used to support tailored information sharing skill 
development. Study findings offer concrete examples of choices, strategies, scripts used, and 
even the kinds of legislative Asks lobbyists make of legislators. Learners can use such examples 
to guide choices, including what they might say during an actual meeting with a legislator or 
their staff.  
Study findings also have implications for policy advocacy strategy development. For 
instance, if the policy goal was to increase state policymaker awareness of an emergent health 
issue, this reflects a pre-legislative goal. Using Figure 6.2, selecting an informing strategy would 
be most appropriate. In this case, public health researchers and advocates could use empirical 
findings to increase salience and understanding of the problem. Further, such a strategy could be 
undertaken by public health researchers and others in the form of an education tour of state 
legislators between legislative sessions. Such meetings could also be used to generate feedback 
from legislators on a legislative proposal. Feedback about the proposal and about each 
legislator’s reactions could then be shared and compared. The former reflects building the 
group’s bill analysis, while feedback about each legislator’s reactions begins to establish or 
update knowledge of the legislator’s hierarchy of interests.  
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Legislative strategy and information sharing requires significant time and other resources. 
Study findings clearly indicate that lobbyists do not work in isolation. That is, they engage others 
collaboratively and in coalition. Nonprofits too could take advantage of collaboration, including 
determining how to work in coalition with like-minde  nonprofits and other partners, in 
legislative advocacy.  This reinforces the value of skills necessary for working in coalitions. 
Nonprofits need to be adept at legislative monitoring and tracking if they are going to 
keep up with their professionally trained competitors. While this might feel like a daunting 
challenge to a nonprofit considering entering into state policy advocacy, it need not be so. Like 
professional lobbyists, nonprofits can join coalitions, which distribute policy practice and 
legislative strategy tasks across coalition members. Nonprofits might also utilize bill tracking 
applications for this purpose, much like study participants. 
Implications for social work macro practice education. Study findings have 
implications for social work policy practice education. Specifically, tailored information sharing 
can be used to inform social work policy practice curri ulum development. Various approaches 
have been utilized to help macro-practice social work students develop requisite knowledge and 
skills. Social work students are frequently given assignments related to policy analysis 
(Comerford, 2003; Ritter, 2013; Sundet & Kelly, 200; Weiss-Gal, 2016). Students are assigned 
to meet with legislators and present their analytic findings (Comerford, 2003). Such approaches 
rely on practicing their talks with peers and multiple contacts with policymakers in various 
contexts (e.g., office visits, guest lectures) to help demystify the experience for students 
(Comerford, 2003).  
It is not clear from the literature how current classroom activities and experiential 
exercises promote learning objectives directly congruent with expert tailored information sharing 
144 
 
for state legislative policy advocacy. For instance, only a few participants mentioned white 
papers or similar policy analyses. When mentioned, those were usually used sparingly, or as 
references for creating fact sheets and talking points. When indicating the information they 
shared with legislators, none mentioned sharing such policy briefs. Likewise, sharing full 
research reports with legislators who “liked to read” ppeared to be both informing and symbolic 
in nature. Certainly, more detailed information was shared with staff, and this might have 
included policy briefs. To the extent that briefs are not part of the primary information sources of 
legislators making policy decisions, this current social work education activity might be off 
base—or at least of only limited utility for social work graduates participating in state legislative 
advocacy.  
Every study participant indicated the importance of bill analysis. The bill analysis 
operated as the foundation for creating fact sheets, talking points, and tailored information 
selection and sharing. The bill analysis served as the central product lobbyists shared as a means 
of influencing committee staff and their understanding of a piece of legislation. The strategic 
value of such analyses to informational lobbying, then, indicates learning bill analysis is a key 
skill which will make social work students more competitive at the state legislative policy 
context. Being able to accomplish such analyses quickly and efficiently will also make social 
work students valuable to state legislative offices, given the number of bills typically introduced 
during a legislative session. 
There is limited recognition of the importance of plitical analysis in social work policy 
practice literature. This is problematic, given its relevance to information tailoring and legislator 
persuasion. Some social work scholars have begun to approach such in their macro classes (e.g., 
Pharris, 2017). Expert lobbyists use their analysis of both the bill and the legislator’s district-
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level politics as part of information tailoring. Analyzing a legislative district in relation to a 
particular issue or bill, then, is an important policy practice skill. Having students assess the 
ways different bills might affect various constituents in a legislative district complements 
exercises in bill analysis. Such information could also be of substantive value to legislators and 
their professional staff in states with limited staff support and/or a high volume of bills to 
analyze for their district-level impact.  This approach mirrors that of Sundet and Kelly (2002), 
but instead of presenting a policy analysis brief to a legislative committee, students would be 
presenting a bill analysis which includes identificat on of district constituent stakeholder impact 
information, similar to the political analysis expert lobbyists in this study conducted.  
Ritter (2013) mentions the use of argumentation as part of skill development associated 
with giving legislative testimony. It is unclear the extent to which students are also obliged to 
identify arguments (and corresponding rebuttals) of opposition arguments which might actually 
hold sway at a specific state capitol. Doing so could be a way of mirroring both the knowledge 
gathering and argumentation practices expert lobbyists use. Additionally, students could be 
encouraged to utilize internet resources to understand a state policy. Assignments could also 
include using the internet for intelligence gathering about policymakers, as expert lobbyists do 
for newly elected officials. Combined with argumentation exercises, social work students could 
be taught argumentation strategies which include tailoring arguments to particular legislators’ 
interests and priorities, as well as their district politics. 
The process of tailoring information sharing is notwholly incongruent with how social 
work students and others currently communicate withdecision makers. So, another way study 
findings can inform social work education is in their application to non-policy specialization 
social work curricula. Tailoring can be taught to clini al or administrative social work students, 
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as a tool for influencing other types of policy decision makers like supervisors, agency leaders, 
etc. As such, students can be helped to expand what is seen as “policy practice.”  
Public health legislative advocacy curriculum implications. Post-secondary and 
graduate public health programs sometimes offer couses on state legislative advocacy. Study 
findings could complement such curricula. Specifically, the tailored information sharing decision 
model and corresponding knowledge types can be used to help public health students recognize 
what they need to know about a legislator in order to craft even more refined tailored information 
as part of a legislative strategy. Course assignments similar to those for social work macro 
practice students could be used to help public healt  students develop skills and knowledge 
strategies. Study findings pointing to the multiple oints of access lobbyists use to communicate 
information to a legislator, including committee and legislative staff, insider lobbying, and so 
forth, can also draw attention to the systematic approach lobbyists take to affect policy decisions.  
Implications for future research. Findings from this qualitative study represent a good 
beginning for understanding how to share information with legislators and others like expert 
state lobbyists. Findings can also guide future empirical investigation. Specifically, there is a 
need to test the extent to which findings are anomal us or more generally true about lobbyist 
information sharing.  
Lobbying research. Findings about tailored information sharing by expert lobbyists add 
an important dimension to understanding lobbying and information sharing. Research into 
information and lobbying has relied on quantitative m thods to generate descriptions of 
information types. Descriptive studies related to lobbyist information sharing (e.g., Baumgartner, 
Berry, et al., 2009; Nownes & Newmark, 2016) offer important insights into the types of 
information lobbyists might share, as part of federal o  state lobbying efforts. At the same time, 
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those studies are not explicit about how lobbyists u e tailoring to guide their information 
selection and presentation decisions. Moreover, such tudies do not mention the expertise level 
of study participants. At the very least, controlling for level of expertise in future such studies 
might add an additional level of knowledge for understanding informational lobbying.  
Study findings also offer important ways of critically appraising empirical investigations 
concerning lobbying and information, For instance on should be somewhat wary of studies 
which limit how the constructs of both lobbyist and of information sharing are specified. 
Additionally, sharing information with the legislator, their legislative staff, and committee staff 
should be seen as substantively different from sharing information with just the legislator or their 
staff. Studies which do not seek to specify the multiple points of information sharing by lobbyists 
obscure this important feature of strategic communications. 
Findings indicate that informational lobbying includes informing as well as persuasion 
and subsidy strategies. Findings also suggest that lobbyists might be employing informing 
strategies variably. For example, lobbyists may use information to educate legislators primarily 
during pre-legislative phases of their lobbying strategy, as when one participant discussed 
conducting an “education tour” with legislators during the summer to explore a new legislative 
proposal. Empirically testing this observation may support informational lobbying theory 
development. It might also inform how informing strategies serve a distinctive goal within 
legislative strategy.  
It is not clear whether tailoring by lobbyists occurs primarily or solely during the 
legislative process, or also during the pre-legislative phase. That is, do lobbyists tailor the 
information they share even if the bill they are talking about is not fully formed, and still only a 
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legislative proposal? Study findings focus primarily on the legislative phase. Understanding the 
role of information pre-legislatively is an importan  area for inquiry.  
Study findings indicate that tailoring is especially pronounced during persuasion of 
individual legislators for obtaining their vote on a bill. Participants were also thoughtful about 
the kinds and amounts of information they shared when t ey sought to persuade a legislator to 
become a bill sponsor. But whether this reflects tailoring is not clear. Future studies should focus 
on comparing expert lobbyist information sharing approaches with potential bill sponsors. Such 
inquiry should aim to tease out the conditions under which tailoring is more important, if at all.  
Testing the extent to which all state lobbyists tailor their information is important. That 
is, it might be that only expert (experienced) lobbyists or lobbyist in this single state utilize this 
approach. So, future studies should tease out whether or how less experienced lobbyists, those in 
other states, or those with other characteristics use tailoring approaches during information 
sharing. This line of empirical inquiry, on the one hand, can begin to establish the 
generalizability of tailoring among state lobbyists. On the other hand, if such inquiry finds that 
tailoring is used primarily by expert lobbyists, then those findings would be especially valuable 
for preparing learners to be competitive, That is, he latter finding would support the value of 
training social work students and nonprofits in tailored information sharing as a means of 
enhancing their competitiveness in state capitols. 
Public health and tailoring research. Study findings have implications for public health 
research design. Public health tailoring research is used to guide researcher decisions on how to 
help policymakers use health research. Public healt researchers might want to add other factors 
when investigating tailoring. For instance, they could investigate whether tailoring research is 
most useful during pre-legislative phases, or when a bill addressing a health issue is currently 
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under consideration by a state legislature. That is, legislators may need more health research 
information to understand a new or emergent health problem before a legislative session begins. 
In that context, general information rather than tailoring might be more appropriate.  
Bill analysis research. Bill analysis is key knowledge used in information tailoring. 
Lobbyists also use their analysis to influence legislative committee staff bill analyses. Findings 
offer preliminary insights into bill analysis knowledge strategies by experts, but given its 
importance, knowledge about analyzing bills needs to be enhanced. The National Council of 
State Legislatures (NCSL) has informally surveyed state  to examine the extent to which staff 
are trained in creating bill summaries or analyses (NCSL, 2013). NCSL has also provided 
training to legislative staff from various states (A. Andrews, personal communication, 2 March 
2018), but only for state legislative staff.  
Consequently, social workers seeking to develop expert practice skills related to bill 
analysis will require training that may not be readily available. Rigorous empirical investigation 
and training design based on how experts approach bill analysis is an important avenue for 
empirical study. Such inquiry could focus on expert lobbyist practices, or the practices of expert 
legislative staff, trainers working with state legislative staff or caucuses, of others.  
Policy advocacy training design research. Finally, this empirical inquiry was designed 
first and foremost to generate knowledge directly applicable to nonprofit policy advocacy 
training design. The decision model should be further ested for both validity and usability by 
various audiences, including nonprofit administratos.  
Study findings should then be used to create a training prototype, followed by 
implementation and evaluation of its efficacy. Instruc ional design involves development of 
materials and resources needed to support instructors in replicating a training design. Once 
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warranted, the training design should serve as a guide for instructional design. The instructional 
design can then be disseminated to various audiences for training replication. Those audiences 
can include the Council for Social Work Education (CSWE), the Network for Social Work 
Managers (NSWM), the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the YWCA, United 
Way, and others interested in promoting policy change reflecting social work values. 
Conclusions 
Social workers and nonprofit administrators need expert policy practice skills and 
knowledge to be effective advocates of client needs and interests. Nonprofit administrators 
similarly need such training if they are going to be able to compete with other professionally 
trained policy advocates, including lobbyists. Just as nonprofit administrators have a 
responsibility for participating in the policy process, social work educators and others have a 
responsibility to prepare social workers to master policy practice knowledge and skills. 
The Tailored Information Sharing Decision Model can be used for both nonprofit training 
design and to enhance social work macro practice curricula. It can also enhance understanding of 
the micro-dimension of macro practice. The integrative theory of legislative information sharing 
can help students and others recognize the linkages between informational lobbying strategies of 
informing, persuasion, and subsidy, information specificity, and specific outputs professional 
lobbyists use to realize their legislative strategies. Taken together, these findings help advance 
social work policy practice knowledge. 
The impetus for the study was more than intellectual c riosity. It was undertaken to 
address a nagging policy practice question the resea ch r was unable to answer as a social 
worker in the field. At the time, the researcher was the director of a program addressing racism 
and race relations by a nonprofit organization in Columbus, Ohio. As the staff member assigned 
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to the YWCA’s Racial Justice and Public Policy committee, the task was to help build the policy 
advocacy capacity of a brilliant group of volunteers.  
The social worker generated a strategic plan, but it fell far short in its usefulness. It could 
not offer the guidance those dedicated volunteers neded for sharing their information effectively 
with state legislators in the Ohio General Assembly less than half a block away. This study 
suggests some approaches for using information to ifluence state legislator policy decisions.  
Social worker participation in state policy decisions is nothing short of an imperative. 
The study helps unpack expert policy practitioner iformation sharing to affect state policy 
decision making. It thus answers a question asked by a social worker who ran into a policy 
practice knowledge brick wall. The belief is that these findings can help other social work 
practitioners address policy practice questions on how to share information to influence state 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Introductions/demographics: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study about lobbyist expertise. Following a few 
general questions about you and your background, we will be exploring your expertise 
concerning how you share information with legislators, beginning with looking at “war stories”. 
Afterwards, we will talk about the tough decisions you have to make that set you apart from 
novice lobbyists.  
Your information is completely confidential, and you are among 25 lobbyists from at least two 
different states who will be interviewed in this project. I am not going to be asking you to share 
any information about clients, legislators, or other lobbyists. The interview should take about 60 
minutes.  
Do you have any questions for me at this point? 
Informed Consent: [Review informed consent, and obtain necessary permissions.] 
May I record the interview? [If “yes”, have participant check the appropriate boxon 
the consent form, then begin audio recording after obtaining signatures and dates.] 
Background information: 
1. How long have you been a contract lobbyist? 
2. What is your education? 
3. What is your professional background? 
4. How did you become a professional lobbyist? 
5. What do you like most about being a state lobbyist?  
6. Have you worked in other states? If so, which state? 
Optional: 
7. Getting hired: If you wanted to hire someone else to work with you, what qualities, 
characteristics, and skills do you see as pre-requisite to being hired by you? 
8. What skills can only be developed “on the job”? 
9. What knowledge can only be developed “on the job”? 
ACTA 
Overview: I am going to ask you to respond to a couple of different scenarios. I’ll start off by 
having you talk about a recent example of when you shared information with a legislator, just to 
get a general sense of how experts do that. Then, I’ll examine with you the kinds of information 
you needed during different steps of the information sharing process. Finally, we’ll explore what 





[The task diagram is optional when ACTA follows the CDM. Employ task diagram if routine 
steps or sequences have not been identified earlier in CDM] 
1. [Identify the incident:] Think about a particular case that took place in the past two years, 
where your effort to share information with a legislator was successful. 
2. What were the main steps in that experience?  
[Draw and label these (as a “task diagram”), large enough to be seen by subject; 8.5x17 
paper, or dry erase board] 
a. What information did you use during each step?  
b. What information did you need, but didn’t have at the ime, that would have 
helped?  
c. What did you need to be aware of? 
d. What kinds of things about the policymaker did you pick up on, or know, at this 
step? 
e. How did timing of particular actions play out here? 
 
3. Exploring Options: 
a. What kinds of options did you have at [indicate/name specific step]? [DP] 
b. What was your strategy for choosing one option over th  other(s)? [knowledge] 
i. What are you looking for, in terms of cues, when choosing an option? 
[knowledge] 
c. How might someone with less expertise make mistakes t this step? [knowledge] 
 
4. Which steps do you think take the most mental effort to do correctly or effectively? 
[Cognitive demands] 
What makes them the most difficult? 
Knowledge Audit [breadth of information about information sharing] 
[Ask for examples of incidents and the information or knowledge needed in relation to the 
incident being described.  Use the prompts 1-3 below first. Prompts 4-6 should be used as 
needed. Choose one of the responses to 1-6 for CDM process after Knowledge Audit. The 
example should be chosen based on your judgment that i w s challenging in terms of lobbyist 
knowledge or skill.] 
I am going to ask you to talk about a couple more examples, in brief, of experiences when you 
shared information with a legislator: 
1. Have you had experiences with sharing information where part of a situation 




environment that others didn't catch, which affected your decisions to share 
information? What are some examples? [Noticing] 
What kinds of signals were you picking up on at the time, which a novice 
lobbyist might have missed? 
 
2. What are the ways of working smart or accomplishing more with less—that 
you have found especially useful, when sharing information with a legislator? 
[Working smarter; rules of thumb] 
 How did you discover these ways of working smarter?  
 When would you not use this short-cut? 
 
3. Can you think of a time when you realized that you would need to change the 
way you were sharing information in order to get the job done? [Self-
monitoring] 
What were you picking up on that let you know it was time to change your 
approach? 
What holds back more novice lobbyists from changing their approaches? 
 
4. [Optional] Can you think of an example when you have improvised in sharing 
information, or noticed an opportunity to do something better? [Improvising] 
What’s your strategy for deciding when improvising s appropriate? 
When is it less safe to improvise? 
 
5.  [Optional] Share an example of when knowing the Big Picture was important 
for sharing information with a legislator? What areth  most important 
elements in the Big Picture you have to know and keep track of? [Big Picture] 
What information did you have that helped you get an idea of the Big 
Picture?  
What were you picking up on that a novice might have missed or 
overlooked? 
6. [Optional] If you were going to give someone a scenario to teach them 
humility—that sharing information is a tough job—what would you put into 
that scenario? Did you ever have an experience that taught you humility in 
performing this job? [cognitive demands] (Militello & Hutton, 1998, p. 20).  
 
CDM [depth of information regarding information sharing]: 
[Take an incident identified during 1-6 of the Knowledge Audit, and use CDM to generate more 
depth.] 
Let’s look more closely at the time when you [_____] that we just touched upon. It sounds 
like it was particularly challenging, and your skills and knowledge really made a difference. 




Phase 1: Briefly review the incident:  
Sequences: 
Here’s what I have heard so far: [mirror back what you heard during Knowledge Audit, using 
participant wording, concerning general phases of the event] 
Probes: 
a. Does the order sound right? [check for inconsistencies]  
b. What’s missing here? [eliminate gaps] 
c. What was happening right before, or right after? 
d. How did this turn out, eventually? 
Phase 2: Elaborate Overview of incident structure (id ntifying key events and segments): 
Identify decision points: 
As things were developing, at what points did you ntice you making a major shift in your 
understanding of the situation, or took some action which really affected the outcome? 
 Probes: 
a. What were the turning points, when there were different options, and different 
ways the situation could have gone?  
 
Optional: Create incident diagram [if segments are not already clear]: 
[Sketch out the segments and decision points on the dry rase board or 8.5x17 sheet of 
paper.]  
 
Here is the incident so far. Are these all the points when you had to make a critical decision? 
 
By the way, which points would you say are otherwise pretty routine or typical? [ACTA 
task diagram data, if CDM is being used before ACTA] 
 
Phase 3: Deepening (participant’s point of view, especially of decision points & knowledge): 
We are going to dig a little deeper into some of the decision points now. 
At point X, …  
Probes: 
1. What were you seeing/hearing/noticing/picking up on? [noticing; perceptions] 
2. What were you trying to accomplish or achieve? [goals] 
3. At this point in time, what was most important to accomplish? [goals/priorities] 
4. What information did you use in making this decision or judgment? [knowledge] 




  How did you use that information? [knowledge] 
5. Did this incident remind you of any previous experience? [analogs] 
6. What was confusing, as the process unfolded? [assessment] 
7. What were you uncertain about, if anything, as you s ght to share your information? 
[assessment] 
8. What other options did you consider or were available to you? [options] 
 How was the option chosen, or others rejected? [options] 
 Was there a rule you were following in choosing the option? [options] 
9. What let you know this was the right thing to do? [decision making] 
How long did it take to come to this decision? [decision making] 
10. Did you seek any guidance, or get advice, from anyone? [guidance] 
 What are the rules for getting help or guidance from others? [institutions] 
11. What was the most mentally challenging aspect of this incident? [cognitive demands] 
Phase 4a: “What-if?” [expert versus novice] 
How might a novice have approached this situation, rather than a more experienced lobbyist? 
Probes: 
What might they not have picked up on, or noticed? [perceptions] 
What mistakes might they have made? [assessment, decision making, etc.] 
Phase 4b: “What-if?” [variations in independent variable values] 
Hypotheticals: [Note: The “possible answers list” might be presented to the interviewee as part 
of a Q-sort exercise. Each of the ten possible answers is written on index cards, the cards are 
shuffled and handed to the interviewee to sort. The Interviewee sorts them by ranking each in 
importance, relative to all others, from most to least important.  The ranking can be done by 
placing cards in the shape of a pyramid on a flat surface, with the top row having one answer, the 
next row having two, etc. Additionally, a blank card might be included to represent “other, 
please specify…” if the interviewee wishes to offer another possible answer not already in the 
set, below.] 
 
If    X   had been different, what impact might it have had on your 
decision/assessment/actions/plans? 
 What X can be: 
1. Lobbyist goal: 
a. Sensitize policymaker to issue/problem 
• “Possible answers list” [variations in dependent variables—i.e., the 
“then” part of “if-then”]:  
• Timing of when you shared? 




• Issue frame used? 
• Increasing amount of data/information? 
• Figuring out what the individual needs or wants? 
• Presenting multiple sides? 
• Increasing transparency? 
• Assessing their position?  
• Assessing their priorities?  
• Promoting policymaker uncertainty? 
b. Promote problem definition 
• Possible answers list… 
c. Increase policymaker knowledge 
• Possible answers list… 
d. Enhance relationship with policymaker 
• Possible answers list… 
e. Maintain policy status quo, versus promote change 
• Possible answers list… 
 If policy change: 
  Small change, versus large change 
• Possible answers list… 
2. Legislator characteristic: 
  a. Issue position 
   e.g., Supportive & Uncertain, versus Opposed & Uncertain 
• Possible answers list… 
  b. Level of expertise 
   High versus low  
• Possible answers list… 




• Possible answers list… 
d. Legislator’s future political aspirations: 
 Stay where they are; seek higher office; leave office at end of their term 
• Possible answers list… 
Institutions 
Introduction: This last phase of the interview will focus on how your information sharing 
decisions are affected by factors like state rules, r gulations, and less formal norms. 




How do state lobbying laws or regulations alter or affect your decisions concerning sharing 
information with legislators?  
Sometimes a lobbyist might want to share information with some legislators, but not with others. 
Talk about a time when you made a decision to share information with some legislators, but not 
others.  
Probes: 
• What’s the advantage of sharing your information selectively? What are the risks, if 
any? [payoff rules] 
• What are the general rules concerning who gets the information? [information rules] 
 Committee chair, versus committee member 
At other times, a lobbyist might want to share information sooner with one legislator, and later 
with another. Talk about a time when you shared information with one legislator earlier than 
with another.  
Probes: 
• What’s the advantage of sharing information with legislators at different points in 
time? What are the risks, if any? [payoff rules] 
• What are the general rules affecting timing? [information rules] 
re Lobbyists: 
Talk about a time when you worked with other lobbyists when making decisions about sharing 
information.  
 Probes:  
• Is coordinating information sharing with other lobbyists okay? When? What are the 
advantages? [payoff rules] 
• What are the do’s and don’ts when working with other lobbyists around information 
sharing?  [information rules] 
 
What is considered permissible among lobbyists when working with other lobbyists?  
 Probes: 
• Asking each other for relevant information about a policymaker (e.g., issue position, 
background, etc). 
Never Sometimes Always 
 If sometimes, when and when not? 
• Asking who has relevant information about an issue 
Never Sometimes Always 




• Developing each other’s ideas or arguments  
Never Sometimes Always 
 If sometimes, when and when not? 
• Asking about past experiences with another lobbyist or organization (good and bad) 
Never Sometimes Always 
 If sometimes, when and when not? 
• Strategizing around an issue  
Never Sometimes Always 
 If sometimes, when and when not? 
 
What is “off limits” to talk about, if anything? 
What happens to lobbyists who mess up or violate these informal rules? 
Getting referrals to other Experts: 
I would like to talk to other expert lobbyists who also have war stories to share. Who 
would you recommend I talk with in the future?  
 Name:______________ 
If you were working on an issue for a client, what’s the name of another lobbyist who 
you would hate to hear was working for the other side, because of their expertise? 
Name? ______________ 
Next steps: 
Thanks so much for your time and willingness to share your stories. I will be transcribing the 
interview next. I might like to touch base with you as I go along and analyze the data, just to 
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